The Normans came from Normandy, a duchy founded by the Viking leader Rollo in 911 and which lasted until 1204. Norman dukes found it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to keep their knights from traveling outside of Normandy. William the Conqueror said with regret of one such knight that he had to take away his lands because he went to Spain without his permission: "I don't think you could find a better knight in the army, but he is fickle, extravagant, and spends all his time scouring different countries." (cit. by: [Petit-Dutailly, 2001, p. 54]). By the end of the eleventh century, the Normans had taken over Southern Italy, England, and Sicily, and were attempting to establish themselves in Asia Minor.

The study of the Norman presence in Asia Minor has a long tradition in foreign historiography. In the XVIII century. Edward Gibbon, in his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, noted the great role of Norman mercenaries in Byzantium. He argued that they had the "ambition and common sense" not to abandon the conquest of Southern Italy for Asia Minor in the middle of the XI century, as the Byzantine emperors sought, who hoped to stop the expansion of the Seljuk Turks with their help (Gibbon, 2008, p.320).

Nevertheless, according to a British researcher, at the battle of Manzikert in 1071, the main force of Byzantium consisted of "mercenary detachments of brave Franks and Normans", who "were under the command of the brave Ursel Baliol, a relative or ancestor of the Scottish kings and were famous for their skill with weapons or, in the Greek expression, skilful performance of the Pyrrhic dance". [Gibbon, 2008, p. 386 et seq.]. The defeat of Roman Diogenes was also due to the fact that, according to Gibbon, he "had the imprudence to divide his forces after the capture of Manazkerd. He tried in vain to win back the hired Franks; they did not comply with his orders, and out of pride he did not want to wait for their arrival" [Gibbon, 2008, p.387].

Corresponding member of the Imperial St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, French historian A. Rambaud noted in" Universal History " that the Normans played a significant role in the Byzantine army during the XI-XII centuries [Rambaud, 1893, p. 818 et seq.].

The French scientist Ferdinand Chalandon, author of the fundamental work "The Rule of the Normans in Italy and Sicily" (Chalandon, 1907), comparing and criticizing the data of sources, wrote a detailed and fairly reliable history of the military and political rise of the Normans in Italy and Sicily, which has not lost its scientific significance to this day. Seven years earlier Chalandon had written an essay on the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (Chalandon, 1900), in which he described in detail Roussel de Balliol's activities in Asia Minor (Chalandon, 1907, pp. 28-31). A large part of this monograph consists of a description of the relationship between-

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The battle of Alexius Comnenus with the Norman leaders Robert Guiscard and his son Bohemond of Tarentum.

The French orientalist Kl. Kazn has always paid great attention to the Norman presence not only in Syria [Cahen, 1940(1)] or Southern Italy [Cahen, 1940 (2)], but also in Asia Minor. In his article "The First Turkish Penetration of Asia Minor", Kazn painted a picture of the long cooperation and discord between the Norman leaders and the Seljuq Turks (Cahen, 1948). Thus, he described the relations between Gervais Francopoulos and Samukh in 1062 [Cahen, 1948, p. 22, 23]; Roussel de Balliol and Artuk ibn Exeb in 1073 [Cahen, 1948, p. 33]; Danishmend and Bohemond of Tarentum in 1103 [Cahen, 1948, p. 22, 23].

Kazn covered the activities of the Normans in Asia Minor in more detail in his monograph on the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum (Cahen, 1988). At the first stage of the formation of "Turkey" from 1071 to 1107, against the background of the Seljuks who had "no political goals", the Norman leader Roussel proclaimed John Duka as the Byzantine emperor, and then tried to establish himself in Armeniak [Cahen, 1948, p.11, 12].

Osman Turan, in his study "The History of the Seljuks and the Turkic-Islamic civilization" (Turan, 1969), argued that the "primitive and barbaric" Normans nevertheless benefited from the knowledge and culture of the Muslims of Sicily (Turan, 1969, p. 329) and acted reasonably, "dominating the Islamic civilization and protecting the Muslim population..."[Turan, 1969, p. 352-353]. According to the Turkish researcher, the revolt of the Norman mercenary Roussel was the reason for the first intervention in Byzantine affairs of the Turkic bey Artuk and provided him with the opportunity to advance far in Asia Minor [Turan, 1969, p. 213].

