Aleksandr Baichorov, professor, Ph.D., former Head of the International Security and Disarmament Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since 1997 - Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Belarus to the EU and since 1998 - Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO.

Decisions of the EU on shaping the Common European Security and Defence Policy

The Constitution of the European Union (EU) - the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on 1 May 1999, did not envisage a common security and defence policy of the EU. An increased interest in this policy in the late 1990s was connected with two major circumstances: NATO operation in Kosovo and a change of Great Britain's negative approach, which having found itself beyond the "Euro" zone, was trying to focus on security and defence issues, thus regaining international positions in shaping the EU strategy. The NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 (operation Allied Force) tangibly demonstrated how big the technological gap between American and European weapons systems was. Exclusively the US Air Force and Navy launched all nighttime shock raids and high-precision weapons strikes. The realisation of the fact of increasing lagging behind the US not just in the defence technology area, but also in mobility and sustainability of the rapid reaction force stimulated the shifts undertaken by the EU that for the first time at the Cologne Summit (in June 1999) decided to reinforce the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (CFSP), envisaged by the Amsterdam Treaty, by a common approach to security and defence. It is at the Cologne meeting of the European Council that decisions were taken not just to strengthen the CFSP, but also the European security and defence policy.

In the EU Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy the Heads of State and Government emphasised:

We are confident that the European Council shall be able to make decisions across the full spectrum of tasks in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management, as covered by the Amsterdam Treaty as "Petersburg missions". To this end, the EU shall have capabilities to accomplish separate (from NATO - A. Baichorov) actions supported by trustworthy combat forces, decision-making tools on their use and readiness to do this in response to international crises without conflicting with NATO actions (Para 1).

We shall develop effective European military capabilities; build up our intelligence, strategic transport and command and control capabilities; make a constant effort to reinforce the defence industrial and technological basis that would be competitive and dynamic (Para 2).

We would develop an effective crisis management system under the authority of the EU, within which both NATO and neutral and non-aligned states could participate in EU-led operations fully and on equal terms. We shall create conditions for European allies and EU partners to participate in this matter to the maximum extent (Para 3).

The WEU has accomplished its mission as an organisation. By the end of 2000 the European Council will decide on the inclusion of major WEU functions in the EU. Different status of the member states regarding collective security guarantees will not be altered. The Alliance will remain the core of the collective defence of EU member states (Para 5). 1

The Cologne European Council entrusted the future EU President (Finnish President M. Achtisaari) with the realisation of concrete activities listed in the Report on Strengthening Common European Security and Defence Policy prepared by the German Presidency (approved by and coordinated with other EU members). The report, in particular, identifies the necessity of a progressive definition of the common defence policy in conformity with Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty. Additionally, it is specified in the Report that the Treaty also envisages a possibility of WEU integration into the EU. The German Presidency Report reminds that already at the 1998 Vienna Meeting of the European Council it was stated that the CFSP should have been supported by trustworthy operational "powers". It welcomes the French-British St. Malo Declaration (04.12.98.), in which Great Britain for the first time at the high level upheld the idea of developing autonomous European defence capabilities. The Washington NATO Summit, as specified in the Report, welcomed a new impetus the Amsterdam Treaty had given to strengthening the common European security and defence policy and confirmed that a stronger European role can help to contribute to the Alliance's vitality

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in the 21 st century. The NATO Summit further emphasised that the CFSP development as provided for by the Amsterdam Treaty would fit into the common security and defence policy within the framework of the Washington Treaty. This process shall lead to a higher level of cooperation, complementarity and synergy.

It is highlighted in the German Presidency Report that the EU goal is to build up the CFSP by means of developing a common European security and defence policy. This development shall not be perceived as an alternative or a parallel line to NATO. According to the Report, the Atlantic Alliance remains the foundation of its members' collective defence. The responsibilities stemming from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Brussels Treaty will in any case be preserved for these treaties' signatories. The policy of the Union shall not have prejudice against specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states.

