It is known that the Polish state in the XVI-XVII centuries was often called the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. True, at first this definition was used as a synonym for the state, but over time, calling Poland the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, they emphasized the fact that the state, along with the king, is governed by the gentry through its own body - the sejm. There were few similar states in Europe at that time, so the Polish state system aroused interest among political writers of that time. The royal title had a long tradition going back to the 11th century, the institution of the Sejm appeared much later, most likely in the 15th century, and only the famous constitution "Nihil novi" of 1505 created a solid foundation for this representative body of the ruling Polish gentry class.
Both of these bodies of state power, especially the fact of their coexistence, have long attracted the interest of both political writers and historians, both former and modern, both Polish and foreign. At the end of the 19th century, Polish historians quite often negatively assessed both the royal power, which they defined as weak, and the activities of the Sejm, accusing it of poor organization and low efficiency. Similar assessments are still found among foreign historians who write about the state system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The purpose of this article is to carefully consider these two state institutions and make a sober, objective assessment of them.
Speaking about the royal power, it should be emphasized that different assessments have long been expressed about it. Thus, Prince L. Gonzaga de Nevers, who wrote in the 16th century, drew particular attention to the fact that the royal power in Poland is strongly limited to the estates. The famous French political writer J. Baudin believed that the oath that the king should take in Poland " cancels, strictly speaking, the power of the king and gives him the role of the first official of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth." In his opinion, among the peoples of Europe, the Poles went the farthest in the direction of limiting royal power. Writing in the first half of the 17th century, Ian Barclay, a Scot by birth, and the Frenchman T. Lansius argued that in Poland there is an oligarchic rule that "deprives the king of all power" 1 .
At the same time, however, there was no shortage of opposing assessments, and even the authors cited above were sometimes inconsistent. Thus, the aforementioned Gonzaga finally asserts that the power of the Polish king is " equal to the royal power in France." Italians who lived longer in Poland, especially papal diplomats, were generally convinced that the royal power in Poland was fundamentally strong. Famous Italian political writer J. Bo-
1 S. Kot. Rzeczpospolita Polska w literaturze politycznej Zachodu. Krakow. 1919, str. 26, 50, 104.
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Thero was quite right in saying that in Poland "the king has as much power as his own resourcefulness and intelligence give him." 2
This is also the case with the estimates given by historians in the XIX-XX centuries. Of course, historians are greatly influenced by their political views. Thus, the conservative M. Bobrzynski, a supporter of strong power, saw the royal power in Poland as weak3 . Historians of the democratic trend, while recognizing that the Polish king was not an absolute ruler, believe, however, that he had a stronger power than is commonly believed. The opinions of historians of this camp were summed up to some extent by the outstanding Polish historian V. Konopczynski, who wrote in his fundamental "History of Poland of Modern Times" even before the Second World War: "It was said that a nobleman owed the king only 2 kopecks from the lana [ ... ], service in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (militia) inside the country and a title on the territory of a court summons. However, we should not conclude from this that the royal power in Poland is weak. " 4
Even if we talk about the XVI and XVII centuries, we should not lose sight of the fact that during this relatively short period, the amount of royal power changed. In the time of Jan III of Sobieski (1674-1696), it was different from the reign of Sigismund I Jagiellon, called the Old One (1506-1548). These changes were not so much the result of newly adopted laws as the result of changes in social and economic relations. Without being able to describe here the history of the weakening of this power, we will necessarily confine ourselves to describing the monarchical power in Poland at a time when the laws rather noticeably limited it, but when it itself was not yet in a state of decline. So, we will describe the power of the Polish kings in the period between 1573, when the "Henryk Articles" introduced significant restrictions on this power, and 1648, when external and partly internal factors seriously contributed to its further weakening. It is widely known that from 1648 to 1660, a period of internal strife and severe wars with other countries continued, as a result of which the very existence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was at some point threatened.
