Автор: Vladimir Makei, Director, European Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus.
The meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the OSCE Member States occurred in Istanbul on 18-19 November has definitely become one of the major events of the current year.
The European and world political elite gives various assessments to the conclusions of the Summit. Some cautiously forecast possible "cool-down" of the Russia-West relations, whereas others announce "final Cold War funeral" or play political solitaire out of "the won" and "the lost". Various and sometimes opposing viewpoints are also expressed in Belarus.
A substantial analysis of the Summit conclusions is yet to be made. We will still try to single out the benefits that the Summit has brought for Europe and Belarus.
The end of the 20th century coincides with dramatic changes in the life of the planet including the European continent. The majority of states meet the new century in an indefinite situation of geopolitical changes in the regional and interregional configuration and failure of the old security system they are accustomed to.
The problem of security provision is acquiring a more universal character. At the same time its political, economic, environmental, informational and other components are becoming more visible along with the military ones.
The bloc opposition is gone. Yet, the orderliness of international relations generated by the "bloc discipline" phenomenon has become a thing of the past along with it. In the course of time the initially rosy hopes for establishment of stability on the European continent - and this is what is meant by the notion of "European security" - have gone too.
So far it is impossible to state that chaos has come or shall inevitably come to replace the "bloc opposition". However, it is quite obvious that the old threats have aggravated and the new ones have emerged. They can hardly be controlled and in case of inadequate or selfish political decisions can undermine international security and inflict serious damage to the prospects of steady development of international relations. Among these "new" threats are aggressive nationalism, separatism, disregard for national territorial integrity, terrorism, organised crime, illegal drug and arms trade, uncontrolled migration, environmental pollution and others.
An accelerated enlargement of the world's biggest military bloc, which can hardly facilitate the unity of the European continent, causes particular anxiety. In this context, the Kosovo crisis has, in a sense, become a forerunner of a "one-power" tomorrow.
Preparation for the OSCE Istanbul Summit, discussion and adoption of the final documents became an explicit demonstration of the two conflicting approaches to the establishment of the world order: a multi-polar system based on a solid foundation of the international law and the strengthening of institutions of multilateral cooperation, or a linear model with an unlimited domination of one superpower or a group of economically and militarily most developed states. The background on which one could clearly see the contours of the most recent and extremely questionable, in the sense of international law, NATO activities in Kosovo can help understand why an attempt was made during the Summit to switch the main attention to Russia exposing it to ostracism for the hostilities in the North Caucasus.
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But no matter how high tensions were at the Summit and how critical speeches of some state leaders were, the results of the meeting can only be evaluated by the contents of the adopted final documents. The Istanbul Summit was no exception.
Two exclusively important documents were signed despite all grounded forecasts that had been made till the very last moment foretelling a possible "failure" in Istanbul. These two documents are a Charter on European Security and the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Additionally, the Vienna 1999 Document relating to negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures and the Declaration of the Istanbul Summit were adopted.
Among these documents a special position is obviously occupied by the Charter on European Security in which an attempt was made to embody basic elements
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of the European security architecture of the 21st century.
The idea of developing a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st century was first announced by the Russian delegation during the Preparatory Conference to the OSCE (formerly the CSCE) Budapest Summit at the end of 1994. At the Budapest meeting the Mandate for devising within the relevant OSCE structures the "Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century" was adopted.
Since then the question of security model development was regularly put on the agenda of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the OSCE, the Permanent Council, and other OSCE bodies. At the 1996 Lisbon Summit the Declaration on the Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21 st century was adopted confirming major principles that were to find their place in the new document. Follow-up discussions on the realisation of proposals on the regional peace and stability strengthening put forward by various parties revealed significant differences in approaches used by delegations of certain states. Nonetheless, the OSCE Ministerial in Copenhagen in 1997 took a Decision on Guidelines on an OSCE Document-Charter on European Security.
The final draft of the present Charter was introduced by the OSCE Norwegian chairmanship during the final stage to Istanbul at the Review Conference in Vienna on 21 September - 1 October 1999. Obvious attempts were made by some states that due to their NATO-centrism had initially been confronting the idea of the Charter and had made every effort to adjust its contents to the concept of the OSCE "supervision" of the developments in the post-Soviet region. However, common sense eventually prevailed at the Summit as well as a responsible approach to the future of the European home, which is seen free of any bloc barriers or dividing lines.
The Belarusian delegation at the Summit had a well-considered and concerted position during the whole period of work over this document and finally achieved, in cooperation with representatives of Russia and other states, incorporation of a number of critical priorities into the Charter.
