Автор: Anatoli Rozanov, Doctor of History, Professor, Belarus State University

The role of structures involved in the process of establishing European security that would correspond to the present realities has been highlighted largely in a new way by the dynamics of the international processes in Europe. Recent events, in particular, have demonstrated that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is becoming an increasingly noticeable player on the European military-political playground. Far not everyone in Europe feels enthusiastic about such developments. For example, very well known is the position of Russia and Belarus concerning the intensification of NATO activities. However, it would be fair to say that on the whole no pronounced idiosyncrasy is observed in Europe with regard to the Alliance's attempts to decisively influence crisis and conflict management process. Moreover, there are certain grounds to believe that irrespective of anybody's likings, the NATO role in resolving Euro-Atlantic security problems will remain significant if not prevailing. The idea is, of course, not that the logics of the established trend will, so to say, marginalize some European institutions moving them into the shadow of the most influential structure with advanced military capabilities. It is rather a matter of establishing a network of interacting and complementing organisations. Within the politico-military aspect the North Atlantic Alliance stands out in this network not just because other structures have not yet acquired considerable and approved military instruments and resources, but also due to the United States laying claims to the status of a "unique and unrivalled superpower" and staking on NATO as the most effective mechanism of enhancing American dominance in European matters.

Within this context an unconstrained view on the Alliance's potential is required - a view that could be used to affect today's European security processes. Such approach should be based upon objective analysis of European realities and various factors facilitating clear-cut differentiation of European institutions and a more explicit separation of authority between them as well as a "synergy" of European mechanisms. In the most general sense it is worth highlighting the all-inclusive role of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), especially in the light of the Charter on European Security adopted in Istanbul; the outlined establishment of the military component in the European Union (EU); and strengthening the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance. These changes are primary indications of introduction of new elements into the European equation allowing to judge about the trends of the development of situation in the sphere of European security.

OSCE Horizons

As regards the OSCE, it is worth noticing that it is a "low profile organisation" 1 according to Mr. V. Ghebali, professor of the Geneva Institute for International Studies, yet it gradually expands its potential including the sphere of rapid crisis reaction. It should, however, be noted that the capabilities of this organisation are still far from being used to the full.

The November 1999 Istanbul Summit confirmed the OSCE intention to facilitate establishment of the "common and indivisible security environment". The special Charter on European Security is aimed at establishing an OSCE region without any dividing lines and areas with different security levels 2 . True, this task is colossal. Yet, its realisation seems to be difficult, to put it mildly, in the environment that is being established today on the European political landscape.

The so-called cooperation-based Security Platform constitutes one of the most important elements of the Charter. It contains major regulations regarding relations between the OSCE and other international organisations. In particular, it was proposed - while bearing in mind the key uniting role that may be played by the OSCE - to use it as a flexible coordination mechanism to develop cooperation through which various organisations could reinforce each other using each other's specific advantages. However, it was emphasised that the OSCE has no intentions to build a "hierarchy of organisations". 3 This proviso is very indicative. It proves that Russia's and Belarus' insistent efforts to lay down in the Charter the special and "core" role of the OSCE in the resolution of key European security issues have not received enough support. Neither has the proposal

стр. 36

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
to grant legal power to the Charter (the way it was adopted, this document is only of a politically-binding nature). Such situation is chiefly determined by the position of influential western political circles, especially transoceanic ones, which often treat the OSCE as nothing more than a "discussion club" assigning it mostly a secondary role, keeping the priority place in reserve for the Atlantic Alliance.

EU Defence Identity

Within the context of development and specification of European defence and security policy exceptionally important are decisions made at the 10-11 December 1999 Helsinki Summit of the EU. It was announced that the EU has to possess a capability to carry out EU-led combat operations in response to international crises when NATO does not fully participate as a military organisation. On the basis of the existing bilateral and multinational forces and assets new and more effective armed forces will be established particularly for the EU crisis management operations with or without NATO materiel and forces. Specifically, by 2003 it is planned to deploy and maintain 50-60 thousand service members self-sufficient militarily and having all the necessary command and control (C2), intelligence, logistic and other combat support services, as well as air force and navy as required. EU member states should be capable of deploying forces at this level within 60 days and forming within this framework smaller rapid reaction and high combat readiness units. It is planned that the EU members will be able to maintain deployed forces within at least one year. 4

New permanent political and military bodies are being established within the European Council, namely Standing Policy and Security Committee, Military Committee, and Military Headquarters. The Standing Policy and Security Committee maintains political control and strategic leadership over military crisis management operations and gives directives to the Military Committee. The Military Committee works out recommendations on military issues, provides the Standing Policy and Security Committee with recommendations on policy and security-related issues, as well as gives directives to the Military Headquarters. The latter provides comprehensive military analysis and relevant military support required to carry out common European security and defence policy including EU-led military crisis management operations.