Starting to consider the meaning and prerogatives of the royal power, it should be remembered that even at the end of the Middle Ages there was a belief in the sovereignty, complete independence of the power of the Polish king as an essential feature of it. It's Already Me. Ostrorog, a political writer of the 15th century, states: "rex non recongnoscit superiorem "(the king does not recognize a sovereign over himself).5 Then, in the first half of the sixteenth century, Subchancellor Tomitsky would say of the royal power: "majestas regia quae condere leges solet "(the royal power that is used to making laws)6 . However, in fact, at the same time, the belief that the power of the monarch is not unlimited is recognized, since after the constitution "Nihil novi" the king could not make laws himself, but had to get the consent of the Sejm. Therefore, another belief is gradually being developed, that it is the law that stands above the king as an expression of the will of the gentry society. This thesis was formulated, for example, by S. Ozhekhovsky, a well-known political writer, who stated in his work "Fidelis subditus, or reflections on the royal rank": "In this kingdom, not a person, but the law orders-
2 Ibid., str. 14, 28.
3 М. Bobrzynski. Dzieje Polski w zarysie. T. II. Krakow. 1881, str. 174.
4 W. Konopczynski. Dzieje Polski nowozytnej. T. I. Warszawa. 1936, str. 383.
5 Z. Kaczmarczyk, B. Lesnodorski. Historia panstwa i prawa Polski. T. II. Warszawa. 1966, str. 111.
6 K. Grzybowski. Teoria reprezentacji w Polsce epoki Odrodzenia. Warszawa. 1959, str. 141.
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and he is the lord. " 7 However, this provision is unlikely to be universally accepted. In any case, this thesis was referred to rather cautiously, and its statement provoked protests from the king. Thus, in the second half of the 17th century, when the ambassador of the Sejm, a certain S. Zamoyski, publicly said: "We have lex regnat non rex" (the law rules, not the king), Jan Kazimir recognized this statement as "impudent and thoughtless", and in the end the marshal of the embassy hut apologized to the king for this trick of the ambassador 8 .
The original authority of the king was certainly weakened by the introduction of the principle of electability of the king as early as the 15th century. However, in this and the following centuries, this principle itself was limited by the fact that, as a rule, the son was chosen after the father or brother after brother. Only the death of the last Jagiellonian, Sigismund Augustus, opened the door wide for the entire gentry to participate in the so-called free choice of the king. This, of course, weakened the position of the Polish king among European monarchs and, although much less, in Poland itself. The szlachta even perceived this as a kind of superiority of the Polish state system over others, that its will, and not chance, decides who should rule in Poland. Foreigners who came to Poland at that time noted with some surprise that the szlachta treated the king with respect at least equal to that with which hereditary rulers were treated in other countries. It cannot, of course, be denied that the king, having offspring and desiring to secure the throne for them, had to take the position of the gentry into account to a greater extent in his undertakings, bearing in mind that the election of his son as king would depend primarily on the opinion of the gentry. Naturally, every ruler dreamed of securing the throne for posterity, while the provisions of the Henrik Articles forbade the king to think about raising a successor to the throne during his lifetime, so that "forever and ever after our death (that is, the king - V. Ch.) and our descendants will be free the choice was left to all the crown estates. " 9 The next provision of the articles that weakened the power and authority of the monarch was the final paragraph, which spoke of the right to refuse obedience to the king. This provision returned to the medieval concepts of a contract between the people and the monarch. I must admit that this question was treated delicately. Thus, it was stipulated that if the king violates existing laws, he thereby releases his subjects "from the obedience and trust due to us", or, more precisely, in such a case, he releases them from this duty in advance.
The right to refuse to obey the monarch if he violated the fundamental rights of his subjects was not unknown in Europe at that time. Such a right existed in Denmark, which was enshrined in the obligations that the king assumed when he ascended the throne (the so-called "Haandfaestning"). It was repeated in successive royal acts throughout the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries .10 In the early years of the Thirty Years ' War, which was, as is well known, a serious attempt to limit the power of the monarch in Germany, there were also voices demanding the introduction of such a clause in the obligations of the monarch .11
The gentry society saw in this prescription a certain kind of guarantee that the king would not try to introduce absolute equality.
