V. A. MELYANTSEV

Doctor of Economics

Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University

Keywords: global economy, developed and developing countries, slowing economic growth, physical and human capital, information technologies, debt, inequality

The global economy, which has generally modernized relatively rapidly over the past two centuries, appears to have entered a prolonged phase of decaying growth. What are the causes of this phenomenon and what are its consequences? To what extent has this "new normal" reached both developed countries (WGS) and developing countries (PCs)?

Despite the significant acceleration of technological, socio-economic, and institutional changes in ^the world1, the rate of investment in physical and human capital has increased many times (from 3-4% of GDP in 1000-1800 to 12-14% in 1800-1950 and 38% in 1950-2015, including by RG - from 4-6% to 17% and 41-42% and PC - from 2-3% to 8-9% and 33% of GDP)², the growth of the global flow of goods, services, and finance (from 55% of GDP in 1975-1984 to 175% in 2005-2014) ³, the multiplication of total computer power since the mid-1950s. ~ by a factor of ⁴ trillion (!), there has been a significant slowdown in global economic dynamics in recent decades.

THE PARADOX OF A LONG-TERM SLOWDOWN IN GROWTH

Average Annual Growth Rate (SGTP) GDP per capita, which increased, in general, on the planet from almost zero - in 1000-1800 to 0.6-0.7% - in 1800-1950 and 2.8% - in 1950-1980, decreased in 1980-2015 by more than a quarter - to 2% (in the WG almost twice - up to 1.7%).

GTP of the human development index, which, as a whole, increased worldwide from 0.1% in 1000-1800 to 0.7 - 0.8% in 1800-1950 and 1.8 - 1.9% in 1950-1980. (in the RG - up to 1.6% and PC - up to 2.4%), decreased in 1980-2015 by a third - up to 1.2% (in the RG - up to 0.9 - 1.0% and PC - up to 1.5 - 1.6%).

Total factor productivity (TFP), which increased globally from almost zero to 0.4 - 0.5%, respectively (0.7 - 0.8% in the WG, 0.1 - 0.3% in the PC) and 2.0% (2.5% in the WG, up to 1.2%), in 1980-2015 it was halved - to 1.0-1.1% (both for the WG and PC) ⁵.

THE SITUATION IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Although it is possible that a number of positive effects of the spread of scientific and technological progress (STP), including ICTs, are not taken into account in the current systems of national accounts of WG ⁶, nevertheless, the phenomenon of a long-term slowdown in the dynamics of their GDP, which arose even before the "great recession" of the late 2000s, is quite real. Calculations show that it is caused not only by the loss of the global demographic dividend, the exhaustion of the effect of intersectoral overflow of labor and capital resources, the achievement of a certain limit in increasing the rate of total investment, and a noticeable loss by developed countries developing in a number of components of total production costs. The slowdown in growth in the Russian Regions is due to the implementation of an inefficient model of capitalism in them in recent decades, based on the rapid growth of the economy's excessive financialization, its debt and inequality, which sharply slowed down the growth of the real sector of their economy. ⁷

Even without taking into account derivatives, the volume of financial assets to GDP, which has increased 2 - 2.5 times in the world as a whole over the past 30 - 35 years, exceeded, according to our calculations, the critical " plan-

Graph 1. Relationship between financial depth (lower scale) and average annual GDP growth rate (vertical scale), % (for the ten largest economies in the world for the period 2000-2014).

Note: 1. The indicator of financial depth is obtained by dividing the sum of loans issued to the real sector of the economy and the sum of the value of equity securities by GDP (in %). 2. R ² - coefficient of determination.

Graph. 1 - 5 рассчитаны по: World DataBank (http://databank.worldbank.org.); IMF Data (http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm); UNCTADstat (http://unctadstat.unctad.org); OECD.StatExtracts (http://stats.oecd.org); UNDP.Data (http://hdr.undp.org/en/data); Maddison A. Contours of the World Economy, 1 - 2030 AD. Oxford, 2007. P. 376 - 383.

1). Financialization of the global economy in recent decades and credit pumping as a means of treating it (both in the WG and in a number of PCs) As a result of the prolonged crisis of 2008 - 2009, the total amount of outstanding debt attributed to GDP, which in 1980-2015 grew at a rate 3 to 4 times higher than in the 1950s and 1980s, doubled, reaching about three times its size. On average, in the WG, the indicator under consideration, having increased over the first 15 years of the current century by an amount equivalent to 3/4 of their GDP, has reached a level that, according to many estimates, threatens the normal functioning of their economy -350-360% (in Japan, it has reached-five times the volume of GDP).