An American scholar of Greek origin, Speros Vrionis, is the author of a major work on the history of Asia Minor: "The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the 11th to the 15th century" (Vrionis, 1971). In his research, Vrionis paid special attention to the actions of the Norman leaders in Asia Minor [Vrionis, 1971, p. 76, 91]. In particular, he concluded that in Asia Minor, the Norman leader Roussel de Balliol tried to create his own "little Normandy" (Vrionis, 1971, p.58).

The German researcher J. Hoffman in his monograph emphasized the separatist aspirations of Roussel de Balliol [Avcioglu, 1974, pp. 13-20, 80-82]. Unfortunately, Hoffman did not take into account the results achieved by other scientists, in particular, he did not use the important study of S. Vrionis.

The socialist historian Dogan Avcioglu, in his five-volume Turkish history, spoke directly about Roussel de Balliol's desire to establish a "new Norman state in Anatolia" following the example of his compatriots in Normandy and Sicily [Vrionis, 1978, p.1932-1939]. However, Artuk captured him, after which Roussel tried to re-establish a small state in Nixar, but again failed.

In the early 1990s, the Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium was published, which D. Moravchik dreamed of creating back in 1948. Leading Byzantinists contributed to the creation of The Oxford Dictionary ( 1991). A significant place in this reference book on the history of Byzantium is given to the Normans, which confirms the growing interest in this topic among modern scholars. Ch. Brandt is the author of articles about two Norman leaders in Asia Minor: Gervais Frankopoulos [The Oxford Dictionary, 1991, p. 922] and Roussel de Balliol [The Oxford Dictionary, 1991,p. 922]. p. 1814-1815]. These works are an example of a brilliantly designed reference material.

In the joint work of Turkish researchers A. Sevim and E. The Normans are formidable opponents that both the Byzantines and the Seljuk Turks had to contend with in Asia Minor (Sevim and Mercil, 1995).

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J. Shepard, in the Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire (2008), describes the Normans as "a small group of alien predators whose energy, greed, and organizational abilities have worn down the Byzantine authorities since the mid-eleventh century" (2008, p.559).

M. Angold in the chapter "The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1118" in the multi-volume "New Cambridge History of the Middle Ages" (Angold, 2008) examines the history of the XI century. The alliance between the Normans and the papacy for a long time predetermined the policy of the West towards Byzantium [Angold, 2008, p. 233].M. Angold believes that the defeat of Byzantium at Manzikert was not a catastrophe "in military terms" [Angold, 2008, p. 238]. At that time, the threat did not come from the Seljuk Turks. Disastrous in its consequences was the civil war caused by the defeat at Manzikert. This war was taken advantage of by Roussel de Balliol, who settled in Amasia and soon took over almost the entire Armeniac fema (Angold, 2008, p.239).

The civil war in the empire and the need to find justice for the rebellious Normans led to the direct intervention of the Seljuk Turks [Angold, 2008, p.239-240]. Subsequently, the more fiercely the Normans attacked Byzantium in 1082-1085 and in 1106-1107, the more firmly the Turks established themselves in Asia Minor. The need to repel the Norman invasions forced Alexios Komnenos to accept the loss of Asia Minor (Angold, 2008, p. 252).

Special works on the penetration of the Normans into Asia Minor appeared at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. The authorship of these works belongs to Byzantine historians, who, after studying Byzantine sources and understanding the importance of the Normans in the history of the Byzantine Empire, became interested in the history of the Normans.

As a rule, these authors belonged to the school of French Byzantinists, since the Normans came from the province of France: Normandy. The interest in this topic among French Byzantinists could be dictated by the current colonial policy of France in relation to the countries of Asia and Africa. In accordance with this policy, science became the mouthpiece of propaganda for the superiority of the French nation and the legitimization of overseas conquests.

In 1881, the French Byzantine scholar G. Schlumberger [Schlumberger, 1881, p.289-303] published a work on two leaders of the Normans in Asia Minor. The impetus for this research was his discovery of sphragistics data: the seals of Gervais Francopoulos and Roussel de Balliol. Schlumberger's article was carried out at a high scientific level and has not lost its relevance to this day.