7 W. Czaplinski. Dwa sejmy w roku 1652. Wroclaw. 1955, str. 111.9 Ibid.
9 "Artykuly Henrykowskie". Poznan. 1946, str. 5
10 P J Joergensen. Dansk Rethistorie. Kebenhavn. 1947, s. 318.
11 H Sturmberger. Georg Erasmus Tschernembl. Zur Geschichte der Gegen-reformation. Linz. 1953, S. 312.
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the Polish government in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, that in order to protect their rights, the Pole would not have to take up the arms of regicides or rise to the anti-monarchical struggle, as was done in the then absolutist states. Therefore, J. Zamoyski, speaking in the Sejm in 1605, said with a certain pride about the Poles:"We have not heard or read that they stabbed their sovereigns with knives like others; every Polish king died in bed" 12 . A few decades later, as the bourgeois revolution and civil war broke out in England against Charles I, Chancellor Ossolinsky spoke with satisfaction: "When we look at other nations that have established their states on the basis of autocracy, we see what destruction, what horrors, what ugly revolutions there are." 13
Turning to the royal prerogatives, it should be noted that one of the most important was the participation of the king in the creation of new laws. However, as we have already seen, since 1505 the legislation was adopted in Poland by the Sejm. However, the king's participation in the work of the Sejm, of which he was a part, was still very important. Thus, he had the right to convene the Seimas, he primarily had the legislative initiative in his hands, and his presence was a necessary condition for the legitimacy of Seimas meetings starting from the middle of the XVI century. In addition, the laws passed by the Sejm were passed on his behalf as an expression of his and other estates ' will. Was this equivalent to the right of the King to reject the law proposed by the Sejm Chambers, or a kind of royal veto? There is no consensus among historians on this issue. In our opinion, the king could oppose every bill proposed by the Chambers, but he did so in exceptional cases; usually, not wanting to bring matters to serious differences in the state, he gave in to the pressure of the estates.
According to the Henry Articles, the introduction of taxes, the establishment of new duties, the declaration of war, and the conclusion of peace depended on the consent of the estates. These were, of course, regulations that severely restricted the royal power. Despite this, it should be remembered that, for example, in matters of foreign policy, the king decided to take action without waiting for the consent of the estates or assuming to receive it post factum. We can also talk more about the King's personal foreign policy. In this area, the consent of the Senate was often enough to make a decision.
It should also be remembered that the King had in his hands such means of obtaining a majority in the Senate and in the embassy hut as the ability to freely dispose of appointments to public offices, as well as the free distribution of numerous royal estates for temporary use. If we are talking about positions, the king appointed first of all the main state dignitaries at the ministerial level, namely: chancellors, marshals, podskarbikh, hetmans. Since these positions were reserved from the time of the Union of Lublin specifically for the Crown and Lithuania, and each of these dignitaries had their own deputy, the King appointed a total of 16 senior dignitaries. Any one of these places was the object of almost every magnate's desire, for they not only gave an opportunity to influence the course of state affairs, but also provided a considerable income.
It was also entirely in the hands of the King to appoint to positions, so to speak, at the senatorial level, that is, to those that provided the appointee with a place in the upper house of the Sejm - the Senate. If
12 J. Czubek. Pisma polityczne z czasow rokoszu Zebrzydowskiego 1606 - 1608. Т. II. Krakow. 1918, str. 94.
13 L. Kubala. Jerzy Ossolinski. Wyd. II. Warszawa. 1924, str. 146.
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If we are talking about secular senatorial posts of voivodes and castellans, then there were about 150 of them (this number was subject to certain changes). These were positions that were highly respected in the gentry society. Usually they were distributed among magnates or rich gentry. These positions were in principle lifelong: the king could not remove a given person from the position to which he was appointed, except in cases when the magnate was convicted of some crime. He could, however, raise it. It must be remembered that these positions were not equivalent, there was a big difference between the lesser and greater castellans or the voivode. Moreover, even among voivodeships there was a certain gradation, and the voivode of Cracow enjoyed much greater authority than the voivode of any smaller voivodeship, for example, Podolsky or Ravsky. This was of fundamental importance, because by giving someone a senatorial position, if it was not the highest post, the king could promote them higher, or, as we would say now, promote them, and this promotion would depend on the behavior of this senator during the sitting of the Sejm and Senate.