Although some growth of inequality, particularly in income, from a low level is not harmful to GDP growth, as calculations show, its significant and rapid increase can be counterproductive, creating "demand" and other constraints on its growth. On average, the share of the richest 1% of the population in its total income has increased by more than 3/5 (from 7-9% to 12-14%) over the last third of the century ^.8

We emphasize that developed countries, despite all the existing problems that have arisen since the beginning of the "great recession", have, on the whole, powerful economies. Although the share of Western countries and Japan does not exceed 1/7 of the world's population, they account for 2/3 of the world's knowledge-intensive trade, economic, financial and information flows in the world, 4/5 of the world's export revenue from the sale of patents and licenses, and 3/4 of the world's wealth.⁹

The United States, whose share in global GDP (in terms of PPP) has halved in the 70 years since World War II and which in 2014 lost the first place in this indicator to China (see graph. 2), accounts for 8 of the 10 most prestigious universities in the world, about 30% of global R & D spending and more than half of global military research spending, 2/3 of the market capitalization of global technology companies, over 3/5 of the most frequently cited publications, most of the Nobel scientific laureates ¹⁰.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: RAPID BUT CONTROVERSIAL GROWTH

Overall, a noticeable acceleration of the SGTP of per capita GDP in PC

Chart 2. Top ten largest countries in the world.

WBR Note: - Great Britain, INDUS - India, INZ-Indonesia, FR-France, YAP-Japan.

(from 1.5-1.6% in the 1980s to 2.1% in the 1990s and 4.1% in 2000-2015) was mainly determined by the success of a number of Asian new industrial economies (the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand) and large Asian states with considerable comparative and economic advantages. dynamic competitive advantages (China, India, Indonesia).

The share of PC in world GDP growth has increased significantly - from a little more than 1/4 in 1800-1950 to almost 2/5 in the 1950s-1980s, and more than 1/2 and 3/4, respectively, in the 1990s and 2000s-2015. In general, for the countries of East and South Asia, the indicator increased from 22-23% in the 1980s to 33-34% in the 1990s and 55-57% in 2000-2015 (including the PRC, respectively, 11-12%, 18-20 and 27-29%).

These achievements are largely related to the activation of foreign economic relations. The share of PC TNCs in the Fortune 500, which increased 5-fold in 2000-2015, has already exceeded a quarter of ¹¹. In 1980-2015, PC's share increased 3-fold in global FDI inflows (~ 3/5) and 1.5-fold in world exports of goods and services (~ 1/2). In both cases, this was 2/3 due to Asian PCs and NIS. And the rate of Asian intra-continental trade integration has more than doubled in a quarter of a century , from 25% in 1990 to ^{54% in 2013.12}

The strength of rising Asian economies can be illustrated by the following calculations. Chinese GDP growth in 2000-2015 it turned out to be more than that of India, the United States, Russia, Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria combined. In terms of the achieved output of the industrial sector of the economy (according to 2011 PPP), in 2015, China surpassed the combined indicator of the United States, India, Japan and Germany.

In China in 2013, absolute R & D expenditures calculated according to PPP exceeded the figure for the Russian Federation by 11.7 times and turned out to be equal to the combined indicator of Japan, Germany and the Republic of Korea, and increased in 2007-2013 from 1/3 to almost 3/4 of the level of the United States.

China has become a world leader in the" production " of patents (although their quality is lower than in the Russian Federation) and more than the United States, "produces" doctors of science in natural sciences and engineering. At the same time, its share in the total number of world scientific publications, which doubled in 2008-2014 to 20.2%, exceeded the figure for the Russian Federation by 9 times and is rapidly catching up with the United States (from 35 to 80%, respectively)¹³.