G. Schlumberger emphasized the influence and importance that the Normans enjoyed in Byzantium: in particular, by the term "Frank" in the second half of the XI century, all Byzantine authors meant exclusively the Italian Normans [Schlumberger, 1881, p. 290], whose main place of application of forces was Asia Minor [Schlumberger, 1881, p. 290]. In his opinion, the Norman leaders in the Byzantine service were " worthy predecessors of Bohemond and Tancred "(Schlumberger, 1881, p. 292).

The editor of the Revue historique, Louis Brehier [Brehier, 1912, p.172-188], published an article entitled "The Adventures of a Norman leader in the East." In contrast to Schlumberger, Breuil considered the career of Roussel de Balliol in more detail and rather biased. Brehier wrote with admiration about "what a beautiful Normandy could be in the Trebizond region!" [Brehier, 1912, p.184]. For him, the creation of a Norman state in Asia Minor did not seem at all like a" chimera " (Brehier, 1912, p.184). Breyer assumed that the Byzantine Empire, having destroyed Roussel's state, missed a unique chance to prevent the conquest of Asia Minor by the Seljuk Turks (Brehier, 1912, p. 187).

Brehier considered Roussel an ideal representative of the" Norman race " (race normande) [Brehier, 1912, p. 187], who has all the necessary qualities:-

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a sense of initiative, courage (especially in terms of execution), a taste for self-reliance and independence, a whimsical mixture of common sense and the spirit of adventure.

In this series, it is necessary to mention the works of French Byzantinists, whose research touched upon the question of the presence of the Normans in Asia Minor: Raymond Janet [Janin, 1930, p. 61-72] and Marquis de la Force [Marquis de la Force, 1936, p. 153-165].

In his short work "The Franks in the Service of Byzantium", Janet very succinctly presented the history of Frankish mercenaries in the empire in the period from IV to XIV centuries. Nevertheless, from the very first pages, Janet recognized that the "Franks" in the XI century should be understood primarily as the Italian Normans [Janin, 1930, p. 61], who "occupied an important place in the Byzantine Empire" [Janin, 1930, p. 64] and were mainly involved in the fight against the Turks- Seljuks [Janin, 1930, p. 65].

The Marquis de la Force in his work tried to identify the "Latin" advisers of the Emperor Alexius Komnenos, who signed the Treaty of Devol in 1108. It turned out that most of the advisers were Normans, such as Peter Alifa, Richard Principate, Raoul, etc. Many of them became the founders of famous Byzantine families, which enjoyed influence and power for more than one century.

The value of the works of Janet and the Marquis de la Force consists in an attempt to trace the fate of individual little-known Norman leaders in the service of the Byzantine Empire from Byzantine sources. Both authors come to the unanimous conclusion that the Byzantines were in dire need of the services of Norman mercenaries and most of all valued their military prowess and energy [Janin, 1930, p. 72; Marquis de la Force, 1936, p.165]. In contrast to the Marquis de la Force, Janet noted the tendency of the Norman leaders to revolt and the danger they posed to the imperial government on a broader historical basis (Janin, 1930, p. 72).

The French Byzantinist Jean-Claude Scheinet devoted some of his works to the history of the Normandy invaders in Asia Minor. In one of them, he investigated the role and fate of Norman mercenaries in the Byzantine army before the first Crusade [Cheynet, 1997, p. 111-128]. In another, Cheynet was interested in the question of when foreign officers of the Byzantine army, including Normans, became Byzantines [Cheynet, 2010, p. 42-60].

In more detail, the issues related to the penetration of the Normans into Asia Minor before the first Crusade were discussed in a separate work [Cheynet, 2002, pp. 115-124]. Scheinet was of the opinion that the Normans had very close ties to the theme of Armeniacus in Asia Minor.

Peter Charanis reconstructed the relationship between Byzantium and the Normans in his article "Byzantium, the West, and the Origins of the First Crusade" (Charanis, 1949, pp. 17-36). Charanis believed that after 1071 the Byzantines sought to expel the Seljuk Turks and restore their position in Asia Minor with the help of the Normans from Southern Italy (Charanis, 1949, p. 17).

