Rostov-on-Don. Rostov Book Publishing House. 1984. 176 p.

Of all the regions that were hit by internal counter-revolution and intervened in the post-October period, the south of Russia is perhaps the most fully covered in the literature, and historians do not owe too much to the topic of the struggle against the Kaledin, Krasnovsky and Denikin White Guards, which in the summer of 1919 turned into a threat to the Soviet Republic. 1 One of the authors of the book under review, K. A. Khmelevsky, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Department of History of the CPSU at the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute named after M. Torez, also made a significant contribution to this literature .2 And here the question may arise: what is the place of the new work of K. A. Khmelevsky, made in collaboration with the Candidate of Historical Sciences, senior lecturer of the Department of History of the CPSU of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University, S. K. Khmelevsky, in the rather extensive historiography of the civil war in the South and, more specifically, on the Don?

The book's subtitle notes that it belongs to the genre of historical essays. However, the authors did not confine themselves to a popular presentation of the material already obtained by historical science, but carried out some research work. The book's source base consists of various and extensive archival and literary materials. The authors consider the "Sovietological" works from a critical point of view. The conjectures and distortions contained in them are refuted in the course of presenting specific historical material, which increases the reasonableness of the position of the authors of the reviewed book. This, like many other things, takes it beyond the genre of historical essay.

Until relatively recently, specialists in the history of the civil war and intervention studied mainly the camp of the revolution. But "there can be no revolution without counter-revolution." 3 Based on this Leninist position, studies have been published showing the camp of the counter-revolution. Now it is possible to cover the history of the Great October Revolution in a deeper and more comprehensive way and to defend its gains during the civil war and intervention as a struggle between opposing forces: revolution and counter-revolution, supported by international imperialism. The reviewed work is one of the first attempts to consider the events on the Don River from this perspective.

The previous monographic literature on the subject did not address much about a wide range of events in the region, there were works published separately on Kaledin, Krasnov, Denikin, etc. D. K. A. and S. K. Khmelevsky set out the entire history of the struggle against the counter-revolution on the Don, up to the defeat of the so-called "Red Army". The Armed Forces of the South of Russia (Denikin region). The book, therefore, has a consolidated character, which gives the reader the opportunity to see a more or less complete, complete picture of the struggle that took place here in all its complexity-

1 See, for example, Kin D. Denikinschina, L. 1927; Yanchevsky N. L. Grazhdanskaya borba na Severnom Kavkaze [Civil Struggle in the North Caucasus]. Tt. 1-2. Rostov-on-Don. 1927; Aleksashenko A. Krakh denikinshchiny, M. 1966; Kiriyenko Yu. K. Krakh kaledinshchiny, M. 1976; Polikarpov V. D. Prologue of the civil war in Russia, M. 1976.

2 Khmelevsky K. A., Berz L. I. Heroic years. Rostov-n/D. 1964; Khmelevsky K. A. The collapse of the Krasnov region and the German intervention on the Don in 1918.

3 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 12, p. 171.

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fast change of events. However, in an effort not to lose the leading thread of the presentation, the authors still focus on several key issues.

Why, for example, did the Kornilov counter-revolution, which was defeated at the end of August 1917 on the outskirts of Petrograd, immediately after the victory of October rush to the Don? Why did it stay here longer than in other central areas? "Sovietologists" are still inclined to explain this by "inveterate" Cossack counterrevolutionism. This version is usually refuted by the fact of deep social stratification of the Cossacks. But K. A. and S. K. Khmelevsky also show that the delay in the struggle on the Don was explained by the interaction of three anti-Bolshevik forces: the counterrevolution of the Cossack " upper classes "and the middle strata attracted by them, the" all-Russian " White Guard counterrevolution (Dobrarmiya) and imperialist intervention, first German, then Entente. The short fate of the Kaledin region confirms this. As for Krasnovshchina, it was supported only by the help of the Germans and the assistance of the Denikinists, and these latter - with the help of the Entente allies. "Behind the backs of the Krasnov and White Guard counter - revolutionaries," wrote V. I. Lenin, "an immeasurably more dangerous force is preparing to attack us, the forces of the international counter - revolutionary bourgeoisie, especially the Anglo-American and French ones." 4
Another problem that is raised in the book more broadly than in other works is the problem of so-called Cossack separatism, Cossack "independence". The authors associate this phenomenon with the same" upper strata " of the Cossacks, although it seems that the middle strata also felt a certain attraction to the idea of Cossack autonomy. There was a tendency in the literature not to single out Cossack separatism as a political phenomenon from the "white cause", however, it would be wrong to put an equal sign between them. During the period of emigration, many White Guard ideologists and memoirists strongly dissociated themselves from Cossack separatism, accusing it of undermining the "white cause". Separatism played a very definite role in the collapse of Denikinism at its final stage, and the authors correctly state that it "hindered the unification of anti-Soviet forces, weakening the counter-revolutionary camp" (p.111).

The book contains a lot of new data describing the socio-economic policies of the anti-Bolshevik regimes: the "ataman" governments and the "government" that was in the train of the" Armed Forces of Southern Russia "(Denikin's "Special Conference"). This aspect of the history of the Russian counter-revolution has not yet been fully considered in the scientific literature, and yet it is here that the anti-national, restorationist nature of the "white cause", which claimed to express "patriotic" and "national" interests, is most clearly visible.

Coverage of the camp of the Don and southern counterrevolution in all its complexity gave the authors the opportunity to show more deeply the heroic struggle of the Communist Party for the final victory of Soviet power on the Don. The party headed by Lenin, based on the actual situation prevailing here, and taking into account the changes in the balance of class forces, was able to win over the broad working masses to its side and thereby decide the outcome of the civil war in this most important region in its favor. Again, as in the depiction of the counter-revolutionary camp, the authors do not follow the path of simplification. In this connection, special attention should be paid to the book's coverage of the party's policy in the "Cossack question". This policy, the authors show, was based on the fact of social stratification of the Cossacks. Relying entirely on the poor, the party sought to gain strong support from broad strata of the working Cossacks, taking into account the class customs and the established "Cossack way of life". The authors try not to avoid "sharp corners" when it comes to the practical implementation of this policy. Life often turned out to be more difficult than it was envisaged in the decisions made, and often these decisions were distorted and distorted by hostile or unscrupulous elements. Lenin said of this: "In some places careerists and adventurers have attached themselves to us, calling themselves communists and deceiving us... These people, who only want to curry favor, use coercion on the ground and think that this is a good thing. But in fact, this sometimes leads to the fact that the peasants say: "Long live the Soviet government, but down with communism!" (i.e., communism)... We must not forget the enormous harm that can be caused by-

4 Ibid., vol. 37, p. 127.

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"all immoderation, all haste and haste" 5 . The party had to correct mistakes and excesses during the fierce battles of the civil war.

Not everything in the book was equally successful for the authors. By presenting their work as a historical sketch, they have taken it upon themselves to give a vivid linguistic and stylistic picture of events. Unfortunately, the book often lacks brightness, convexity, and those "exciting" places that attract the reader.

The civil war is not only a military struggle, but also a social and political one, but the authors failed to show this fully, especially when covering the counter-revolutionary camp. More details should be given about the organization and functioning of counterrevolutionary governments that tried to oppose themselves to the Soviet government and suffered a complete collapse.

The book by K. A. and S., K. Khmelevsky will be useful not only for professional historians, but also for anyone who is interested in the problem of the formation of the Republic of Soviets, the history of its struggle against internal and external counterrevolution.

5 Ibid., vol. 38, p. 199.

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