Although China still lags 4-6 times behind major countries in terms of the level of robot armament employed in the manufacturing industry, it is estimated that by 2017 it will become the world's leader in the total number of industrial robots.¹⁴

The share of PCs in the total computing power of the world's top ten supercomputers reached a third at the end of 2015. The performance of the Chinese giant Tianhe-2 (33.9 petaflops*) is almost equal to the total power of two American supergiants (Titan and

* Petaflops - a unit of supercomputer performance. It is equal to ^10-15 (quadrillion) operations per second. The Chinese computer "world champion" is almost 19 times more productive than the most powerful Russian supercomputer (Lomonosov-2, Lomonosov Moscow State University, 1.8 petaflops, at the end of 2015 - 36th place in the world). This is serious information to think about. If we want to be a strong, respected country, we need to dramatically change our development priorities, finding ways and mechanisms to significantly strengthen our scientific and technological power. See: Tor500 List. 2015. November - http://www.top500.org/lists/2015/ll

Graph 3. Dynamics of the relative (A) and absolute (B) GDP gap per capita between the WG and the PC.

Note: 1. Relative gap - a multiple of the division of the RG indicator by the PC indicator. The absolute gap is measured in US dollars at 2011 PPP.

2. Developing countries include transition and emerging economies.

Sequoia, 17.6 and 17.2 petaflops) and more than three times higher than the Japanese supercomputer (K computer, 10.5 petaflops, world rating N 4).

For a number of countries that implemented pragmatic reforms and generally balanced macroeconomic policies, managed to increase the rate of accumulation and diversify exports, it is characteristic that their international competitiveness ratings according to the WEF version were (for Malaysia, Thailand, India, China, Indonesia, Vietnam) dozens of positions higher than the trend generated by the logarithm of their per capita income^..

According to the model calculated by us for ¹⁸ large RGS and PCs for 2000-201516, the overall higher SGTP of per capita GDP in the second group can be explained by about 1/4-1/3 of the average higher rate of accumulation of physical and human capital in ^the PC17, and by 2/3 - 3/4 - relatively higher * significant progress (than in the WG) in implementing pragmatic reforms aimed at increasing (usually from a low level) the degree of economic liberalization.

Summing up the above, we emphasize that if in the 1800-1950s, according to such a complex indicator as the HDI, there was a clearly pronounced trend towards divergence between the RG group and future PCs (the relative gap increased from 1.8 to 3.5 times), then in the future, when the former colonies and dependent countries gained independence and became more or less independent, In general, there is a growing trend towards convergence: the HDI gap narrowed in 1980 to 2.8 and in ²⁰¹⁵ to 2.3.18

At the same time, approximately 3/4 of the population has not taken the path of sustainable catch - up development, and at least four dozen of them are so-called "failed states" with particularly acute problems and underdeveloped institutions.¹⁹

A number of PCs have either already fallen, or in the near future may fall into the so-called "trap" of the average level of development. This often happens when the movement of cheap labor from traditional to modern segments of the economy is reduced, and the existing quality of institutions and the business environment is no longer sufficient to maintain acceptable GDP growth rates for the implementation of the catch-up development strategy.²⁰

Graph 4. Dynamics of the level of aggregate factor productivity (TFP) of leading PCs and RGS in % from the USA and the average ratio of the level of TFP of PCs from RGS, in %.

Note: 1. IN = India.

2. Calculated by the formula: TFP_i/TFP_j= (Y_i/ (L_i^0.65* K_i^0.35)) / (Y_j/ (L_j^0.65* K_J^0.35)), where TFP_i and TFP_j, Y_I and Y_j, L_I and L_j, K_i and K_j.

Accordingly, the levels of SFP, GDP, employment, and fixed capital in the compared country and the United States.

3. The amount of capital is calculated using the continuous inventory method.

The PRC, in particular, is characterized by a rapidly aging population and an increasingly expensive labor force, a significant exhaustion of the effect of its overflow into productive industries, and the inability to further increase the (prohibitively high) rate of capital investment and export quotas.

In general, their GDP growth rates decreased by almost 2/5 from the mid-2000s to 2012-2015 (in India-by more than 1/4, in China-by 1/3, in South Africa-by 2/3, in Brazil and the Russian Federation-by 9/10) ²¹.

Although in the years 1980-2015, the PCs reduced their relative gap in the level of per capita GDP from the RGS as a whole by 1/3, their per capita GDP still does not exceed, on average, 1/4 of the latter. And the absolute gap in per capita GDP grew by 2/3 (see graph 3).