Immediately after the defeat at Manzikert, Roman Diogenes wanted to marry his son to one of the daughters of Robert Guiscard, which was a kind of recognition of the latter's rights to Southern Italy. Michael VII Duca continued Roman Diogenes ' policy towards Robert. There were two reasons for this friendly policy towards the Normans: to protect the Empire from further attacks by the Normans and to direct their efforts against the Seljuk Turks in Asia Minor (Charanis, 1949, p. 17-18).

The" instigator " of the first crusade, Alexey Komnenos, acted in the same spirit [Charanis, 1949, p. 36]. Relying on a Byzantine source of the 13th century, Haranis believed that the" real motive "of Alexios Komnenos was the expulsion of the Seljuk Turks from Asia Minor, and the "pretended motive" was to rely on the psychology of Western Europeans who were eager to take over Palestine and expel non-Jews from there.-

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the faithful [Charanis, 1949, p. 35]. It is this source that indicates that Alexey was counting on an alliance with the Italian Normans against the Seljuk Turks [Charanis, 1949, p. 33-34].

In his article "Cultural diversity and the decline of Byzantine power in Asia Minor" [Charanis, 1975, p. 1-20], Charanis cites two main factors among the reasons for the defeat of the Byzantines and the loss of positions in the region: the decline of the Byzantine army and the "dubious role of mercenaries" [Charanis, 1975, p.17-18]. At a time when the Byzantines aspired to be "lawyers or jurists", the armies of Anatolian femes consisted of foreign mercenaries "who were alien to the cultural traditions of the empire and were more inclined to pursue their own interests than the interests of the empire" (Charanis, 1975, p.17-18). By mercenaries who did more harm than good, P. Haranis meant Normans and Seljuk Turks.

In turn, "these two factors were the result of a much more fundamental process.": the loss of cohesion by the people of Asia Minor" or rather the loss of "cultural cohesion of Byzantine Asia Minor", which, along with vigorous external invasions, changes in the social structure of the region, the deterioration of femal armies, and the lack of "aggressive leadership" led to the fall of Byzantine power in Asia Minor (Charanis, 1975, p.20).

The British Byzantinist S. Runsimen devoted a lot of space to the Normans in his fundamental work on the history of the Crusades (Runsimen, 1995). In the first volume of the monograph Runciman described the early Norman connections with Asia Minor: active participation in pilgrimage to the Holy sites of Southern Italy and Palestine since the beginning of the XI century [Runsimen, 1995, p. 46]. Runsimen believed that the Norman conquests in Southern Italy in the first half of the 11th century "gave the Byzantines an idea of the future Norman expansion to the East" (Runsimen, 1995, p. 56-57). Runsimen explained the motives of the Normans by saying that "only a few generations separated them from nomadic filibusters" (Runsimen, 1995, p.92).

The Normans formed an elite heavy cavalry unit in the Byzantine army, which was under the command of their compatriots: Gervais Francopoulos, Robert Crispin and Roussel de Balliol (Runsimen, 1995, p.62). According to Runsimen, Roussel de Balliol's unwillingness to participate in the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 provided a decisive advantage to the Seljuk Turks [Runsimen, 1995, p. 63, 66].

The defeat at the Battle of Manzikert was not only the greatest catastrophe in the history of Byzantium, but also, from the point of view of Western Europe, deprived it of the title of defender of Christianity and legalized invasions from the West (Runsimen, 1995, p.64). For this reason, Runsimen wonders why Michael VII Duca again believed Roussel de Balliol, who was "a more dangerous enemy than the Turks" (Runsimen, 1995, p. 66). Roussel cherished the dream of creating a "Norman state in Anatolia" following the example of his compatriots in Southern Italy. He had three thousand well-armed, trained and, most importantly, loyal people. In a one-on-one battle, neither the Byzantines nor the Seljuks could resist him (Runsimen, 1995, p.66).

With the help of the Seljuks, the Byzantines managed to put down Roussel's rebellion, which taught them to distrust the Norman mercenaries, since " their ambitions were not limited to the borders of Southern Italy... they sought to create states in the East" (Runsimen, 1995, p. 67).