This was also the case with the appointment of bishops in 16 Polish dioceses. It should be emphasized that at that time the rank of bishop had a double meaning. On the one hand, he was a high ecclesiastical dignitary, who had a large contingent of priests, preachers, and teachers - spiritual mentors of the gentry. On the other hand, in most cases the bishop was the administrator of sometimes very extensive episcopal estates, managed not by priests, but by the gentry, thereby financially dependent on this bishop. Bishops were also known to sit in the Senate, and even more often than other secular senators, they took part in the sessions of both the Senate and the Sejm. The appointment of bishops, namely the right to choose them, was reserved for the cathedral chapters, but in reality the king indicated the candidate he would like to see in a given episcopal position, the chapter dutifully chose the named one, and the pope almost always approved the election. But the election of a bishop was, in fact, entirely dependent on the king. Here, too, the bishop theoretically occupied a certain episcopal see for life, but usually expected to be promoted to another, more honorable and usually better paid one. Therefore, the king always had the opportunity to attract these important dignitaries to his side. In addition, the bishops generally supported the king's policy at that time, expecting from him in return the support of the Catholic Church and the restriction of the rights of non-believers, who were quite numerous in Poland in the second half of the XVI and first half of the XVII centuries.
Summing up, we can say that, with approximately 180 posts available, the king could, with a reasonably calculated policy, create a solid group of his supporters in the Senate, on which the decision of various issues depended, especially in the period between the sejms, which usually met every two years. 14
The Henry Articles imposed on the King the obligation to keep a group of resident senators with him, as if they were special advisers. Residents were automatically selected from the circle of senators, four of whom were required to be constantly with the king, serve as his advice and help in the consideration of state affairs. According to the regulations of the Henrik Articles, the king had no right to do anything "without the advice of the crown advisers of both peoples" (that is, the Crown and Lithuania), moreover, the articles established that the king should not "decide anything by his own power". In these positions
14 Z. Kaczmarczyk, B. Lesnodorski. Op. cit., str. 110 nn.
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old historians saw a serious limitation on the power of the monarch, but forgot, however, about several points. First, these articles were not implemented for more than 30 years after their adoption. Only at the beginning of the 17th century were resident senators appointed in separate seimas. Secondly, resident senators in many cases did not cope with the duties assigned to them and repeatedly simply did not appear at the royal court. Finally, even if all four of the residents came to the king in the capital, given that the Senate was attended by ministers of state, as well as all the former court senators, the king could always suppress the residents ' voices by gathering loyal senators, the so-called regalists, at the court. In addition, it should be emphasized that although the Henry Articles forced the King to submit important state affairs to senators, they did not oblige him to take into account the advice of the majority. After all, the king had to join the opinion of those "who were most inclined to liberties, rights, customs according to the law of each land and the good of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth." The question of whose opinion "leaned towards the liberties and rights of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth" was decided mainly by the king. This could also be the point of view of the minority of sitting senators-councilors .15
Undoubtedly, only the Sejm, a wide circle of representatives of the vast masses of the gentry, seriously limited the royal power. However, even here the king could create a regalist party, using the right to distribute posts and royal estates. The first part of this statement may raise doubts for those who are not very well versed in the issues of the Polish state structure. After all, the highest ministerial and senatorial positions were assigned to a relatively small stratum of magnates and the wealthiest gentry. But we should not forget that in Poland at that time there were quite a large number of titular positions in individual voivodeships, lands, and even municipalities, such as stolniki, podstolii, chashniki, mechniki, voiskie, podchashie, and so on. These offices were numbered in the hundreds in Poland, and it must be remembered that, although they were mostly titular, they were still the object of desire of the gentry, because, as an adjunct to the family name, they played the same role as scientific titles or degrees in our day. The great Polish poet A. Mickiewicz put in the mouth of one of the heroes of the remarkable poem "Pan Tadeusz" the words: "A greyhound without a tail is like a nobleman without a position", - well reflecting in this proverb the opinion prevailing among the gentry. Thus, the nobleman was ready to do a lot for the king, just to decorate his family name with a title associated with any position. These titles were so strongly fused with the gentry surname that very often a person was called not by his last name, but simply by his title.