Due to the imperfect (industry-specific, sector-specific, functional) structure of capital accumulation, as a whole, and the poor quality of personnel training, infrastructure, management, and institutions ²², although they have caught up with the RG in terms of TFP, they are still three times behind the latter (see graph. 4) and they are about the same number of times, on average, behind the WG in terms of the contribution of SFP to GDP growth. Within the PC, the average rate of SPF growth varies significantly. But, in general, for them, including the BRICS group, it decreased by 2-4 times in 2010-2014 / 2015-to 0.5-1.0 pp. ²³

The country's problems have been significantly compounded in recent years by the cheapening of exported commodities, the depreciation of national currencies, and the outflow of capital, which in 2015 turned out to be equivalent to 2-3% of their GDP.²⁴ This has exacerbated macroeconomic imbalances. Although the total amount of outstanding debt attributed to GDP in the PC (180-190%) is half that of the WG average, it grew twice as fast in 2000-2015, and in the last seven to eight years it has increased by many tens of percentage points of GDP in countries such as Brazil, Mexico,and the United States. Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia ²⁵.

In the PRC, which tried to overcome the crisis phenomena in the economy by "credit pumping", the total debt increased from 110-120% of GDP in 2000 to 155-165% in 2008 and 280-290% in 2015. 3/4 of its growth was accounted for by corporate debts of state-owned companies, one-third of which have debt in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in the form of loans in three times the value of their assets ²⁶.

In 2008-2015, the volume of non-performing loans in China, attributed to-

the percentage of GDP increased by 2-3 times, reaching at least 15-17% ²⁷. Although China has more than 9 / 10th of all its debt - domestic, restrictions on the movement of capital, a positive balance of payments on current accounts and still a solid stock of foreign exchange reserves, the financial system is becoming less stable.²⁸

In general, the relatively rapid extensive growth of PC over several decades has caused a significant aggravation of environmental problems. Their share in the increase in global carbon dioxide (DU) emissions increased from 1/2 in 1960-1980 to 9/10 in 1980-2010, including India and China - from 1/10 to 3/5. In 2015, the latter's DU emissions were higher than in the US, EU and Japan, combined taken.

By air pollution indicators in the mid-2010s. India ranked 174th and China 176th among the 178 countries surveyed. According to experts, heavy air pollution "cuts" life expectancy by 3 to 6 years for about 3/5 of the population of India and China.²⁹

RISING SOCIAL INEQUALITY

One of the negative consequences and constraints on the country's economic growth has been a significant increase in the so-called level of inequality, including income and wealth, in many of them.

The Gini coefficient* for income distribution in Central Asia on average increased from 0.39 to 0.46 in the 1990s-2000s ³⁰. In China, it increased from 0.29 - 0.3 in 1980-1983 to 0.35 - 0.36 in 1990-1993 and 0.39 in 2000-2003, reaching 0.47 in 2010-2014, according to official data, and -0.55 - 0.61 in sample surveys. ³¹ In 2014, the indicator of multicriteria inequality (according to national statistics) increased from 0.29 - 0.3 in 1980-1983 to 0.35 - 0.36 in 1990-1993 and 0.39 in 2000-2003. income, education, life expectancy) in the middle-income countries of the East and South was 1.6-2.2 times higher, and in the poor - 2.5 - 3 times higher than the average for the Russian Federation.

In 2000-2015, the share of wealth concentrated in the top percentile of the population increased significantly in a number of Eastern and Southern countries: in China-more than twice (from 19 to 39-40%), in the Republic of Korea-one and a half times (from 22-23 to 34%), in the Russian Federation - by a third (from 53 to 70-71%), Taiwan, India and Indonesia - by 2/5 (from 23-24 to 32-33%, from 36-37 to 53% and from 38-39 to 53-54%), Brazil-by 1/5 (from 39-40 to 48%).

Taking into account the Gini coefficients calculated on the basis of data on the distribution of wealth in a number of large industrial and newly industrialized countries (in 2015 in China-0.73, Mexico and the Republic of Korea-0.74-0.76, India, Brazil and Indonesia-0.83-0.85, the Russian Federation-0.91), we can talk about a huge social polarization of their societies. The average Gini index for the distribution of wealth in the seven large PCs (0.80) is higher than in the seven large RGS as a whole (0.71)³².

The very high level of income inequality limits the ability to quickly eliminate poverty. Although the number of the critically poor (daily consumption of less than $1.9 according to 2011 PPP), as a whole, decreased by more than half in the PC in 1981-2012 (mainly due to the PRC), in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) it increased by about the same amount.