Thus, fundamental provisions of the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act and other documents that had been adopted by the OSCE, were clearly confirmed in the Charter together with the tack towards establishing a common, comprehensive and undivided security system in all its dimensions in the OSCE region, free of new dividing lines, spheres of influence and areas with different security levels. The imperative of non- interference in domestic affairs and respect for national sovereignty, the necessity of an absolute recognition of the non-use of force principle and rejection of the threat of force in relations between states, as well as inadmissibility of taking arbitrary military measures against any sovereign state passing over the UN Security Council were also identified at the Summit. The Charter embodies the principle of a composite security character, which is essential for Belarus and is not reduced to the military component only.
Due to their combined efforts, Belarus, Russia and some other delegations managed to secure the principle of consensus used at decision-making within the OSCE, the thesis of the importance of a steady economic and social development in countries with transitional economies, and a mechanism to review the fulfilment by the OSCE participating states of their commitments, including preservation of the OSCE Econo- mic Forum.
As far as field operations are concerned, the leading role of the OSCE Joint Permanent Council was laid out and the main principles of carrying out peacekeeping operations (PKO), including their police component, were embodied.
The Operations Document - a Platform for Cooperative Security - was approved as the most important component of the Charter. The aim of this document is to enhance cooperation and complementarity among organisations and institutions concerned with reinforcing comprehensive security in the OSCE region.
At the same time the Charter failed to reflect the primary role of the OSCE in the resolution of key European security issues, as emphasised by Belarus and Russia. As a compromise achieved between this position, on the one hand, and the position of the West on an actually secondary role of the OSCE in security issues, on the other hand, the Charter features the most inclusive role of the OSCE within the structure of European institutions in a non-hierarchical way.
Also, Western and other OSCE participating states did not support a proposal made by Belarus and Russia already at the initial stage on entrusting the Charter with a legal authority. In its present form the Charter on European Security has a politically mandatory character.
An Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty was determined by the necessity to increase the effectiveness and vitality of the CFE Treaty (signed on 19 November 1990) by means of redefining outdated provisions and reflecting the changes that had occurred in Europe since early 1990s. Incidentally, these were Belarus and Russia that originally proposed the adaptation.
As a result of the signature of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty in Istanbul, a transition was made from arms and military equipment restrictions based on a group balance of forces between the two military-political blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation) towards individual restrictions for each State Party based on maximum national and territorial
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ceilings. The adapted Treaty based on the principles of indivisibility of security, cooperation and confidence adequately reflects the current military-political situation without detriment to the achievements of conventional arms reductions during the last decade in Europe.
Belarus has managed to retain all the existing rights for treaty-limited items of equipment (TLEs); prevent adoption of any commitments that could entail new reductions in TLEs in Belarus; avoid exceeding expenditures relating to the Belarusian commitments under the adapted CFE Treaty; maintain the sphere and the quality of inspections of verification sites keeping their number; restrict possibilities of deploying foreign TLEs on the territory of new NATO members.
A specific feature of the adapted CFE Treaty is an additional package of unilateral political commitments to be taken on by Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, as well as Belarus, Germany and Ukraine not to use the Treaty mechanism permitting to increase their own territorial ceilings. This would restrain deployment of foreign arms and military equipment on the own territory and establish a "stabilisation area", which is in line with the Belarusian idea of a "good neighbourliness belt".
The signature of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty is an evidence of a mutually acceptable result that all OSCE participating states managed to come to, despite significant divergences of positions of the parties and intense disputes in the course of the Summit (in particular, concerning flank restrictions in the context of the Chechen crisis). One of the demonstrations of this is the assessment of the adapted CFE Treaty made in The Tribune by Mr. Koberatsky, Head of the Permanent Polish Mission to the OSCE, that Poland received what it had most been concerned with, i. e. conditions and ceilings to retain conventional arms including main battle tanks, artillery, armoured vehicles and attack helicopters that guarantee Poland's security.
A similar evaluation within the context of the achieved compromise can be given to the Vienna 1999 Negotiations Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures subsuming the 1994 Document. In the course of the negotiations on the development of the Vienna 1994 Document, significant differences were revealed in the positions of NATO members and potential candidates to the Alliance, on the one hand, and Belarus and Russia - on the other, concerning, for example, the issues of coverage by confidence measures of navies and maritime activities, broadening of confidence measures relating to ground components, enhancement of inspection procedures etc.
However, the present updated Vienna Document adequately reflects the geopolitical realities established on the international arena, remaining transparent enough, yet not affecting each sovereign state's right for self-defence.
The Republic of Belarus cooperating very closely with Russia has fully provided protection of its national security within the framework of this Document. Its implementation will not entail any additional organisational or financial load. Additional measures, as compared to the Vienna 1994 Document, are of a purely voluntary character. The adapted Vienna Document does not expand control measures over merely defensive facilities not designated for combat offensive operations (air defence assets, paramilitary units, storage facilities, pipelines etc.).