It is time, finally, to say a few words about the second way to attract both magnates and senators, as well as broad gentry circles, by distributing royal estates and various financial benefits. It should be remembered that the king was the owner of almost one-sixth of the land in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 16 . A huge part of these estates was distributed by the king as a reward to the "well-deserved". The grant, receiving income for life from these estates, was obliged to pay a relatively small amount of money in the form of payment for the army. In most cases, receiving a lifetime lease of such estates provided a magnate or a nobleman with considerable income, not to mention the fact that the grant could still bear the title of headman of the given name.-
15 W. Czaplinski. Senat za Wladyslawa IV. "Studia ku czci Stanislawa Kutrzeby". T. I. Krakow. 1938, str. 81.
16 Z. Kaczmarczyk, B. Lesnodorski. Op. cit.
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research institute. Usually, senators, magnates, and the rich gentry were given such old-class estates (the so-called non-patrimonial ones). However, in addition to these estates, the king also had various other ways to satisfy the greed of the smaller gentry. This included the right to distribute various salt products, enterprises (mills, melting furnaces), and finally extortionate property, which by right, in the absence of legitimate heirs, passed to the disposal of the king.
Thanks to the methods listed above, a quick monarch could create a strong, loyal party in the Sejm. Therefore, as early as 1623, a major magnate, an opponent of the king, wrote to a friend: "The sovereign will overcome everything, everyone follows him, there are only a few who would like to see corrections, but they can't do anything against everyone else." The secret of this state of affairs is revealed by the courtier of K. Radziwill, one of the main Lithuanian magnates and at the same time an opponent of the king, S. Buchinsky, who writes to this prince: "As long as people live in hope of court handouts and are forced to flatter for this reason, I doubt that anyone here can sincerely communicate with Your princely Highness"17 . As we can see, these "court handouts" - various kinds of lucrative grants of estates, pensions, and money-were a way for the court to attract noble ambassadors.
It remains to say a few words about the financial situation of the Polish king. Polish historians have repeatedly emphasized the fact of the low security of the Polish king. In essence, however, this is not true. Indeed, the income of the Polish king can not be compared with the income of, for example, Louis XIV or the Moscow tsars, but for all that, in principle, they were not so small. Prudent kings, such as Stephen Bathory or Sigismund III, were able to cover the expenses of the court from these revenues and even left their successors considerable sums in the treasury. According to the most careful estimates, these revenues reached the sum of one million zlotys, which in the first half of the 17th century was a large sum, especially if the king did not keep too large a court .18 The real concerns of the king began in the end when he behaved extravagantly, like Vladislav IV, or when the state and the whole country experienced serious military complications, as during the reign of Jan Casimir.
This would be the end of the discussion on the subject of royal power. To get a more complete picture, we also recall that even after the creation of the crown tribunal in 1578, the king still took a certain part in the highest-order legal proceedings, and once on the battlefield, he could, if he wanted, take over the supreme command, bypassing the great crown hetman. As a result, despite all the restrictions, the royal power was still quite strong in the first half of the XVII century, which was noticed, however, by attentive foreign observers. Only in the second half of this century, after the collapse of Polish statehood, during the wars with the Cossacks and Sweden, together with the growing importance of magnateria (although it is perhaps incorrect to speak of a magnate oligarchy), the royal power gradually weakened more and more, and the efforts of Jan III Sobieski to suspend this process ended in failure. However, until the mid-seventeenth century, Botero's claim that the king in Poland has as much power as his own wit and resourcefulness give him remains valid.