The report enumerates steps to be made in the foreseeable future for the development of the common European security and defence policy:

Defence ministers will be invited to attend meetings of the European Council if required; The Political and Security Committee will be operating in Brussels on a permanent basis; The EU Military Committee consisting of military representatives will be working out recommendations for the Political and Security Committee; The EU Military Secretariat including the Situational Centre will be set up; Such WEU institutions as the Satellite Centre and the Centre for Security Studies will be used by the EU to collect intelligence data and for strategic planning. All decisions relating to crisis management, in particular, those having military or defence complications, shall be made in accordance with Article 23 of the Amsterdam Treaty, i.e. in all cases member states will maintain the right to decide whether or not they wish to deploy the national forces.

Two kinds of crisis management operations are planned to be carried out under the auspices of the EU: employing NATO potential and recourses and without these. A successful European security and defence policy is considered to envisage:

Possibility for all EU member states including non-allied [to NATO or the WEU] members to participate in EU-led operations to a full extent and on equal terms; Conditions under which non-EU European NATO members could most fully be engaged in EU-led operations maintaining the existing cooperation practice within the WEU; Provision of equal rights for all participants of EU-led operations; Development of effective mutual consultations, cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU; Study of possibilities to engage associated WEU partners - i.e. countries of Central and Eastern Europe - in EU-led operations. 2 The next important step on the way of European security and defence policy development were decisions (conclusions) of the EC Helsinki Summit (10-11.12.1999.). It is stated in its Conclusion 27 that the European Council emphasises that shall create une capacite autonome to decide, and whenever NATO makes a decision not to interfere, to commence and carry out EU-led military operations in response to the international crises. This process, as set out in the Conclusion, will prevent unnecessary duplication and does not envisage establishment of the European army. In Helsinki the EU members pledged to form by 2003 a Rapid Reaction Force comprising 50-60,000 troops, capable to deploy within 60 days and be sustainable for a year to conduct "Petersburg missions", i. e. peacekeeping and relevant operations).

Actually, the first decision right has deliberately been granted to NATO, and only whenever the Alliance decides that it is not worthwhile to get involved in the conflict, the EU will be able to use its Rapid Reaction Force.

Also, a decision was made in Helsinki to set up paramilitary crisis management capabilities (police units, units for combating humanitarian disasters and emergencies, etc.).

In principle crisis management for the EU means getting a capability to utilise the full spectrum of measures, from political - military and non-military - to diplomatic and economic ones. The latter can also fall into positive or negative. In Helsinki four possible scenarios were defined that could become the basis for the use of the EU Rapid Reaction Force: conflict prevention, forced partition of fighting forces, safety provision of the large-scale humanitarian assistance, and civil evacuation.

On 11 May 2000, a EU ad hoc military body (embryo of the Military Committee) conducted its first meeting on the level of the Chiefs of Defence of member states. In his speech at the meeting, "Mister CFSP" of the EU and Secretary General of the Western European Union (WEU) J. Solana announced that the improvement of military capabilities would become the most essential task, and in this matter the Military Committee would play a critical role to provide real progress and not just promises on paper.

Along the same lines, building up of the EU non-military crisis management means is taking place. On 24 May, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament adopted a Resolution calling upon the European Council to give preference to the non-military crisis management means. However, it is noted in this Resolution that the EU should have "military capabilities" making it possible to provide any type of crisis response. The Resolution calls for attaching special attention to the protection of civil population in the course

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of peacekeeping operations and to create European public security force.

At present a certain partition of labour is taking shape, when the European Council (and first of all J. Solana and his staff) deals with the military aspects of crisis management, and the European Commission (and first of all Cris Putten, its member in charge of foreign policy) - with the non- military ones.

At the Feira Summit (Portugal) on 19-20 June 2000, Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy was adopted, in which civil aspects of crisis management were highlighted. 3 In a special addendum thereto the EU heads of state attempted to define modalities of consultations and/or involvement of non-EU NATO states, and the EU prospective members in the EU-led crisis management operations. A separate addendum contains recommendations on the development of EU-NATO relations.