The share of the critically poor in the population decreased by more than 3.5 times (from 54-55% to 14-15%). But their total number in the country (850-900 million people) is not much lower than the population of SSA. If the previously underestimated criterion is raised only by a small dollar to $3.1 at 2011 PPP, it turns out that during the period under review, the share of the critically poor, although it has halved, still amounts to a third (in the countries of East and South-East Asia - 1/5, in South Asia-more than 1/2, in the SSA - 2/3), and their number reaches 1.9-2 billion. that's only 1/5 less than in the early 1980s.

PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES ARE NOT INEVITABLE, BUT THEY ARE LIKELY

In summary, we emphasize that, despite the progress made in the world in the last third of the century in the accumulation of capital, the development of technology and foreign economic relations, the resulting imbalances caused a significant slowdown in the growth of the global economy. At the same time, several dozen (less than a quarter) developing countries that have managed to implement pragmatic reforms that have improved the quality of institutions and investment rates, as well as take advantage of the offshorization of businesses from Russia, have generally made considerable progress on the path of catch-up development and, until recently, have relatively steadily increased their contribution to the global economy.

However, Western countries and Japan, losing a number of positions, continue to remain at the forefront in the field of science and technology. Although over the past quarter of a century, their share among

* Gini coefficient-an indicator of the degree of inequality in the distribution of income, consumption, and wealth. It varies from 0 to 1. The closer to 1, the less uniform the distribution.

The world's top 500 companies have declined by almost a quarter (from 95% to 74%), and they still have over 2/3 of the global corporate profits. RG TNCs, squeezed by PC partners in the labor-and capital-intensive segments of the global economy, began to receive twice as much of their profits (1/6 in 1999 and 1/3 in 2014/2015) in the field of idea production33.

Despite advances in ICT (in 2000-2015, mobile phone penetration or coverage increased from 10% to 97% in the world, and from 7% to 43% on the Internet), the digital divide between mobile phones and PCs is significant. In 2015, 81% of the population had access to the "network" in the WG, ³⁴% in the PC, and only 7% in the least developed countries34.

The impact of new ICTs is highly controversial. In addition to the obvious advantages (in 2000-2014, their contribution to GDP growth in the RG was estimated at at least 1/3, in the PC - at 1/5 ³⁵), there are also considerable disadvantages. Technology has become relatively cheaper. Investing in a robot pays off, on average, in less than 2 years.

While in the RG, as a result of the spread of labor - saving production technologies, about half of the employees are at risk of losing their jobs in the next 10 to 15 years, in the PC - 2/3 - 3/4 (69% - in India, 77% - in China and 85% - in Ethiopia).³⁶. TNCs have started de-offshorization and are actively automating technological processes, shortening production chains and moving factories closer to the large and extensive markets of the Russian Federation.

In recent years, companies have begun to lose important competitive advantages associated with the low cost of labor and solid revenues from exports in the past of relatively more expensive raw materials, including energy, which, along with such factors as relatively low (in most of them)consumption of raw materials. the quality of infrastructure, labor, investment climate, management and institutions has caused a slowdown in their economic growth.

Under these conditions, it seems that few countries, especially East Asian ones, will be able to adapt relatively quickly, where the standards of public administration are higher, and the basic values are intensive work, discipline and education. In other countries, economic, financial, social and political problems may well worsen in the near future. And if they do not change their policy principles and significantly expand the financial base for development, they will lag behind not only the Russian Federation, but also the rising East Asian countries in a number of its key parameters.

* * *

To overcome the paradoxical (in the context of rapid scientific and technological progress) phenomenon of slowing down global GDP growth and a sharp increase in its instability, ³⁷ in a situation where the effect of credit pumping through the use of monetary policy instruments has already been largely exhausted in the WG and a number of PCs, it is advisable, as it is, in particular, proposed by the UN and a number of other international organizations to activate the mechanisms of so-called inclusive development. In particular, we are talking about a more vigorous application of fiscal policy tools, which are associated not only with better administration at the local, regional and global levels of tax collection (avoiding taxation), but also with a transition to more progressive taxation of both income and assets, the concentration of which is among a few (groups) of people in the United States. The price of RG and PC, literally speaking, began to go off scale. This hinders the expansion of effective demand, as well as the growth of physical and, more importantly, human capital.