The Bulgarian scholar I. Dujcev, in his article "The Normans and the East of Byzantium" (Dujcev, 1979, pp. 105-131), described the expansion of the Normans in the Byzantine Empire. His work was intended to give an insight into the main events and stages of the great Norman expansion, which, in his opinion, prepared the Crusader conquest of Constantinople in 1204. At the same time, the Slavist Duychev paid more attention to the influence of relations between the Normans and Byzantines on the fate of the Slavic peoples of the Balkan Peninsula.

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English historian and essayist E. Van Houts applied a new approach in her article "Normandy and Byzantium in the XI century" [Van Houts, 1985, p. 544-559]. She was extremely critical of the Latin sources that reported on contacts between the Normans and Byzantium during the XI century. Van Houts believes that it is impossible to talk about close contacts between the Normans and Byzantines before the middle of the XI century, and the number of Norman mercenaries in the Byzantine service was extremely insignificant, as well as their influence on the state of affairs in the empire [Van Houts, 1985, p. 556].

Siggaar (1986, p. 43-69), in contrast to Van Houts, placed more trust in Latin sources and suggested that Normandy and Byzantium had close ties as early as 1035 (Ciggaar, 1986, p.44). In this year Constantinople was visited by the Duke of Normandy Robert the Magnificent, and a little later, in 1040, the Norwegian Prince Harald Gardrada. In July 1036, Robert the Magnificent died in Nicaea and was buried there. According to Siggaar, Michael IV Paphlagonicus (1034-1041) suggested that the Norman knights who accompanied Robert on pilgrimage and participated in his funeral should enter the imperial service [Ciggaar, 1986, p.44].

Thus, since 1036, the first detachments of Norman knights appeared in the service of the Byzantine emperors. William of Poitiers reports that in 1070 the Normans defended Constantinople. Siggaar considers this report to be an important confirmation of the continuous links between Normandy and its "colonies" [Ciggaar, 1986, p. 45]. And according to Lampert of Herefield between 1050 and 1060. Some Normans offered ambassadors to Robert of Flanders to go to Constantinople, where they promised him power over "the entire Greek state" [Ciggaar, 1986, p. 45].

K. Siggaar believed that the Normans came to Byzantium as pilgrims, as mercenaries, and as spies [Ciggaar, 1986, p. 46]. The Norman Bishop Ivo de Belem collected money from the Normans in Constantinople for the construction of a church in Normandy. Odo the son of Stigand, at the age of 26, managed to serve for three years at the court of the Byzantine emperor with the rank of protospatharius, and at the same time spoke Greek and had the ability to heal not only people, horses, but also birds [Ciggaar, 1986, p.48].

Odo was acquainted with Gervais Frankopoulos, who was above him in rank and did everything possible to promote him [Ciggaar, 1986, p.51]. According to K. Siggaar, William the Conqueror specifically sent Norman youths to Byzantium to study Byzantine military technologies, such as for the manufacture of transport ships for transporting horses [Ciggaar, 1986, p.54].

Siggaar's research and the use of additional Latin sources to study the fate of the Normans in Byzantium served as a starting point for the works of such scholars as E. Amsellem (1999), who considered in more detail the connections between the Norman Stigand family and Byzantium in the XI century (Amsellem, 1999, p.283-288).

V. B. McQueen, in his article "Relations between the Normans and Byzantium 1071-1112," set out to prove "that the Normans were the ideal military aristocracy" (McQueen, 1986, p.427-428) in the eyes of the Byzantines. McQueen hoped to "show how an analysis of the political, military, and social relationships between two groups of people can shed light on the nature and structure of their societies" (McQueen, 1986, p.428). By setting these goals, McQueen's work has become groundbreaking. The author sought not only to describe events and facts in chronological order, but also to come closer to understanding the relations between the Normans and Byzantines.

In conclusion, McQueen concluded that the reason for the active penetration of the Normans into the Byzantine territory between 1071-1112 was the " instability "[McQueen, 1986, p. 427-467] of Norman society in Southern Italy, which in turn was due to the "basic mercenary mentality" [McQueen, 1986, p. 468] and regardless of social status, it was characteristic of all Normans. The only stabilizing factor for the Norman world was the constant

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Byzantium's need for trained mercenary soldiers, whom the Empire attracted with gifts and titles (McQueen, 1986, p. 468).