Active attempts were made by NATO members to get authorisation to use special equipment for inspections significantly increasing capabilities of inspectors relating to the collection of information on military facilities. However, the use of this equipment in the future, as well as in compliance with the former Vienna 1994 Document shall be permitted only on a bilateral basis and exclusively with the permission of the host country.
The discussion of individual provisions of the Istanbul Summit Declaration caused major debates, sometimes looking insoluble. This chiefly applies to the paragraphs associated with the North Caucasian events and the situation in Kosovo.
Along with the evaluation of situations in various OSCE regions, the Final Declaration contains a paragraph on Belarus with support to the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus, which cooperates closely both with the Belarusian authorities and oppositional parties and leaders as well as NGOs in promoting democratic institutions and stricter implementation of the OSCE commitments, thus contributing to overcoming constitutional discrepancies in Belarus.
A series of the Declaration provisions, in particular, on strengthening economic and environmental components of security in the OSCE region, are fully concordant with the priorities of Belarus within its cooperation with the OSCE.
While talking about the Summit one cannot but mention efforts of some forces within Belarus and abroad to focus attention on the so-called "Belarusian Theme" and lead the discussion to merely criticising the official Belarusian authorities. This is too a narrow approach for such an international forum.
On the whole, a productive conversation occurred in Istanbul, in which Belarus participated as an equal, active and concerned member. This is proved by the above- mentioned critical suggestions made by Belarus and reflected in the final documents of the Summit.
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It is too early to draw up final conclusions of the Istanbul Summit, since a great deal of work has to be done to implement provisions of its final documents.
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However, we can already talk about the Summit being an important milestone in the establishment of the European security architecture for the 21st century. It has reiterated the complexity of the process of OSCE transformation from a weak- structured forum lacking legal framework into an organisation capable of influencing European processes effectively, making other states respect the European order, and taking on coordinating efforts of European and Euro-Atlantic organisations.
The Istanbul Summit significantly expanded operational capabilities of the OSCE secretariat, strengthened capabilities of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre relating to early warning and crisis prevention, and presented a new vision of cooperation between the OSCE and other international, regional and sub-regional organisations. Specifically, it is expressed in the adoption of the Platform for Cooperative Security, adoption of the decision to form Rapid Expert and Cooperation Teams (REACT) allowing quick OSCE reaction to requests for assistance or large- scale local civil operations, as well as taking decisions on establishment of an Operations Centre for planning and running OSCE operations and reinforcing consultation process within the framework of the OSCE through the establishment of a Preparatory Committee under the OSCE Permanent Council.
The results of the Istanbul Summit can be viewed as highly positive for Belarus as well. Attempts by some states, first of all the US, to revise the fundamental OSCE principles and institutionalise a NATO-centrist security model were successfully prevented.
In the future Belarus obviously has to facilitate further strengthening of the OSCE as a principal body providing the European security. The prioritised role of the OSCE in dispute settlement in the area of its responsibility based on the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of participating states also deserves Belarusian support. As before, Belarus supports establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the OSCE region, based on voluntary agreements achieved between OSCE members. Belarus itself is ready for a consistent development of a dialogue with major European institutions relating to fulfilment of international commitments in the area of human rights on equal basis.
In his speech at the Summit, President of the Republic of Belarus A. Lukashenko announced every intention of Belarus' leadership to conduct "free and fair parliamentary elections, complying with current requirements" in 2000. Therein it is important to use all the existing OSCE experience and potential for development of electoral legislation and organisation of internationally recognised elections on its basis. This would allow removing all the remaining hindrances on the way of the full- scale involvement of Belarus in the European integration processes.
The signature of the Union Treaty between Belarus and Russia ensuing the Istanbul Summit also acquired a special geopolitical shade. Within the context of NATO's eastward enlargement and the tendency to a unipolar world, the emergence of a new intergovernmental institution on the European continent can be viewed as an attempt to restore the balance in the shaky system of the European security and a prospect for establishment of a new powerful pole of the future multi-polar world.
Thus, results of the last summit of this century should hardly be evaluated with the use of "who won" and "who lost" criteria. The truth is, as always, somewhere in- between. The Italian Stampa seemed to be most correct stating that the spirit of a "long suffered" compromise had won in Istanbul.
Shortly before the Summit an earthquake occurred in Turkey - this time luckily without any casualties. At some moment rumours predicted possible cancellation of the Summit. Nevertheless, the meeting did take place and it is very symbolic that despite tectonic movements the determined and challenging construction of a still fragile building of the European security still goes on.
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