It is very important to do this, but, of course, it is not easy, because it seriously affects the interests of the current oligarchic elites both in the RG and PC, to put it mildly, who are not very inclined to significant manifestations of not only altruism, but also reasonable selfishness in the name of common progress.

¹ See: Melyantsev V. A. Vostok i Zapad v vtorom millennii: ekonomika, istoriya i sovremennost ' [East and West in the Second Millennium: Economy, History and Modernity], Moscow, 1996; onka: Long-term trends, Counter-trends and Factors of Economic growth in Developed and Developing countries], Moscow, 2015. Over the past 2-3 centuries, the time gap between a technical invention and its widespread use has decreased by an average of 5-10 times.

² hereafter, unless specifically specified, calculated from sources to graph 1.

³ Compiled and calculated by: Kose A., Ozturk E. A World of Change // The Finance and Development. 2014. Vol. 51. N 3. P. 7.

⁴ A typical smartphone is now 3 million times more powerful and about a thousand times cheaper (adjusted for inflation) than the average computer in the mid-1960s, international Internet traffic is growing at an average annual rate of 38-44%, and knowledge is doubling ten times faster than it did a few centuries ago See: Kose A., Ozturk E. Op. cit.; McKinsey Global Institute. Global Flows in a Digital Age. San Francisco, 2014. p. 4; The world in 2050 / Franklin D., Andrews D., ed. Moscow, 2013. p. 315.

⁵ Compiled and calculated by: Melyantsev V. A. Long-term trends... P. 6 - 15, 18 - 22, 40 - 41, 45 - 49; go to graph 1.

⁶ See: Melyantsev V. A. Vozmozhnosti i ogranicheniya an adequate econometric assessment of the pace, levels and factors of econometric development in Western and Eastern countries / / Proceedings of the scientific and practical conference "Econometric methods in the study of global economic processes", Moscow, 2013, pp. 122-123; Bean Ch. Independent Review of UK Economic Journal. Statistics. L., 2016. P. 83, 106-107.

⁷ See: Melyantsev V. A. Long-term trends... Chapter 2.

⁸ См.: The Economic Report of the President. Washington, D.C., 2016. P. 25.

⁹ Calculated from sources to the graph. 1, and also: McKinsey Global Institute ... P. 9; Credit Suisse. Global Wealth Databook, 2015. Zurich, 2015. P. 143.

¹⁰ See: Goldman Sachs. US Preeminence. New York, 2015. P. 13 - 14,17 - 19.

¹¹ Death and Transfiguration // The Economist. 2015. September 19 - http://www.economist.com/news/business/21665073-golden-age-western-corporation-may-be -coming-end-death-and-transfiguration

¹² Special Report. Business in Asia. How to Keep Roaring // The Economist. 2014. May 31. P. 3.

¹³ Compiled and calculated by: UNESCO. Science Report. Towards 2030. Paris, 2015. P. 26, 36, 624.

¹⁴ См.: Bland B. China's Robot Revolution // The Financial Times. 2016. April 28 - http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/1dbd8c60 - 0cc6 - 11e6-ad80 - 67655613c2d6.html#axzz47bn7iL21

¹⁵ Calculated by: The World Economic Forum. Global Competitiveness Report, 2015 - 2016. Geneva, 2015. P. 7.

¹⁶ Calculated from sources to the graph. 1, and also: The Fraser Institute. Economic Freedom of the World. Vancouver, B.C., 2014. P. 16 - 19.

¹⁷ Without taking into account health care expenditures, which are more likely to serve as a recovery function rather than a human capital building function.

¹⁸ Calculated from sources to Graph 1.

¹⁹ See: Abramova I. O., Fituni L. L., Sapuntsov A. L. "Emerging" and "failed" states in the World economy and Politics, Moscow, 2007; The Fund for Peace. The Fragile States Index 2015 - http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015

²⁰ См.: Aiyar S., Duval R., Puy D., Wu Y., Zhang L. Growth Slowdowns and the Middle-Income Trap. IMF Working Paper N 71. Washington, D.C., 2013.

²¹ Calculated from sources to graph. 1, а также: Wildau G. China: Making the Numbers Add Up // The Financial Times. 2015. September 28 - http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cb446el0 - 6057-lle5 - 97e9 - 7f0bf5e7177b.html#axzz3nPINZfml

²² The average rating on the corruption perception index in the top five PC is 6 times lower than in the top five WG. See: Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index. 2015. Berlin, 2015 - http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#downloads

²³ See: The World Bank. Global Economic Prospects. Washington, D.C., 2016. P. 15, 29.