McQueen paid much attention to the fate of Bohemond of Taren. He believed that Bohemond never gave up the hope of conquering Byzantium until his death, and he saw the architecture of the mausoleum of Bohemond in Venosa as a symbol of the "Eastern ambitions" of the ruler of Antioch that did not come true (McQueen, 1986, pp. 427-473).

Oxford Professor J. R. R. Tolkien Shepard was the author of one of the most important studies on the history of Norman mercenaries in the Byzantine service [Shepard, 1993, pp. 275-307]. He questioned why the Norman mercenaries had been actively employed in the Byzantine army since 1038; why they had so quickly captured the attention of Byzantine chroniclers to the detriment of other soldiers of fortune; and whether these "Franks" were so "valiant", whose fighting skills and military equipment could not be countered.

According to Shepard, mercenaries have been arriving in the Byzantine Empire since the fourth century. [Shepard, 1993, p. 278], but only since the 11th century has the term "mercenary" become common in Byzantine sources to refer to foreign soldiers of fortune, who were previously perceived as "allied forces" directed to imperial service by their own rulers [Shepard, 1993, p.281].

Shepard finds striking differences between the Norman " Franks "and the" Russo-Scandinavians "and other" allies " of the empire. In the Byzantine and Latin chronicles of the XI century, the Normans appeared suddenly, they served themselves, were materialists-pragmatists, for whom the issue of payment was in the first place, ready to stage a rebellion in case of dissatisfaction with payments. The Italo-Norman chronicles are full of black-and-white cliches in contrast to "Franks" and "Greeks." In them, the Norman leaders compete with the Byzantine emperor and are always ready to rebel against him. On the contrary, Skalds in their sagas are loyal and loyal to the emperor (Shepard, 1993, p. 281).

Shepard believed that the key to understanding the rebellious nature of the Normans, their willingness to rebel over an unfair division or an insufficient share of the loot, lay in the mercenary spirit that distinguished them from all other allies of the empire. Their behavior was dictated by the fact that they arrived in a fundamentally different way to the Byzantine service. The rulers who initially welcomed and supplied them, whose possessions bordered on Byzantium, were not from their people, and therefore the Normans initially came to them as mercenaries. Money and material rewards were of such great importance to them that the Byzantines had not previously encountered among the soldiers of fortune. Unlike the "Russo-Scandinavians", who did not seek to stay in Byzantium for longer than a certain period of time, the Normans associated their luck with a region where money was of great value for the purchase of goods and services (Shepard, 1993, p.284).

From 1048-1049, the Byzantine government used Norman detachments to defend the eastern borders of the empire from Seljuk raids (for example, in Manzikert). The place of winter quarters for the Normans was the Fema Armeniacus, where their leaders had land holdings and even castles [Shepard, 1993, p. 287-288]. Shepard thought that the imperial government had every reason to trust the Norman mercenaries, since all the financial flows flowed to the capital and only the emperor had hard currency. Therefore, the Normans were extremely reluctant to take part in military coups "and only a third of them posed a serious threat to the government, and only in extreme political and military circumstances" (Shepard, 1993, p. 296). Among the latter, Shepard briefly described the careers of three prominent Norman leaders: Gervais Francopoulos, Robert Crispin, and Roussel de Balliol (1993, pp. 296-302).

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Eventually, the Byzantines learned how to handle Norman mercenaries, and the first person to master this art perfectly was the Emperor Alexios Komnenos (Shepard, 1993, pp. 303-304). During his reign, the empire was strong enough to stop the Norman attempts to raise a rebellion in time. This was facilitated by a number of measures: at the head of the Norman mercenaries was a man whom Alexey could trust (Konstantin Umbertopoulos, for example), there was an increase in the number of Western mercenaries due to immigrants from other regions of Europe (for example, Flanders). Finally, the emperor tried to change relations with the Normans, and through them with other representatives of Western European warriors, focusing on their oath of allegiance. Thus, from the mercenaries, he wanted to make his "loyal" vassals, or at least to gain their loyalty and favor by friendly treatment and generous gifts.