Relations between NATO and the European Union

It might seem strange and even unbelievable, yet there have been no formal relations between NATO and the EU until 2000. To have a clearer picture of the process relating to the formation of NATO position on the EU, one should bear in mind that this position is not formed by the Alliance' leadership. Rather, it is a compromise line elaborated in the headquarters in the course of extensive discussions between 19 member states. Amongst the most principal components of such compromise are the positions of the EU members themselves and the US approach - a country, preserving domineering positions in the NATO military issues.

After J. Solana was elected "Mister CFSP" of the EU in October 1999, he introduced a practice of having informal breakfasts with the new Secretary General of the Alliance George Robertson, where major issues of the two organisations' interaction were discussed.

Finally, in late April 2000, the EU submitted officially a proposal to set up four joint working groups meeting regularly to discuss the following issues:

- Defence capabilities; - Safety issues (exchange of classified documents, physical protection of the facilities, where meetings are held from information leak, etc.); - Transfer of NATO resources to the EU to conduct EU-led operations; - Development of constant agreements to conduct consultations between NATO and the EU. These four working groups will be composed of employees of the new EU bodies, established in March 2000 to pursue European security and defence policy: Political Affairs and Security Challenges Committee, an ad hoc Military Committee and Military Secretariat.

The proposal by the EU also envisaged separate consultations with six European non-EU members of the Alliance (Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary). This suggestion was accepted at the NATO headquarters enthusiastically.

In his statement after the meeting of the NATO Council on the level of Foreign Ministers in Florence on 24 May G. Robertson noted that they all agreed that the Alliance needs a stronger European identity. He wholeheartedly welcomes the steps undertaken by the EU in recent months, aimed at the establishment of structures dealing with defence issues, but what really matters - are the capacities allowing Europe and NATO to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Trust in the EU is at stake. It committed itself to a headline goal (formation of a Rapid Deployment Corps by 2003 - A. Baichorov) and should fulfil these commitments, and NATO is ready to assist in this matter. This is good both for NATO and the EU. We should also see to it that non-EU allies are appropriately involved in this process... 4

It is not by chance that Secretary General of the WEU and "Mister CFSP" of the EU J. Solana partook in the NATO Ministerial in Florence.

In general, EU representatives constantly underscore that they seek neither to conflict nor compete with the NATO role and that they are ready to achieve understanding and support on the part of their NATO allies. The basis for the harmonious and mutually complementing relations between these two organisations has already been laid. Moreover, the prospective EU member states also realise that now matter how successful the European security and defence policy is, it will not comprise mutual defence guarantees and therefore, in their view, will fail to undermine or weaken the logics of their parallel longing for NATO membership.

Also, formation and strengthening of the European security and defence policy can in the end have a positive impact on the traditional NATO aims and approaches. Alyson Bailes, a known expert in international and European security problems, believes that if NATO learns to get on with the EU and respect it as an independent partner, this experience can also facilitate the emergence of mutually reinforcing relations between NATO and other strategic partners and institutions. 5 Attitude of the US towards the European Security and Defence Policy

In a nutshell, this attitude can be characterised with "yes, but" expression. In other words, we support it unless it runs counter the American interests. The level of Washington's concern about negative implications of the European security and defence policy is directly proportional to what significance the EU governments attach to the word "autonomous" (see Conclusion 27 of the Helsinki Summit). Moreover, the most extremist political circles of Washington interpret the European security and defence policy as a direct challenge to political

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goals and leadership of the US. Quite a few American politicians and experts think that France is striving to oust the US from Europe (contrary to sincere declarations by French officials that this is not the case).