²⁴ См.: The UN. World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2016. New York, 2016. P. 18.

²⁵ Compiled and calculated by: Kynge J., Wheatley J. Emerging Markets: The Great Unraveling // The Financial Times. 2015. April 1 - http://www.ft.eom/intl/cms/s/0/ddd8caf0-d86a-l1e4-ba53 - 00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3W8JMGJue; Unfamiliar Ways Forward // The Economist. 2016. February 20 -http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21693205-policymakers-rich-economies-need-con sider-some-radical-approaches-tackling-next

²⁶ См.: Fight or Flight // The Economist. 2016. January 16 - http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21688440-chinas-leaders-face-menu -unappealing-exchange-rate-options-fight-or-flight; Wolf M. China's Great Economic Shift Needs to Begin // The Financial Times. 2016. January 19 - http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/564c7490-bb8d-11e5-b151 - 8e15c9a029fb.html#axzz3yEbrFNuQ

²⁷ См.: Dobbs R., Lund S., Woetzel J., Mutafchieva M. Debt and (not Much) Deleveraging. McKinsey Global Institute. February 2015 - http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/Economic_Studies/Debt_and_not_much_deleveraging?ci d=mckgrowth-eml-alt-mgi-mck-oth-1502; Magnus G. China's Debt Reckoning Cannot Be Deferred Indefinitely // The Financial Times. 2016. April 29 - http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ab61044c-0df3 - 11e6-b41f-0beb7e589515.html#axzz47PaEI0wD

²⁸ In the summer of 2015, the stock market of the PRC collapsed by an amount equivalent, according to average estimates, to a quarter of its GDP (See: Pilling D. Beijing Meets Its Match in the Markets // The Financial Times. 2015. July 08 -http://www.ft.eom/intl/cms/s/0/ba9b30de-23e0 - 11e5-bd83 - 71cb60e8f08c.html#axzz3fHZXhA7L

²⁹ Breathe Uneasy // The Economist. 2015. February 7 -http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21642224-air-indians-breathe-dangerously-toxic-breat he-uneasy; Can China Clean Up Fast Enough? // The Economist. 2013. August 10 - http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21583277-worlds-biggest-polluter-going-green-it-ne eds-speed-up-transition-can-china

³⁰ См.: Rhee Ch. Inequality Threatens Asia Growth Miracle // The Financial Times. 2012. May 7 -http://www.ft.eom/intl/cms/s/0/fba71e2c-9607 - 11e1 - 9d9d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1wOBjOVda

³¹ См.: Whyte M. Soaring Income Gap: China in Comparative Perspective // Daedalus, 2014. Spring. Vol. 143. N 2. P. 41; Wil G., Mitchell T. China Income Inequality Among World's Worst // The Financial Times. 2016. January 14 -http://www.ft.eom/intl/cms/s/0/3c521faa-baa6 - 11e5-a7cc-280dfe875e28.html#axzz3yEbrFNuQ

³² Compiled and calculated by: Credit Suisse... 2014. P. 102 - 105, 124 - 125, 150; 2015. P. 101 - 103, 148 - 149, 185.

³³ См.: Death and Transfiguration...

^{Wolf M.} 34 Seven Ways Technology Has Changed Us // The Financial Times. 2016. January 20 - http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/7d9874c0-a25d-lle5 - 8d70 - 42b68cfae6e4.html#axzz3xoruhLId

³⁵ See: The UNDP. Human Development Report, 2015. New York, 2015. P. 8.

³⁶ См.: Frey C., Rahbari E. Technology at Work: How Digital Revolution Is Reshaping the Global Workforce // The VoxEU. 03.25.2016 - http://www.voxeu.org/article/how-digital-revolution-reshaping-global-workforce; Machine Earning // The Economist. 2016. January 30 -http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21689635-jobs-poor-countries-may -be-especially-vulnerable-automation-machine-earning

³⁷ Since the beginning of deregulation of the global economy in the mid-1970s, the number of financial and economic crises per 10 years has increased 4 to 5 times. Calculated by: Chang H. J. Bad Samaritans. The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. N.Y., 2008. P. 87; Rodrik D. The Globalization Paradox. Oxford, 2011. P. 109; Rose A., Ozturk E. Op. cit. P. 9 - 10.

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