Speaking of the power of the monarch in Poland, one cannot but say something about the second body of supreme power in the country, namely, the Sejm. Need
17 W. Czaplinski, J. Dlogosz. Zycie codzienne magnatow polskich w XVII w Warszawa. 1976, str. 180.
18 W. Czapliiiski. Wladyslaw IV i jego czasy. Warszawa. 1972, str. 299.
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We must admit that this institution was not recognized, and sometimes even still is not recognized, among both Polish and foreign historians. Too often, both parties look at the Sejm and evaluate it in terms of its later degeneration. According to the seventeenth-century Polish satirist K. Opalinsky, even then the Polish Sejm was the subject of ridicule in Italy, which, however, should not be surprising, since in that century the Italian states were governed mainly by absolutist rulers, who looked with a certain contempt mixed with concern at a class representation with such great power as the Polish one sejm 19 .
When evaluating the Sejm negatively, it is also often forgotten that the Polish Sejm, which emerged in the XV century, existed and operated until the end of the XVIII century, had, in fact, only 50 years of actual and almost absolute degeneration in its 300-year history, from the state of which, however, after 1764 it rose by its own efforts. It is also forgotten that during the heyday of this institution, discussions in the Polish Sejm were more than once better conducted than in other class institutions, and that in assemblies where different views collide, meetings are rarely sensible and calm, as evidenced at least by the history of the European parliaments of the XIX century.
Turning to a more detailed consideration of the organization and activities of the Polish Sejm, it should first of all be emphasized that only the szlachta, who made up only 10% of the population, were represented in it. However, it should again be remembered that during the period of feudalism, the idea of full representation of the entire people was not very popular, and even those who supported its wider representation, as a rule, believed that the poorest strata did not need representation in the estate assembly. Moreover, it must be remembered that the poorer gentry, who sometimes owned a single lan of land without serfs of their own and cultivated the land with their own hands, did not really differ much from the well-to-do peasants in terms of their property status and even their way of life.
As you know, the Sejm consisted of two chambers-the Senate and the embassy hut, usually called estates, and the third estate was the king himself. The weak point of the Sejm was undoubtedly that, although it was usually convened after two years, it met in principle in a different composition each time, since the sejmiks each time chose new ambassadors for the Sejm session. In this regard, the meetings and discussions were attended by people mostly inexperienced, often uninitiated in state affairs. The nobles, however, tried to overcome this weakness by electing as ambassadors at the sejmiks persons who had previously sat on the embassy benches more than once or twice. Therefore, in the first half of the 17th century, we meet experienced people in the embassy hut, with a long parliamentary experience, one might say, veterans of the parliament. An element of well-known stability were senators who, having repeatedly held various positions, sat in the Senate for many years and took part in many seimas. Of course, the second element of stability was the King, who presided over the Chambers for decades. Thus, Sigismund III participated in 37 sejms during his long reign .20
19 K. Opalitiski. Satyry. Wroclaw. 1953, str. 157.
20 For more information about the Sejm, see: S. Kutrzeba. Sejm walnv dawnej Rzeczypospolitej polskiej. Warszawa, b. d.; H. Olszewski. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej epoki oligarchii 1652- 1763. Poznan. 1966; W. Czaplinski. Z problematyki sejmu polskiego w pierwszej polowle XVII Wieku. "Kwartaliiik Historyczny", 1969, N 1, str. 31; W. Konopczynski. Chronologia sejmow polskich 1493 - 1793. "Archiwum Komisji Historycznej PAU" S. 2, t. IV.