The fact that the UK plays the most active part in the European security and defence policy furtherance, on the one hand, encouraged Washington (the British attitude towards Trans-Atlantic links is known to have almost always been compatible with American interests), on the other - causes a certain anxiety as to Tony Blair's possible wish to give something up in Anglo-American relations to get extra points in Europe. On the whole, the fact that the former Secretary General of NATO J. Solana was elected "Mister CFSP" was given a very warm welcome in Washington. Yet who will succeed him? The US Administration would very much want the European security and defence policy formation undergo within the common Trans-Atlantic framework.

On the eve of the US presidential elections in November 2000 two basic approaches of American policy to Europe got outlined. The first one (close to the Democratic Party leaders) being the notion that the best means of sustaining the US position in Europe is strong leadership (including even unilateral actions). The other one (close to the Republican Party leaders) consists in the notion that reduction of the European involvement of the US corresponds to the American interests, which will allow cutting down the burden of expenses and responsibility on the other side of the Atlantic. However, the common feature of both approaches is that it is in the US interests to preserve strong and effective NATO.

One of the most frequent US arguments against an excessive emphasis on the development of the European security and defence policy is a so-called duplication issue. They say Europe should not create what is already available to the US or NATO. This logic can entail, inter alia , certain hindrances of political character. For example, if the EU decides to act autonomously in a violent conflict situation, it will have to use the full spectrum of military means and duplication automatically becomes inevitable. Concurrently, it is hardly possible to imagine a difficult situation without NATO and the US involvement. At the Washington NATO Summit in April 1999 a compromise relating to the reduction of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance was reached: the right of the EU to act but not make decisions autonomously was confirmed. It means, in practical terms, that decisions associated with the European Identity should be considered by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which would decide whether the conflict requires interference of the whole Alliance or it can be left to the EU initiative. Then the EU can make a decision to carry out a military operation with or without use of the NATO assets. In the former case the modalities of the transfer of the Alliance's capabilities to the EU come into force to conduct a purely European operation. Thus, nothing can protect the EU from the use of right to veto by one of the NATO members. According to European analysts' views, a relatively considerable duplication with the US forces is inevitable; it exists from the day NATO was founded and will persist until both the US and Europeans preserve separate national military capabilities. 6

Making use of capabilities and mechanisms of the Alliance and the EAPC, Washington was pursuing a line with regard to the European security and defence policy so that it could:

Underline the necessity of reinforcing Trans-Atlantic and Trans-European ties (i. e. between the EU members and non-members); Caution against differentiation between NATO and EU positions on security issues; Insist on the significance of transparency in the framing of the European security and defence policy; Transfer to the European nations' jurisdiction direct leadership of the operation on the Balkans while concurrently insisting that they remain within the general NATO framework; Clarify that there is no need in the establishment of the "European pillar" outside the Alliance to attach greater significance to Europe in security issues. Washington begins to realise that in order not to find itself a "world policeman without an escort", one should contribute to the development and deployment of defence systems compatible with NATO allies and encourage the European allies to procure and/or develop defence systems adequate to the modern warfare.

Prospects of the European Security and Defence Policy

The EU has completed formation of a single market, "Euro" has been introduced, and a series of complex budgetary problems have been solved (until 2006). All this facilitated coming to the foreground in the EU agenda of the problem relating to the framing of the CFSP and European security and defence policy. The European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission still have to explain to the "broad public" that the establishment of the CFSP is not a concession of sovereignty, but rather its expansion. A single country (Belgium, Austria, or even Germany) is incapable to decisively affect the course of world and pan-European events. Yet its capability to do so drastically goes up through the CFSP. In a sense, the CFSP formation is similar to the introduction of "Euro" in terms of its implications: the emergence of a common European currency entailed not a loss but rather enhancement of sovereignty, since prior to the introduction of "Euro" a single, even large country could not protect its interests from the fluctuations of the currency market for a long time, and now it is possible.

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It would be wrong to ascertain that the commencing CFSP framing process, inter alia , through the search of common approaches to defence and security issues, is a negative reaction of a kind to the US domineering in NATO, or that it is aimed at the creation of a European defence counterbalance to the Alliance. NATO has been and remains the basis of the EU defence.