P. Magdalino made a number of valuable observations about the presence of the Normans in Asia Minor in the second half of the XI century (Magdalino, 1996). In the Byzantine army, the Normans "formed a significant and independent element", totaling about 3,000 men in 1071, with a clear tendency to constantly increase. Magdalino, citing Shepard, gave a breakdown of the possible number of Normans in Byzantine service. In total, the Byzantine army had three tagmats of 500 men each, of which two tagmats were based in Asia Minor, and one in Constantinople. Magdalino noted that Shepard did not take into account another 500 people based in Armeniak.

Since 1050, Asia Minor, and especially Fema Armeniacus, has been home to Norman mercenaries. It was the "Franks" settled in this area that served as a support for the rebellions of three Norman leaders: Gervais Francopoulos, Robert Crispin and Roussel de Balliol. The last rebellion had every chance of success - the formation of a Norman state in Asia Minor. At the same time, Bohemond of Tarentum took into account more than half a century of Norman relations with the empire and, happily bypassing all the tricks of Alexius I Komnenos, founded an independent principality in Antioch.

The American researcher A. Simpson wrote a special work on the rebellions of three Norman leaders in Asia Minor in the XI century [Simpson, 2000, p. 181-207]. Following S. Vrionis, she believes that the Norman mercenaries played a prominent role in the decline of the Byzantine system of governance in Asia Minor. In fact, they took advantage of the situation of chaos that prevailed, but at the same time this was not the cause of specific Norman rebellions, but only the background [Simpson, 2000, p.181].

With reference to Shepherd and Janet, Simpson says that the Byzantines used the Normans primarily in Anatolia to fight the Seljuq Turks and to guard the empire's borders. Winter apartments were located mainly in Fema Armeniac, where, according to Skilica and Michael Attaliat, Gervais Francopoulos and Roussel de Balliol had land holdings. "At the same time, there is no doubt that some of these soldiers received high command positions and titles in the imperial service, while the bulk of the mercenaries were ordinary soldiers who received wages" [Simpson, 2000, p.182].

Simpson notes that the excesses of mercenaries: desertion, military uprisings, looting and extortion, did not differ much from the behavior of Byzantine detachments. At the same time, the common soldiers never rebelled against their Norman leaders. Simpson explains this fact by the independence of the Tagmat command from the emperor. Tagmats were recruited by representatives of the same people, and the command was entrusted to the commander of the same tribe. The command of the Tagmata, as well as the loyalty of the soldiers, belonged entirely to its commander, regardless of whether he was a Norman or a Byzantine. Therefore, Simpson concludes that the" infidelity " of mercenaries should be understood as the behavior of tagmat commanders, and not their subordinates. The common feature of the Norman mercenary uprisings was due to the time of the political revolution.

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instability and defenselessness of Asia Minor before the invasion of the Seljuk Turks [Simpson, 2000, p. 182].

Simpson attributes the loyalty of the Byzantine rulers to the rebellious Normans to the need to suppress the Byzantine rebels. In contrast, the Norman mercenaries were never considered by the Byzantine administration as real contenders for the imperial throne. Simpson considers it very important to study issues related to the territories in Asia Minor where the rebellions of the Norman leaders took place. Robert Crispin's base was in Kolonea, which had long been a gathering place for Fema's armies, was of great strategic importance, and was the domain of the Kekawmen family. In 1059, Kolonea and Melitene were abandoned and became completely defenseless against the invasion of the Seljuk Turks. Therefore, it was not difficult for Crispin to conquer this region [Simpson, 2000, p. 183]. Roussel de Balliol chose Amasia and its environs in Armeniac (Simpson, 2000, p. 184).

Of great interest is G. Leveniotis 'monograph" The Revolt of Norman Urselius (Roussel de Balliol) in Asia Minor (1073-1076) " [ΛεβεηιωτσΣ , 2004]. The researcher used a huge range of historical sources to examine the life and activities of Roussel de Balliol and the general conditions of the Byzantine Empire (and especially Anatolia) during the years of troubles, as well as to analyze the reasons that led to the formation of the "ephemeral Norman state in Asia Minor" [ΛεβεηιωτξΣ, 2004, p.7].