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The weak side of the Seimas was that its meetings usually began three months after its convocation. Thus, it was quite a long time before appropriate measures could be taken in urgent cases. In such cases, the more energetic ruler had to make a decision on his own responsibility, and seek the approval of the Sejm later.
It should also be emphasized that the method of holding meetings in the Polish Parliament was clear and logical. What was to be discussed at the next Sejm, the nobles learned at the sejmics from the so-called royal legations, that is, the king's message delivered by the royal messenger at the opening of the provincial sejmik. Thus, the discussions at the sejmics, which were attended by thousands of Polish nobles, focused mainly on the issues proposed by the king. There were more than 60 such sejmiks in Poland, and since about 40 people participated in each of them on average, it can be assumed that more than 3 thousand nobles took a certain position on these proposals.
The ambassadors chosen by the nobility at the sejmiks received instructions from them, in which they were instructed to take one or another position in relation to the royal proposals, and also contained special wishes of this sejmik. Many times in the historical literature, opinions were expressed that the instructions decisively obliged the ambassadors and thus tied their hands. However, some historians have questioned these claims. More recently, a scrupulous researcher of the history of the Polish Sejm stated :" We were not able to find in the instructions themselves - until the end of Saxon times - a statement or recognition that the ambassador's action, contrary to the instructions, was lawless." And then: "Wasn't the ambassador's responsibility just a political responsibility?"21 . Based on my personal study of the history of the Sejms of the first half of the 17th century, I should note that the same conclusions can be reached by studying the history of the sejms of an earlier period.
The next stage of discussion of the king's proposals was already held in the Sejm, most often in Warsaw or Krakow castle. After the divine service and the selection of the marshal of the embassy hut, at the first meeting, the Chancellor or subchancellor presented the king's proposals, as we would now say, in a throne speech, in which they sometimes repeated verbatim the royal proposals and their motivation set out in the royal legation mentioned above to the Sejmiks. Naturally, if necessary, the chancellor supplemented the list of royal proposals.
Then the senators took the floor, expressing the so-called votes. For the ambassadors who arrived, often from the deep provinces, these speeches were like an introduction to the difficult and sometimes confusing problems of domestic and foreign policy, an instruction in how to deal with them, since these speeches were delivered by senators who were at court or kept up a constant correspondence with the king, or by the highest state dignitaries. Of course, among these speeches there were also empty, worthless speeches designed for oratorical effect, often with difficulty masking the lack of deep thoughts or oratory. But where do they not make such speeches? The main thing was that from these speeches, deputies could learn the opinion of wise people who were well-versed in state issues. Therefore, the ambassadors listened attentively and with interest to the speeches of such senators. This is all the more understandable because, as we know from the example of some speeches, the texts of which have come down to our days, these were sometimes speeches by people of outstanding oratorical talent, works of art. ,
21 H. Olszewski. Op. cit., str. 117.
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which are still being read with interest. Of course, in the second half of the 17th century, along with the decline of political and intellectual culture after the mid-century wars, the number of weak and empty speeches increased.
The main discussions of the king's proposals were held, as is well known, in the embassy hut, which met separately or, which was relatively rare, together with the Senate. Of course, the weak side of these meetings was that due to the lack of clear rules of procedure, their course and harmony depended on the personality of the marshal of the embassy hut. Reading the Sejm diaries, one is sometimes under the impression that an intelligent and in the parliamentary sense experienced marshal of the embassy hut was able to impose on it a clear and reasonable course of discussion. Undoubtedly, a certain weakness of the Polish Sejm was that the course of its meetings ultimately depended on the personality of the marshal, who was not always a person of the appropriate level, in short, the exact rules of procedure for meetings were not developed. Nevertheless, the Seimas ' meetings were usually clear-cut. The Polish Sejm avoided the inconvenient system of holding meetings between chambers by exchanging letters, as was customary in German estate representations. Discussions were held orally and, if necessary, in joint sessions .draft laws, as they were then called, "constitutions", were submitted at the end to the three estates of the Sejm for final approval. The "constitution" came into force only when both houses, as well as the King, approved it.