The development of a common security and defence policy of the EU is linked not as much with the Europeans' wish to act without the US, but rather with the US unwillingness to be involved in every European crisis settlement. It is Washington that has insisted for a long time that the European allies should attach greater significance to security and defence issues, provide more considerable funding for the army, modernise their militaries and so on.

After a few months of misunderstanding and mutual accusations in excessive autonomy and one- sidedness, NATO and the EU find concerted approaches to the incorporation of the European security and defence policy into the general context of the European security architecture. Addressed should be various technical and administrative issues pertaining to the temporary transfer of NATO assets to the EU, to the modalities of decision-making in joint working groups and so on. However, Conclusion 27 of the European Council in Helsinki, which envisages that the EU can be involved in crisis management only unless NATO decides not to get involved, solved a major political problem of division of authority between these two organisations in the field of security. In his opening remarks at the informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Birmingham on 10 October 2000 Lord Robertson could announce with satisfaction that NATO also continues to evolve and adapt to the new circumstances. This largely includes new relations with the EU, when our two organisations operate well together, whereas the EU is creating a force capable of solving peacekeeping missions, if NATO is not involved. 7

Surely, upon gaining military capacities in the form of rapid deployment force capable of conducting two independent large-scale peacekeeping operations simultaneously, the EU will have a higher profile in the international arena and will be able to promote its specific interests both on the European and global level. It will help the EU be prepared to address any crises or conflicts that might occur on its expanding territory or on its periphery. The development of the European security and defence policy also fits very well into the concept of the multipolar world, upheld by Russia.

The General Strategy of the European Union for Russia, endorsed in June 1999, determines cooperation with Russia within the European security and defence policy. It specially notes that the EU will invite Russia to take part in crises management operations, conducted by the EU under the auspices of the WEU. It would be logical to assume that since the EU took on functions of the WEU, then this provision of its General Strategy also remains in force. The EU has also admitted that expansion of its borders in the Northern Baltic region should take place in such a way that would provide for territorial integrity of Russia and, in particular, would open up new advantages for the Kaliningrad oblast', rather than create encumbrances.

It is, of course, inappropriate to consider the first attempts to reinforce the not yet borne European security and defence policy with "capabilities" for crisis management in Europe as transformation of the EU into the military-political union. Alyson Bailes finds the conclusion that the EU is now becoming "militarised" or that it can begin posing a strategic challenge or rivalry to its neighbours an "incorrect interpretation". 8

Most EU members have been solving all their strategic defence and military tasks through NATO. However, resolution of tactical problems pertaining to small European crises management will now become theoretically possible through operations under the EU aegis with the use of the assets of the WEU (being "integrated" into the EU) and/or NATO.

It should be borne in mind that so far the EU member states do not make a single EU policy in the realm of security and defence. The EU policy for the foreseeable future (10-15 years) in this sphere will consist in an intergovernmental compromise subject to pressure on the part of the national interests of the present and future EU members.

1. European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence. - Permanent Delegation of the FRG to NATO, 7 June 1999, para 1, 2, 3, 5.

2. Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence. - Permanent Delegation of the FRG to NATO, 7 June 1999, para 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

3. Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy. - Bulletin Quotidian Europe, 1 July 2000.

4. Statement to the Press by the Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson, Following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Florence, 24 May 2000. - NATO Press & Media, p. 2.

5. Bailes, Alyson. Russia's Place in European Defence. Presentation at the Tel Aviv Conference, 3-5 April 2000, p. 5.

6. Heisbourg, Francois. Defense europeenne: la mise en oeuvre. - Cahiers de Chaillot, No. 42. Institut d'Etudes de Securite, Paris, September 2000, p. 50.

7. Informal Meeting of Defence Ministers. Birmingham, 10 October 2000. Introduction by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General. NATO Press & Media, 10 October 2000.

8. Bailes, Op. cit.

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