G. Leveniotis defines Roussel's revolt as the most destructive movement for the imperial power in Asia Minor during the period from 1071 to 1081. The Normans, in his opinion, turned out to be the most dangerous ethnic group that ever served the Byzantines [ΛεβεηιωτξΣ, 2004, p.39]. Since 1060. they held high positions in the court and army, owned lands and castles in strategically important geographical locations in Anatolia, and their leaders enjoyed considerable power and influence [ΛεβεηιωτξΣ, 2004, p. 40]. G. Leveniotis believes that Roussel de Balliol's rebellion enjoyed the support of the population of Lycaonia, Galatia, and especially Armeniacus; it allowed for the first time the Turks-The Seljuks intervened in the internal affairs of the empire; it led to the weakening of Byzantine power in Asia Minor after the battle of Manzikert [ΛεβεηιωτξΣ, 2004, p. 41].

G. Leveniotis explains the failure of Roussel's revolt by the lack of a national or ethnic basis in Armeniakis, in contrast, for example, to the revolt of Filaret Varazhnuni in the south-east of Asia Minor [ΛεβεηιωτσΣ, 2004, p.212-213]. It is difficult to imagine the fate of this region if the state of Roussel de Balliol had lasted until the arrival of Bohemond of Tarentum at the head of the first crusade. The Byzantines later treated the Normans with distrust and were very willing to invite their opponents - the Anglo-Saxons, who were supposed to replace the former at court and in the army [ΛεβεηιωτσΣ, 2004, p. 221-222].

For G. Leveniotis, it is obvious that the Norman society, being inherently feudal and aggressive, at the same time was distinguished by a creative approach and high adaptability to existing conditions. The Norman leaders sought to acquire vassals, military forces, and territories to maintain them. The descendants of the Vikings managed to create a "fragmentary" empire from Britain to Syria, connected by tribal and blood ties. All military campaigns of the Normans were based on a common ethnic origin and traditions, ambitions and military superiority [ΛεβεηιωτξΣ, 2004, p. 205]. For this reason, Leveniotis places Roussel de Balliol on a par with William the Conqueror and Robert Guiscard [ΛεβεηιωτσΣ, 2004, p.206]. Leveniotis sees the reason for Roussel's rebellion in the personal ambitions associated with his Norman origin [ΛεβεηιωτξΣ, 2004, p.208].

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G. Leveniotis continued the discussion of issues related to the presence of the Normans in Asia Minor in the monograph " The Political collapse of the Byzantine Empire in the East. The Eastern border and Central Asia Minor in the second half of the XI century "[ΛεβεηιωτξΣ, 2007]. In particular, he confirmed his conclusion that Roussel de Balliol's actions led to the loss of Constantinople's control over the eastern provinces of central and northwestern Asia Minor. As a result of the actions of ambitious mercenaries, the connection of the capital with the regions of Theodosiopolis from Melitene, Edessa and Antioch was destroyed [ΛεβεηιωτξΣ, 2007, p. 591]. Roussel's revolt was one of the reasons that allowed the Turkish rulers to penetrate into the western regions of Asia Minor and firmly establish themselves in Bithynia, Thema Heraklion and the region of Sebastia - Caesarea.

Recently, special works have appeared in Turkish, which touch on the relations of the Normans and the empire during the XI century. [Kagasa, 2012, p. 101-118]. A Turkish researcher from the University of Thrace Karadzha examined the main stages of relations between the Normans and the Byzantines in Southern Italy, the Balkans and Asia Minor and came to the conclusion that the military support of the Normans cost Byzantium dearly and ultimately their participation in the affairs of the empire turned out to be more disastrous than the invasion of the Seljuk Turks [Kagasa, 2012, p. 113].

Modern research on Norman mercenaries in the Byzantine service is of high quality and is of great importance for studying the penetration of the Normans into Asia Minor. Most of these works deal in detail with the relationship between the Normans and the Byzantines. The places of permanent residence of Norman mercenaries in Asia Minor are partially localized.

The reviewed works of Orientalists, Byzantinists, historians of the Crusades, and Turkologists clearly demonstrate that the study of the history of the Normans in Asia Minor is possible only within the framework of an integrated approach to sources.

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