Seimas ambassadors also realized early on that some issues were better resolved in commissions created mainly for the consideration of certain issues and consisting of representatives of the embassy's hut and the Senate. Then these commissions passed the approved projects to the meeting of the embassy hut. These commissions often included experts on certain issues, which made their discussions more fruitful. Sometimes they decided certain issues, so to speak, in a neighboring composition, calling provincial sessions from all the ambassadors of the voivodeships of one province, for example, Greater Poland, Lesser Poland or Lithuania. These sessions were held on issues that primarily affected individual provinces, but sometimes it was considered that some common problems could be discussed in the circle of ambassadors of voivodeships that were closely connected due to their neighborhood or long-standing traditions. Of course, these sessions also served to streamline discussions.
Now we need to address the most important problem, namely, the method of approving laws. As you know, the Polish Sejm has adopted the custom of approving laws unanimously, while preserving the right of the minority to resist the law and disrupt its approval. This became the basis of the very pernicious liberum veto law adopted later, as well as the custom that a protest against one law led to the annulment of all laws previously approved by this Seimas.
Turning to this question, we should first get acquainted with the statistics of Polish sejms in the second half of the XVI and first half of the XVII centuries. So, in 1550-1600, out of 40 seimas convened, 9 seimas, or 22%, failed due to minority protests. Over the next 50 years, out of 46 seimas, 6 seimas dispersed without success, or the share of unsuccessful seimas was then only 13%. It should be recalled that, in addition, this was the period when the well-known Sandomierz rokosh occurred, sometimes called the Zebrzydowski rokosh, that is, the turmoil that contributed to the disruption of the sejms. Only in the second half of the 17th century did the number of failed seimas increase to 35%.
This juxtaposition alone should be thought provoking. Is it really not too disciplined at the time under review-
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perhaps the rather individualistic gentry showed such unity of views that out of 86 sejms, 71 could end with complete unanimity? What, however, was the secret of such a successful completion of the sejms? The answer is relatively simple. Theoretically, the mandatory principle of unanimity was not strictly observed at that time. More than once, using various methods, the Seimas persuaded the small opposition not to openly protest against the decisions taken. Similarly, when opponents weren't too stubborn, their protests were simply ignored. Therefore, in the diaries of the sejms written by agents of the city of Gdansk, it was often noted with some surprise that some "constitution" was adopted, " although there was no general agreement on this." The king's authority played a significant role here, sometimes directly warning opponents that with a majority of ambassadors, he would approve the "constitution" even without their consent. Only in cases when the matter was too serious and the number of opponents was as large as the weight and their positions, the Sejm conceded, but even then this did not always mean that the Sejm was disrupted. Most often, in such cases, they were limited to breaking the act with the draft "constitution" and moving on to making decisions against which there were no protests. The Sejm was thwarted only when a substantial minority simply wanted it to .the diet ended in nothing, thus forcing the king to pursue a different policy than before. Previously, it was considered, strictly speaking,that the first case of liberum veto, or disruption of the Sejm by one person, took place already in 1639. However, it is enough to look more closely at the diaries of this Sejm to make sure that this was not the case. The first case of failure of the Sejm by one person occurred, as has long been established,in 1652.
It should be emphasized here, however, that voices seeking respect for individual protests have been heard before. For some explanation of them, we can only cite what was mentioned above, namely, that the king, through the distribution of posts and state estates, could, in fact, always secure a majority of the ambassadorial votes. In this regard, there was a fear among the gentry that if they did not respect the protest of the minority, the king would open the way to strengthen his power and even to secure absolute power in the state. And this the Polish gentry feared like fire.
We have come to the end of our discussion. Our task was not to praise the power of the monarch in Poland or the Polish Sejm. We would just like to point out that when evaluating these two institutions, one-sided and too peremptory judgments should be avoided.
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