It is characteristic that although Helsinki Summit documents contain information concerning development of "organisational framework for comprehensive political consultations, cooperation and provision of transparency in the EU-NATO relations", no clear steps to institutionalise EU-NATO connections have been set out. On the other hand, it was emphasised that "Russia, Ukraine and other European nations carrying out political dialogue with the EU can be invited to participate in EU operations" together with other nations concerned. 5

Metamorphoses of the Transatlantic Linkage

Thus, the decisions made in Helsinki indicate that a new situation can develop on the European continent connected with the transformation of the EU into a real player in the sphere of security and defence. At a certain stage such scenario might possibly entail NATO devaluation and the "de-Atlantisation" of European security. Therefore, some U.S. officials dealing with development of the American policy within the European construction, the same as NATO high-ranking officials, starting from late 1999 have been expressing certain concerns coupled with warnings about the unacceptability of the prospects detrimental to transatlantic solidarity.

A. Vershbow, Permanent U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Council, in his speech in Berlin on 28 December 1999 gave to understand that Washington is not quite happy with the EU Helsinki Summit results. In particular, from the U.S. viewpoint, there are problems that have to be clarified as soon as possible. These are participation of non-EU European NATO members in the EU crisis management efforts and institutional ties between NATO and the EU. The U.S. favours establishment of a consulting mechanism on an early stage that could be used to involve six non-EU European NATO nations "in the planning and realisation of future EU-led operations". According to A. Vershbow, from the practical point of view and since any significant EU-led operation will most likely require certain NATO resources, EU members should not count on them if they try to remove their non-EU allies from the policy-making preceding such operation". 6

There is a special U.S. pressure on the immediate legalisation of the EU-NATO relations. The U.S. does not share the viewpoint, according to which the institutional cooperation between the EU and NATO could be delayed until the EU will have finished establishing its new military-political bodies. The U.S. is very suspicious about the Europeans trying to create a relatively autonomous security structure in Europe deprived of the American domination and the decisive vote of the U.S. American analysts have an impression that some EU nations are worried that if the EU-NATO institutional relations are established too early, the U.S. will "infect" the EU internal structures with their presence. Figuratively speaking, in this case the U.S. is viewed as a "computer virus" that might get into the EU destroying its capability to make independent decisions.

In other words, Washington is alarmed by the EU attempts to slightly separate its nations' military potential

стр. 37

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
from NATO. On the other hand, from the U.S. standpoint, since the forces and assets required by Europe are actually the forces and assets required by NATO, different standards and methodologies should not be used with regards to the European armed forces and the forces of the Alliance. This can lead to a "two-tiered Alliance" within which European members will concentrate on "low-intensity conflicts" leaving the "dirty work" to NATO. According to the American position, this "cannot improve the transatlantic relations". 7

It has but to be accepted that Washington's concerns associated with a possible autonomisation of European defence have certain grounds. Concurrently, it is quite obvious that the so far timorous attempts of the EU to create its own armed forces and carry out peacekeeping operations under its own leadership have not been finalised and in their final form are not likely to be in an opposition to the U.S. and NATO potential. No wonder that the Helsinki EU Summit decisions recognise that "NATO remains the basis of its members' collective defence". 8

Additionally, due to the importance of establishing better balance in the Alliance between the U.S. and its European allies, and equalising the North American and European "pillars" of the Alliance, relevant measures have been undertaken by NATO to intensify the so-called European Security and Defence Identity (according to NATO terminology). Back in 1996, as provided by the position adopted in Berlin, NATO undertook to support future operations by the West European Union (WEU) with its resources. The next step was made at Washington April 1999 NATO Summit. This step comprised readiness to outline and develop procedures required to grant the EU a possibility to use collective forces and assets of the Alliance for the EU-led operations when NATO as a whole is not involved militarily as an Alliance. 9 It was noted that the Alliance is ready to provide the EU with NATO resources in the military operation planning and other areas. This obviously reflects understanding of the fact that sooner or later the EU will take on military functions in addition to the economic, financial, and political tasks.

Surely, along with that U.S. politicians do their utmost so that the Alliance rather than the EU will be playing first fiddle in European security matters. In fact, the place and role of NATO in Washington's European policy can hardly be overestimated. Most openly and eloquently the meaning of NATO for the U.S. was revealed by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his last book The Great Chessboard . According to Z. Brzezinski, NATO does not only provide the main mechanism of American influence in European matters, but also is a basis for the critical from the viewpoint of the American policy, U.S. military presence in Europe. 10 Incidentally, the venerable American theorist is not disposed to exaggerating the true independence of Europe. In his opinion, although the Soviet threat is gone, some Europeans' wish to get rid of the American tutelage has not yet transformed into an irresistible impetus for the unification of the continent. 11 Moreover, according to Z. Brzezinski's logics, Europe has not yet taken shape not only militarily but also politically - Europe does not exist as a "single organism". The bitter truth is, as Z. Brzezinski ironically puts it, that Western and more and more Central Europe remain primarily the American protectorate with the allied nations looking more like ancient vassals and servants. 12 It has to be noted that Z. Brzezinski's status as a first-class foreign policy and security analyst is very well known and his opinions are examined closely by high-ranking politicians both in the U.S. and oversees. He, therefore, can hardly be accused of artificial dramatisation of the addresses problems.

New Scenarios in the Discussion

On the whole, all the above-mentioned suggests an idea that the tension in the discussion of European security, as well as NATO's and EU's role in it is unlikely to decrease in the near future. More and more new nuances loom in the distance that can seriously affect the themes and tonality of the transatlantic dialogue. Some of those were noticed by N. Gnesotto, Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies. 13 In particular, he introduces into the European equation such an unexpected element as the American project of establishing national Anti-Missile Defence (AMD) system. As a matter of fact, the Europeans are quite concerned that the AMD programme will weaken the European linkage since a gap will emerge immediately between the degree of vulnerability of the U.S. territory as compared to the European continent. On the other hand, Americans, according to N. Gnesotto puts it, are afraid to weaken NATO and undermine transatlantic link through realisation of the common European defence policy within the EU. Hence the debates on each side of the Atlantics feature one and the same topic: who stimulates the disengagement most - Americans or Europeans? The notorious disengagement has an additional aspect that was demonstrated during NATO operation in Kosovo: the military- technological gap between the U.S. and its European NATO allies. According to some western experts, this gap is acquiring threatening forms when strategic interaction between the armed forces of the U.S. and of European NATO nations, as well as their interoperability are questioned due to the technological obsolescence of the allied armaments as compared to the military potential of the transoceanic patron.

The Kosovo crisis and the way it was resolved have once again proved inadequacy of today's European efforts in the area of security provision on the continent and excessive dependency of Europe on the U.S.

стр. 38

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
in the military-political area. In this regard, the steps taken by the EU in the field of creating common military potential that would allow Europeans to act independently can only be welcomed. This is obviously not a matter of pressing the U.S. out of Europe. Such task would be impossible to realise and questionable in the sense of long-term consequences, since the U.S. does play a stabilising role in the European processes. The majority of European nations - and this has to be reckoned with - have no doubts as to the limited American presence in Europe, including the military one. However, the U.S. presence in Europe and the whole system of transatlantic relations need to be adjusted having in mind that these are European nations that should themselves take care of security and stability in Europe.

In this regard the position of Belarus and Russia has to be to a greater degree determined by the search for the most efficient ways to get involved into the processes of European integration and cooperation, which above all embraces defence and security sphere. There are very few doubts that European security largely depends on the nature of Russia-NATO relations. It is important not to let these relations get back to confrontation. They should rather become relations of partnership and full-scale cooperation. Accordingly, Belarus as Russia's unique strategic ally could make its input into the development of mutual understanding and interaction with NATO so as not to make the dividing line between the Belarus-Russia Union and the North Atlantic Alliance a line of separation and confrontation.

1. Ghebali V. The OSCE's Istanbul Charter on European Security // NATO Review , Spring-Summer 2000, p. 26.

2. Khartiya yevropeiskoi bezopasnosti. Istanbul, 18 Nvember 1999 // Dipcourier , 1999, N21, p. 41.

3. Ibid., p. 46.

4. Yevropeiskij soyuz: ukrepleniye sovmestnoi politiki v oblasti bezopasnosti i oborony // Compas , 2000, N2, p. 36.

5. Ibid., p. 39-40.

6. U.S. Department of State. Washington File, Russian Edition. December 28, 1999.

7. Ibid.

8. Yevropeiskij soyuz: ukrepleniye sovmestnoi politiki v oblasti bezopasnosti i oborony // Compas , 2000, N2, p. 34.

9. Washington Summit Communiquй, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24 April 1999 // The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, 23-25 April 1999. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999, p. 16.

10. Brzezinski Z. Velikaya shakhmatnaya doska. Gospodstvo Ameriki i yego geostrategicheskiye imperativy. M., 1998, p. 65-66.

11. Ibid., p. 77.

12. Ibid., p. 76.

13. Gnesotto N. Transatlantic debates // Newsletter . WEU Institute for Security Studies, April 2000, #29.

Постоянный адрес данной публикации: