Introduction

Soviet society was seen as an atheistic society. This was explicitly mentioned in the Second Program of the Party (1919) and detailed in the Third Program adopted at the Twenty-first Congress of the CPSU (1961) at the peak of Khrushchev's struggle for communist "renewal of society"1. The" new man "of such a society should be stripped of all the "birthmarks of capitalism", among which "religious superstitions", manifested primarily in religious rites, were considered as the most tenacious and undesirable 2. "Typical religious people "(as it was imagined - only old grandparents and sometimes grandfathers) could continue to believe in God, go to church and take part in religious ceremonies until their death. With their physical disappearance, both religion and the Church had to disappear as a relic and unnecessary attribute of religiosity.

This was the ideal, partly drawn from a peculiarly interpreted Marxist understanding of the"communist paradise." In the post-revolutionary years, the period of the "great turning point", the forced implementation of the Soviet modernization project in the late 1920s - 1930s.

1. See the texts in the publication: Programs and Charters of the CPSU, Moscow: Politicheskaya literatura Publ., 1969.

2. Ibid., pp. 48, 198-200.

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an attempt was made to speed up the inevitable process of religion's demise. The religious revival during the Second World War showed the futility of such forceful actions. In the post-war period, the leaders of the state revised tactics without abandoning or modifying the strategy in any way. They realized that dealing with a fully loyal church institution is much more profitable than dealing with "uncontrolled manifestations of spontaneous religiosity of the masses"3. Therefore, the existence of the Russian Orthodox Church - as the sole legal representative of all Eastern Rite Christians - was allowed, its hierarchy was used to achieve certain - mainly foreign - policy goals. At the same time, the struggle for the irreligious ideal did not stop in any way.

The new strategic task was to accelerate the transformation of the Church into a survival institution, to turn it into a "Church for itself", a "Church for grandmothers", a Church incomprehensible and unnecessary for the majority of the Soviet population - carriers of "advanced ideology and scientific worldview". It was proposed to achieve this through social isolation of the Church, first of all through the struggle against church tradition - religious holidays, rituals, " holy places "-everything that allowed the Church to go beyond the narrow space of existence reserved for it, to exert some influence on the broad masses of the population - not just"typical believers".

The Khrushchev anti-religious campaign of the late 1950s and early 1960s was a period in the post-war history of state-church relations when the fight against church rites and manifestations of popular religiosity was given primary importance and various methods were used: from "accusatory ethnography"4 to criminal persecution. This was already indicated by one of the first documents indicating the beginning of a large-scale offensive on the Church - the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of November 28, 1958 on the cessation of pilgrimage to the so-called "holy places".

3. See for example: Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). F. 17. Op. 132. D. 6. L. 132-133.

4. For more details on the anti-religious orientation of ethnographic expeditions, see: Shtyrkov S. Revealing ethnography of the Khrushchev era: Big Ideology and folk Custom (on the example of the North Ossetian ASSR)//An inviolable supply. Debates about politics and culture. 2009. N 1 (63). Access mode: http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2009/1/sh12.html.

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It was during the Khrushchev period that the new Soviet "non - religious" rite of passage was consistently introduced, and the need to develop it-as an alternative to religious rites-was discussed at the highest party level as early as the 1920s (Trotsky was one of the proponents of this idea), but was eventually rejected as a reminder of "God-building" ideas. During the years of Khrushchev's struggle for the "renewal of society", it was somehow "remembered" that Soviet "mass holidays act as an instrument of communist education of the masses and directly join party propaganda", 5 and "new rites" allow "to take away from the churchmen the right they have appropriated to act as guardians of morality" (from Kremenetsky's note party Committee, 1963) 6. As a result of this understanding, a campaign to introduce a "new ritualism"is being launched in parallel with the anti-religious one (and directly correlated with it). This campaign, which was seen as an effective tool for socializing the population, had as its primary goal to replace the "survivable" church rituals of the life cycle, as well as to replace the main holidays of the church calendar with civil ones. The beginning of this campaign on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR can be roughly dated to the end of 1962: the decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine of October 9, 1962 "On the state and measures to improve the scientific and atheistic education of workers in the Ukrainian SSR" and of July 26, 1963 "On the experience of some party organizations in introducing modern civil new customs." In 1964. "Rules on Religious Cults" were developed, which provided for the introduction of "new rituals" (and therefore the fight against religious rituals) in all spheres and at all levels: from the development of an "approximate repertoire" of new ceremonies to the introduction of a compulsory special course on "The role of Soviet holidays, customs and rituals in the communist education of workers"in higher educational institutions, for example .7
The Orthodox Church is a "liturgical" Church that considers the "visible sacraments" necessary for salvation. This,

5. Radjansju svjata 1 obryadi v komushstichnom vikhovant [Radjansju svjata 1 obryadi v komushstichnom vikhovant] / / V. K. Borisenko, V. Yu. Kelembetova, A. P. Obertinska.

6. Central State Archive of the highest authorities and management of Ukraine (TsGAVO). F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 376. L. 143.

7. Ibid. d. 421. l. 193-197.

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The ritualism of popular religiosity also contributed to the preservation of the Church in the Soviet space, as it made it unlikely that believers would choose the model of religiosity that Western sociologists define as "believing without belonging". At the same time, the liturgical nature of the Church has made it particularly sensitive to anti-ecclesiastical and secularizing measures of the state. In the face of numerous prohibitions and restrictions, unequal competition with the "new rites", the performance of rites turned into an "act of civic courage", as Mikhail Shkarovsky defined, far from remaining only a sign of religiosity.8 From an anthropological perspective, as Vlad Naumescu points out in religious rites, ceremonies in a communist state were by definition a "form of protest", as they provided an opportunity to preserve the identities and collective memory that the regime was trying to destroy.9
The State's discriminatory policy was met with opposition from the Church. The protection of the Orthodox tradition was seen as possible through its transformation, modification, adaptation to socialist realities. The article analyzes some of the transformations in the ritual and ceremonial practices of the Russian Orthodox Church both during and as a result of the Khrushchev campaign. Available sources (reports of the authorized representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church Council and the Council for Religious Affairs, statistical data, articles in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, internal church documentation, oral sources, ethnographic materials, etc.) make it possible to trace changes in the ritual life of Orthodox dioceses and parishes on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, brought to life as direct "achievements" the Khrushchevite struggle (reduction of the number of churches and clergy, 10 restrictions on holding church ceremonies, introduction of alternative "new rites", etc.), and the general need for the Church to adapt to the new socialist realities.

8. Russian Orthodox Church under Stalin and Khrushchev (State-Church relations in the USSR in 1939-1964). Moscow: Krutitskoe patriarchal metochion; Society of lovers of Church History, 2000. p. 20.

Naumescu V. 9. Modes of Religiosity in Eastern Christianity: Religious Processes and Social Change in Ukraine. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008. P. 25.

10. See Appendix 1.

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Priority attention should be paid to the spread of secret illegal rites, specific changes in traditional rites (first of all, baptisms and funerals), which can be defined as "adapted rites", the appearance of "secular" ceremonies, as well as organizational changes in the conduct of the central festivals of the church calendar. In all cases, it is important to track who initiated the initiative (believers, clergy, bishops), as well as how the church and state authorities perceived certain changes and new phenomena in religious life.

Secret rites

The ministers of the traditionalist liturgical Church, which for centuries was the state church, Orthodox priests, were the least prepared to respond to the challenges of our time (from anti-religious persecution to secularization processes). As we read in the scientific literature, the consequences of this were as follows: the clergy completely obeyed official instructions, were completely controlled by deans and diocesan leadership, and therefore did not show any initiative in meeting the religious needs of their flock.11
State and ecclesiastical authorities required priests to report on any rites performed, which provided ample opportunities for monitoring the population's religiosity. Fr. Eshliman and Fr. Yakunin emphasize the disastrous consequences: the priest turned into an "informer" who betrayed those who "entrusted themselves to the protection of the Mother Church"12. The answer of the clergy was secret rites, which are very difficult for a researcher to learn about the features and scale of, because it is easy to assume how little information about them has been preserved. Only indirect testimonies and oral sources make it possible to examine the secret ritual life of the Church.

Stehle H. 11. Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917 - 1979. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1981. P. 4; Fletcher W.C. A Study in Survival: The Church in Russia 1927 - 1943. London: S.P.C.K., 1965. P. 4 - 5; Young G. Power and the Sacred in Revolutionary Russia: Religious Activists in the Village. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

12. Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine (TsGA-OO). F. 1. Op. 31. d. 2972. L. 8.

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Secret baptisms have become the most common rite, the reasons for which should be sought in the determining role of this sacrament for the Christian Church. Ms. Datsishina recalls that her husband is Fr. Mikhail Datsishin-always asked whether baptisms and other sacraments should be registered before they are performed. She also recalls numerous occasions when, after performing a properly executed rite, parishioners returned to the priest, asking him to destroy the records in the receipt books. 13 In the church, such baptisms were performed mainly at night, in most cases only in the presence of the infant's grandmother, often without the consent of the parents and without godparents, sometimes in the presence of only the infant's mother. Most often, as Ms. Datsishina recalls, such baptisms were performed outside the walls of the church, in apartments and even in specially rented premises.14
Datsishin's behavior was not so exceptional, although he was a "reunited" -former Greek Catholic - priest, and therefore better prepared than the Orthodox to circumvent official restrictions and prohibitions. Numerical evidence from the documentation of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and later the Council for Religious Affairs and internal church documentation confirm that the practice has become widespread. In an address to the Episcopate by the head of the Chancellery of the Moscow Patriarchate, Archpriest Nikolai Kolchitsky of October 23, 1959. We read about " violations of the legislation on cults by the clergy." Special attention was paid to the widespread practice of performing baptisms and other rites outside the walls of the church, especially in rented premises. 15 Patriarchal Epistle No. 1917 of December 22, 1964 reveals that the performance of secret rites became particularly widespread in the mid-1960s, due to the numerical prohibitions and restrictions of the Khrushchev era. Patriarch Alexy (Simansky) forbade priests to perform unregistered baptisms, such as baptisms and baptisms.-

13. Interview with Mrs. Yaroslav Datsishina, March 1, 2002, Stryi, Lviv region. Interviewer: Natalia Shlichta. See also: Interview with O. Bohdan Shchur, March 13, Derzhiv village, Mykolaiv district, Lviv region.//Archive of the Institute of Church History (Lviv). P-1-1-331. P. 14; Interview with O. Bohdan Nud, April 1, 1993, Zagirochko village, Zhidachevsky district, Lviv region.//In the same place. P-1-1-333. P. 34.

14. Interview with Mrs. Yaroslav Datsishina, March 1, 2002.

15. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 187. L. 25.

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baptisms without the consent of both parents, as well as baptisms outside the church 16. He stressed that a baptism performed illegally-outside the walls of the church, without the consent of parents and without proper registration- " does not correspond to the height and sanctity of the sacrament performed and contradicts the law."17. And therefore: "It is necessary to explain to the clergy with all firmness that the performance of the sacrament of baptism over minors without appropriate prior registration by the church executive bodies should not take place"18

By failing to comply with these instructions, many priests falsified records in the receipt books: they wrote down false information, which mainly concerned the names and addresses of the baby's parents. Such false records could only be detected as a result of administrative checks (which were carried out from time to time by commissioners and local authorities), and therefore it is almost impossible to determine the extent of this practice.19 If false records were found, the priests justified themselves by saying that they did not know whether the information that was provided to them was true. 20 Such an excuse sounded plausible enough from the lips of the city clergy. It also points to one of the main reasons why the faithful wanted to baptize their children in large urban churches and cathedrals, even when their local church was still active: the priority was not to show their own membership in the Church.21
Organizational changes in ritual practices

In order to communicate more closely with the faithful outside the walls of the church, priests made rounds, which allowed performing rituals without control. The rounds gave the clergy the opportunity to communicate with the population, and not only with "typical believers".-

16. Ibid. Op. 5. d. 220. L. 33.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid. Italics are ours. - N. S.

19. TSGAO. f. 1. Op. 25. D. 185. L. 3; TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 358. L. 153; Ibid. Op. 5. d. 88. L. 27; State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). f. 6991-Op. 2. D. 453. L. 5.

20. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 407. L. 112.

21. TSGAOOO. F. 1. Op. 31. D. 2166. L. 15.

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both of them". As we learn from the reports of the Council's commissioners, during such rounds, the priest could conduct "a broad campaign to attract citizens to attend church, baptize children, sing, perform the consecration of houses, wells and other services [during the Christmas Fast]" (Commissioner in the Kherson region Gryzhenko), or he (not) directly opposed" [nash. - N. Sh.] cultural and mass work" (Commissioner in Zaporizhia region Sidorenko)22. It is for this reason that a number of documents adopted in the late 1950s and early 1960s restricted the right of priests to visit only the homes of " believers "and only"by invitation".

Sources describe two scenarios for such crawls. In keeping with Orthodox tradition, rounds led by priests were common, often with the participation of secular church officials and lay activists during Lent and Nativity. Mass closures of rural churches during Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign have added a new dimension to traditional detours. Priests and church activists from the diocesan center spread information about the schedule of festive services in urban churches, visiting villages where churches were closed.23
The detours of lay activists and nuns, in turn, were a response to the regime's anti-church policy. Such detours were also primarily timed to coincide with posts. Three main reasons contributed to their transformation into a large-scale practice. The first is the shortage of clergy and, consequently, the inability of registered clergy - mainly urban clergy - to visit all vacant rural parishes during their rounds. Secondly, it made it possible to circumvent official prohibitions on clergy visits. An equally important reason was the desire to hide the fact of making detours from the commissioner. Commissioner Gryzhenko explained in 1959 that at least some information about such detours can only be obtained from informal conversations with believers. 24
In the Council's documentation, there are two opposite estimates of such workarounds. More often than not, the commissioners view them as an even more " pernicious way of religion."-

22. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 160. L. 206; Ibid. d. 176. L. 53.

23. Ibid. d. 144. l. 103.

24. Ibid. d. 193. L. 135-136.

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of religious propaganda", than the rounds of the clergy. This understanding was mainly based on the fact that they had minimal information about them and virtually no administrative authority to restrict or punish church activists. It is equally important that such detours indicated an increase in the role of lay people in the life of the Church and/or provided an opportunity for monastics to communicate with the population. "Wandering nuns"were described in the Council's documentation as the most dangerous "propagators of religious ideas", and their contribution to strengthening the religious beliefs of the population was always emphasized separately. 25
A less typical and rather unexpected assessment, based on the above, is found in the report of Commissioner Gryzhenko on the Christmas holidays of 1960 in the Kherson region: "Working with people [of the church's activists and nuns - N. S.]... is less successful and less dangerous than the work of the clergy themselves"26. The only explanation for this situation is that it is not possible to a contradictory assessment can be offered only by recalling the primary anti-clerical focus of the Khrushchev campaign.

The clergy's diligent organization of festive services is a step towards meeting the needs of believers, as well as a way to attract more people to the church. The innovations analyzed below can be considered typical, because they were reported by representatives from different regions of the Ukrainian Exarchate, and this kind of information appears more and more often with the deployment of an anti-religious campaign. The best recorded innovations are those introduced to the most popular rites of the Kulicha and Jordan water consecration since the mid-1950s. Changes to traditional celebrations, as in all other cases, were especially urgent in urban churches. Choosing the most optimal time for the consecration of cakes is one of the main problems that clergy face at Easter. Priests had to take into account the demands of the "new socialist reality" (mainly the working schedule of the population), as well as the immediate results and long-term consequences of the regime's anti-religious measures. The faithful wanted to hide their own participation in the ceremony. Priests were forced to consecrate cakes in large quantities.

25. Ibid. d. 358. l. 81-83.

26. Ibid. d. 219. L. 13.

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in large numbers, due to the small number of active churches and the clergy themselves, and due to the influx of believers from closed rural churches.27 An expressive certificate was left by the commissioner in the Kherson region Sukhoi. In 1967, parishioners of a registered religious community in the village of Staraya Zbruevka, Holopristansky district, complained that they were unable to consecrate cakes because of the influx of believers from neighboring closed churches.28
The practice of moving the rite of consecration of Easter cakes to the second half of Holy Saturday has become widespread. This innovation directly contradicted the Orthodox canons, which provide for the performance of the rite of consecration only after the all-night vigil, Easter matins and festive liturgy. In addition, priests often consecrated" batches of cakes " (from a few dozen to several hundred at a time), instead of individual ones, in order to make better use of the festival's time.

The explanations of the priests from Stalina, a large diocesan and industrial center, shed light on the considerations of the clergy, forcing them to deliberately violate the canons. The priests explained that changing the time of performing the rite made it possible to avoid commotion and crowding in churches, to consecrate Easter food for those who could not stay for the all-night vigil and Easter liturgy, and also provided an opportunity for those who lived far from the diocesan center (in remote rural churches) to return home before the Easter breakfast 30. Even when the Easter cakes were consecrated on Easter morning, the ceremony was continued for several hours (6-d hours in the morning), and not timed to coincide with the end of the festive service, with the same goal-to avoid pandemonium in churches and allow as many people as possible to attend the ceremony.31
The changes that the clergy made to the popular rite of the Great Consecration of Water were caused by such reasoning, as well as the need to comply with orders prohibiting the consecration of water outside the church walls. The commissioners strictly controlled the implementation of this requirement, and the slightest violation could cost the priest registration. To proil-

27. Ibid. Op. 5. D. 7. L. 187.

28. Ibid. d. 42. l. 57.

29. Ibid., l. 58.

30. Ibid. Op. 1. d. 193. L. 93.

31. Ibid. d. 298. l. 149.

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To illustrate the categorical nature of the ban, I will give the following example: Rodnin, the commissioner for the Odessa region, explained in his 1967 report that the clergy were not allowed to consecrate water in wells located immediately outside the church gates. If there was no well in the churchyard, the faithful were required to bring bottled water for consecration.32 Of course, the priests could not simply rely on the initiative of the laity, because the result was often a big crush in the churches. Since the mid-1950s, most city churches have consecrated water quite regularly. An additional reason was the desire to revive the festive atmosphere, which disappeared after the tradition of the Great Consecration of water in rivers and lakes was banned 33. Water in barrels and buckets was prepared ahead of time. They were placed all over the churchyard for more efficient distribution of water to the faithful. After the festive service, several priests consecrated the water at the same time: there were cases of five or six priests participating in the rite in city churches.34
"Secular" rite

In defending their right to religious life, the faithful did not rely solely on the initiative of the clergy. They resorted to numerous illegal actions, indicating their practical adaptation to the Soviet socio-political realities. William Fletcher states: "Practical adjustment has become the main advantage of the Church in its struggle for survival." 35
Unauthorized seizure of officially confiscated churches and holding secret ceremonies in them are the most typical actions resorted to by the laity. It is not surprising that such actions became possible and, moreover, were further stimulated by the "ill-considered actions" of local authorities in the issue of confi-

32. Ibid. d. 176. L. 168; Ibid. Op. 5. d. 42. L. 25.

33. See the authorized representatives ' descriptions of the clergy's attempts to revive the Epiphany celebration: Ibid. Op. 1. d. 176. L. 233; Ibid. d. 219. L. 65; Ibid. Op. 5. d. 42. l. 22.

34. Ibid. Op. 1. d. 298. L. 48.

Fletcher W. 35. A Study in Survival. P. 4.

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churches ' associations (as explained by the Commissioner for the Ukrainian SSR Konstantin Litvin): closed, mainly during the Khrushchev campaign, the churches were mostly not used in any way for many years.36 The researcher is unable to determine the extent of such secret ceremonies or reconstruct them in detail. Individual testimonies, both oral and written, still allow for some generalizations. The number of such seizures of churches for the purpose of holding services there increased on the eve and during major religious holidays, mainly Easter and Christmas. Since the late 1950s, illegal seizures of churches and holding secret services there have become a familiar feature of religious life, mainly in rural areas, where only closed and forgotten churches remained suitable for worship. If such an opportunity did not exist, believers gathered for prayer or worship in residential buildings and apartments.

The commissioners reported on the increasingly common practice of" gatherings " of the laity themselves, without a priest. One of the rarest detailed evidence of such a "secular" rite is found in the report of the commissioner in the Chernivtsi region Podolsky on the Easter celebrations of 1970. He described the usual (as he emphasized) practice of residents of those villages where churches had been closed since the days of Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign. Believers gathered in a closed church, read prayers and even consecrated cakes themselves, without a priest. Water for consecration was prepared ahead of time by priests from the nearest operating churches 37. Between the lines in the reports of the commissioners, we read that until the 1970s, such illegal " secular services "became a familiar feature of church life, a kind of new, fairly well-organized"rite". The Commissioner for the Transcarpathian region summarized his observations on such ceremonies:

Everything was subject to a clear ritual, the hand of an invisible leader was felt. From believers it became known that there is

36. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 5. D. 128. L. 67.

37. Ibid. d. 189. l. 97.

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church self-government, after the service donations are collected for the maintenance of the church 38.

The assumption that" secular services "are turning into a kind of" new rite " is first found in the report on religious life in the Ukrainian SSR by Deputy Republican Commissioner Katunin in the early 1950s. (report for the first half of 1952). Katunin analyzed numerous cases of secret meetings of believers for collective prayers and divine services (on the occasion of major holidays and on Sundays) in churches (both registered, but left without a priest, and closed), residential buildings and apartments. Such ceremonies were conducted mainly by the faithful themselves, due to the lack of clergy or the latter's unwillingness to resort to such openly "illegal actions". Summing up, the official stressed that such services "take the form of a new ritual for the Orthodox Church." 39 He pointed out that such ceremonies - "in absentia" - were conducted by church activists, "often not only unable to read Church Slavonic, but generally illiterate individuals who remember by heart some of the church services or know a certain number of prayers."40

Katunin's final remark is very important for understanding the essence of such a "new rite". The spread of" secular rites", on the one hand, showed that the mechanical reduction of the network of churches and the number of clergy did not automatically lead to a" departure of the population from religion", only further stimulating the religious feelings of believers. Vlad Naumescu summarizes:

When the traditional parish was destroyed as a result of Soviet policies, a completely new kind of relationship between clergy and believers developed, resulting in completely new collective practices ... which only increased the motivation of the faithful.41
38.Cit. by: Belyakova N. From the history of registration of religious associations in Ukraine and Belarus in 1976-1986//An inviolable supply. Debates about politics and culture. 20о8. N з (59). Access mode: http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2008/3/be13.html.

39. TSGAOOO. F. 1. Op. 24. D. 1572. L. 261.

40. Ibid.

Naumescu V. 41. Modes of Religiosity in Eastern Christianity. P. 135.

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On the other hand, the spread of such practices indicated an increasingly profound destruction of traditional church life, because such actions of believers, as Katunin emphasized, "cease to be consistent with the statutory requirements of the Orthodox Church."42 This new feature caused concern for both the official church and the ecclesiastical opposition, who could not accept "the massive development of sectarianism among the masses (believers - N. Sh.) who seek satisfaction for their religious needs wherever they can"43.

The Orthodox tradition, paradoxical as it may sound, not only made such services possible, but also made them a step that was very difficult for believers to take. The Orthodox Church is "non-clerical" 44, and the secular element is given a significant role in all spheres of religious life, not excluding worship. Therefore, "an Orthodox believer is not as dependent on a priest as, for example, a Catholic"45. At the same time, it is enough to recall the liturgical nature of the Church and the behavioral traditionalism of the Orthodox to understand how difficult and undesirable such a "new rite"was for them.

"Adapted" rites

The slightest changes in the established ritual practice were perceived very painfully by the liturgical Church. They were also harshly criticized by the authorities, as they helped the Church circumvent official prohibitions and restrictions. On a more fundamental level, they showed the ability of the Church to adapt to unfavorable socio-political conditions, which the regime, which wanted to deal with a traditionalist, out-of-touch Church, could not welcome.

An interesting observation can be made on the basis of a systematic analysis of the documentation of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and Co-

42. TSGAOOO. F. 1. Op. 24. D. 1572. L. 262.

43. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 5. D. 128. L. 47.

Phillips A. 44. The Church and the Filioquism//Orthodox Christianity and the English Tradition. Norfolk: The English Orthodox Trust, 1995. P. 66.

Pascal P. 45. The Religion of the Russian People/Trans. Williams R. New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1976. P. 118.

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department of Religious Affairs. Secret rites were not recorded much by the commissioners, not only because of the lack of information about them, but also because the Council was much less concerned about the spread of secret practices than the adaptation/modification of rites. To explain this strange attitude, it is enough to recall that according to the official view: a) the ritual life of the Church was explained by the ritualism of popular religiosity, and not considered as evidence of faith; b) the first task of the regime's efforts was to isolate the traditionalist Church from the modernized society. As long as the performance of the rites could be explained by the nature of popular religiosity and Orthodox traditionalism, the ritual life was less dangerous for the official ideal of a secularized society than in the case when the rites were "adapted", "modernized".

The term "adapted rites" itself, unlike other concepts used on these pages - "secret rites", "secular rites", etc. - is not found in the official documentation of the Soviet period. Perhaps not the most optimal category from a terminological point of view is introduced by the author of the article to summarize those modifications of ritual practice that were criticized in the Council's documents for striving to "modernize" the Orthodox tradition, to "adapt"/"apply" it to Soviet social, cultural and political realities.

Modifications of life-cycle rituals were of primary concern to the authorities because of their far-reaching socio-cultural implications. The theological and socio-cultural significance of the sacrament of baptism has made it the main target of anti-religious and secularization activities. Since the prohibitions were the most numerous and the control over their implementation was the most severe, the rite of baptism underwent significant changes.

One of the initiatives of Khrushchev's anti - religious campaign is to ban any baptisms other than infant baptisms. "It is forbidden by the authorities to baptize children older than one and a half to two years, if the child is older than two years, they should be sent home unbaptized" 46. The ban was a response to the widespread practice of baptizing children, adolescents, and adults. The rite has become widespread-

46. Keston Institute (Oxford, Great Britain), Samizdat Archive (SAKI), SU/Ort 7/14.1 Pochaev Appeal "Orthodox Christians of all Russia". P. 2.

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In the late 1940s and early 1950s, when the relatively liberal conditions of the state-church agreement made it possible to baptize those who had not been baptized in the previous years of Stalin's anti - religious persecution.

Commenting on the state of religiosity in the Ukrainian Exarchate in 1947, the Commissioner for the Ukrainian SSR Pavel Khodchenko considered the rite of adult baptism, which had reached a "critical" level, as an important indicator of "the large size of the state of religiosity among the masses"47. In 1951, the new Commissioner for the Ukrainian SSR Grigory Korchevoy informed that baptisms remained the most popular among the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. all the rites. As for the rite of adult baptism, after the culminating first post-war years, its popularity declined slightly.48 After the bans of the early 1960s,49 the number of baptisms of children and adults increased dramatically again. Over the next decade, about half of the baptisms performed in the central and eastern regions of Ukraine were such baptisms.50
Taking into account the scale of this phenomenon, the Council's leadership demanded that the commissioners pay more attention to such baptisms and provide detailed statistics, which should help in developing methods of countering them. Within six months in 1965, Vladimir Kuroyedov signed two almost identical decrees (letters No. 494 of February 25 and No. 2030 of August 27)to submit separate figures in reports for baptisms of infants, children under three, children from three to 6 years, from 7 to 16 years and older. 51
The spread of baptisms of children and adults has become a new phenomenon in the religious life of the Orthodox community in Ukraine. It was this rite that, according to the leadership and representatives of the Council, especially clearly testified to the commitment of the population to the Church. Unlike the traditional rite of infant baptism, the adapted rite is "hardly caused by the setting of a new birth certificate."-

47. TSGAOOO. F. 1. Op. 23. D. 4555. L. 186-187.

48. Ibid. Op. 24. d. 783. L. 39.

49. No direct evidence could be found, but from the reports of the commissioners we can assume that the relevant policy documents were dated 1963 TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 407. L. 74.

50. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 450. L. 41, 19-20; Ibid. Op. 5. d. 281. L. 206-207; GARF. F. 6991. Op. 2. D. 574. L. 172.

51. GARF. F. 6991. Op. 2. D. 566. L. 5.

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whether this fact indicates the growing influence of the church on the population" (from the report of the Commissioner in the Kiev region Sukhonin, 1965)52.

The Council officials were most concerned about the spread of the practice of mass collective baptisms since the mid-1950s. When the anti-religious campaign reached its climax, the Commissioner for the Ukrainian SSR, Grigory Pinchuk, even proposed banning "collective baptisms" .53 At first glance, the spread of the collective ceremony only indicated an acute shortage of clergy and the desire of the population to hide their own commitment to the Church by hiding in the crowd during major holidays, when such ceremonies were mainly performed. But the list of holidays to which such ceremonies were timed explains the special concern of the authorities: Easter, Christmas, as well as New Year's Eve, May 1, November 7. It is May 1 and November 7-the central dates of the Soviet calendar-that are most often found in the Council's documentation, of course, because of the complete inadmissibility of any correlation between a Soviet holiday and a religious ceremony. "The desire of believers to coincide the baptisms of children with the days of the revolutionary holidays of May 1 and November 7" can be traced back to the first post-war years.54 Since the mid-1950s, such a collective ceremony has become a feature of religious life in urban areas, although it has also been somewhat widespread in rural areas.55
Priests, especially from the industrial regions of Eastern Ukraine and Kiev, emotionally describe all the difficulties they faced while performing many baptisms on the days of Soviet holidays. The dean of the diocesan center of Staline claimed that every year on the October holidays - November 7 and 8 - four priests from the cathedral could not meet the ever-increasing ritual needs of the population. They "spent the whole day baptizing their children until they were completely tired," although they performed only a simplified collective ceremony, and not an individual rite.56 Other priests from the Stalinist region confirmed-

52. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 450. L. 43.

53. GARF. F. 6991. Op. 1C. D. 1788. L. 48.

54. TSGAO. f. 1. Op. 24. D. 312. L. 4-5; TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 144. L. 123.

55. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 144. L. 84.

56. Ibid. d. 144. L. 130.

page 396
It is believed that during the revolutionary holidays, infants, children and adults were forced to baptize from early morning to late evening "in large and small groups and alone", and "there are so many of them that they (the priests - N. S.) are exhausted"57.

Statistics help us better understand their experiences. According to the sources of the Russian Orthodox Church Affairs Council, the rite of baptism in Kharkiv (a very "dysfunctional" center in this respect) on the holiday of May 1 was performed in the following numbers: in 1953 - 256 (an additional 79 in suburban churches), in 1954 - 318 (116), in 1955-298 (80)58. In 1958, Pinchuk informed the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine about the performance of baptisms on the feast of November 9 in the churches of large cities in Eastern Ukraine: in Kharkiv-496, Voroshilovgrad-226, Stalin-400.59 Of course, a direct correlation with the data on the rite of baptism performed on religious holidays (which, unfortunately, could not be found) is necessary for final conclusions about the actual popularity of such ceremonies.

Such baptisms-regardless of whether they were as "large - scale" as the Council's documentation and ethnographic sources indicate, or not-did not simply serve to meet the religious needs of the population. They were becoming a worrying sign for the regime, which sought to completely isolate the Church. The fact that the rite of baptism was timed to coincide with the Soviet holiday in order to make this family event more solemn testified that the" old "religious rite remained quite important for the "secularized" population. This timing, which can hardly be reduced to the weekend factor alone, helped maintain a symbolic link between the Church and Soviet society. Important in this context is the evidence of the special popularity of this ceremony among the intelligentsia and the working population of Kiev and the large industrial centers of the East and South of Ukraine.

The funeral ceremony is no less significant for popular religiosity and has no less socio-cultural significance. Nothing showed this better than the percentage of religious funerals of Communists. Assessing them as "blasphemy", the authorized Body-

57. Ibid., l. 124.

58. TSGAOOO. F. 1. Op. 24. D. 4038. L. 292.

59. Ibid. d. 4927. L. 49-50.

page 397
Khodin, a researcher in the Kharkiv region, in his report for 1965 even demanded "to establish... legal norms restricting churchmen from performing funeral rites for dead communists." His proposal was to develop an effective alternative in the form of "beautiful, cheap burials" .60
An unnamed priest from the industrial village of Novoukrainka, Kharkiv region, noted in 1947 that he did not know of any cases of burial without a religious ceremony. Even "in cases where funerals are performed according to a civil rite, then [relatives. - N. Sh.] bring the earth to the church to the priest - "seal""61. Two decades later, Konstantin Litvin, in his 1968 report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Republic on the religiosity of the population of the republic, was forced to admit that funerals remained one of the main reasons for this. one of the most common religious ceremonies and that the number of absentee funerals even exceeded the number of traditional rites. According to its data, that year Orthodox priests performed 96,338 traditional funeral ceremonies and 114,041 absentee funerals.62 The reason for the special popularity of the correspondence ceremony is simple: it is practically impossible to control it, let alone to oppose it in any way.63
In the two decades that separate these observations of the Orthodox priest and the republican commissioner, absentee funerals have changed significantly. The goal was to make them an even more accessible alternative in the face of increasing anti-religious persecution. In the 1940s and 1950s, priests required relatives to bring earth from the grave for the ceremony and pour it back onto the grave after consecration. In the 1960s, the requirements were significantly relaxed: "Earth, as they explain, can be taken from any grave and not even from the grave and poured out on any grave" 64. Believers considered such a simplified ceremony as an alternative only in extreme cases. Usually, earth was taken from the grave and brought to the priest, who "sealed the coffin... he prayed, sprinkled holy water, and (recited) prayed accordingly-

60. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 450. L. 111.

61. TSGAOOO. F. 1. Op. 23. D. 4555. L. 186.

62. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 5. D. 281. L. 206.

63. See Appendix 2.

64. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 450. L. 10.

page 398
you". Then the earth was poured back onto the grave, accompanied by prayers 65.

The connection between religious and civil rites, which was also visible during absentee funerals, became apparent when, mainly in cities, a combined ceremony was held with the attributes of both religious and Soviet burial. Usually, the combined ceremony consisted of a religious procession with a priest and a church choir, followed by a brass band - a necessary attribute of a civil ceremony. After the religious ceremony, the parting words were pronounced by one of the official comrades of the church. It is quite easy to understand the authorities ' sharply negative attitude towards this ceremony. The combined funerals signaled the fiasco of official efforts to supplant religious rites with a "new" civil one, as well as the Church's ability to adapt its ritual practices to unfavorable conditions, thus preserving ritual life. At the basic level, the ceremony had even more negative consequences for the official anti-religious and secularization program, as it showed the ability of the Church to confirm its own "timeliness", its necessity for the relevant "comrades" and their families, because the ceremony was hardly performed on "typical believers" - "elderly grandparents".

The Patriarchate's guide to the modification of rites

Modification of rites has become a protective and quite effective step on the part of the clergy and laity. The lack of an alternative way to ensure the preservation of ritual life in the face of anti-religious persecution and the scale of local initiatives forced the church authorities, despite all their rejection of ritual changes, to agree with them and even authorize them, at least semi-officially.

Analyzing the changes in ritual practice in the Soviet era, William Fletcher clearly distinguishes between"theological conservatism" and "Orthodox christianity".

65. Interview with fr. Ivan Repela, 14.02.93, Ivano-Frankivsk. P-1 - 1-275. p. 17; Interview with Mrs. Yaroslav Datsishina, March 22, 2002.

66. TsGAOO. F. 1. Op. 31. d. 4555. L. 281; Russian State Archive of Modern History (RGANI). F. 5. Op. 33. D. 90. L. 9.

page 399
The Church and its capacity for "practical adjustment". He argues that theological conservatism in no way hindered the Church's adaptation to Soviet realities. Moreover, I even helped him. "The changes did take place. But because the dogmas of the Church were inviolable, these changes did not require a rethinking of the theological principles of the Church"67. In fact, the transition from " dogmatic inflexibility "(another concept proposed by Fletcher) to" practical adjustment " was not nearly as painless or easy as Fletcher writes. Moreover, some of the changes introduced by the clergy to meet the needs of the faithful reached such proportions that it was impossible to avoid their theological justification or at least the sanction of the church authorities.

The attitude of the official church to ritual changes can be easily illustrated by the example of collective confession. The very dogmatics of the Russian Orthodox Church demanded a change in the form of the sacrament. After all, confession is a necessary condition for the communion of the laity. The traditional requirement to receive communion at least once a year - on Easter - automatically implied the need for confession. Due to the acute shortage of clergy and functioning churches, registered priests did not have the practical opportunity to profess all comers during Lent, and therefore resorted to a collective ceremony.68
Due to its inseparable connection with the Sacrament of Communion, collective (general) confession became one of those "adapted" rites that the church authorities sharply criticized. Patriarch Alexy strongly opposed this practice. He raised this issue immediately after his appointment as locum tenens of the Patriarchal throne at a meeting of the Holy Synod on July 18, 1944. The future patriarch argued that "the rite of confession is radically distorted by the practice of the so-called general confession", because "the church charter does not know general confession, it recognizes only private confession". Of particular concern to him was the fact that the collective confession was threatened

Fletcher W.C. 67. A Study in Survival. P. 5.

68. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 176. L. 19-20, 60, 105; Ibid. d. 193. L. 135; Ibid. Op. 1. D. 7. L. 101.

page 400
The Sacrament of Communion: "A careless attitude to confession entails the same attitude to the sacrament of communion." 69
Despite the open criticism of the collective ceremony, the head of the Church still allowed it to be performed "if necessary" with the only condition of individual permissive prayer for each penitent. The reason was obvious - he could not offer any alternative solution to the problem that the Church faced every year during Lent. Yet, despite the complete lack of an alternative, over the following decades the church authorities were very reluctant to grant permission for a collective ceremony, claiming that it could only be accepted "as an exception." 70
The researcher does not have enough sources to determine the attitude of the clergy who practiced it to the collective confession. The available sources, however, call into question the simplistic view of the" practical adjustment " of the Church. Parish priests pondered the canonical justification for their actions much more than Fletcher suggests. In Fr. Mikhail Datsishin's diary from the 1950s to the 1960s, we find numerous quotations from Orthodox literature with his own approving comments:

The modern general confession, if you approach it strictly, is not a confession at all. Common confession causes us terrible harm, people stop observing their conscience, there is no spiritual growth, there is indifference to their salvation. They perform only the form, formalism is a terrible danger 71.

The leadership of the Patriarchate was forced to react to the initiatives of the clergy, not only criticizing or reluctantly accepting them, but also sanctioning them. The position of the official church in the late 1960s did not differ very much from the views voiced by the future Patriarch in 1944: "Every sacrament,

69. GARF. F. 6991. Op. 2. D. ga. L. 100.

Tsypin V. (prot.). 70. History of the Russian Church 1917-1997 (History of the Russian Church. - Book 9). Moscow: Izd. Spaso-Preobrazhensky Valaam Monastery, 1997, p. 372.

71. Private archive of O. Mykhailo Datsyshyn (Stryi, Lviv region). A notebook called "Confession" - "Thoughts-Journal of the MP".

page 401
according to Orthodox teaching, only then will it be a sacrament and only then will it have a gracious effect on a person when it is performed exactly according to the established rite. " 72 And yet the understanding of the "exactly according to the established rank" formula has changed significantly over the decades. Departure from traditional practices has rarely been officially justified: the researcher will not find synodal or patriarchal permits to modify the rites. But a careful reading of the" Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate " allows us to trace the evolution of the attitude.

Articles raising the issue of modification of rites and canonical practices first appeared on the pages of the Journal in the mid-1950s. The earliest articles looked for ways to justify common local practices and usually did so by referring to the apostolic tradition. One of the articles, for example, considering the ritual changes approved by the Apostolic Council, explained: "The dogmas and teachings of the church can never be changed. Rites can also be changed... It cannot be otherwise: rites, in their external composition, are often composed depending on circumstances, and they also change with changes in circumstances. " 73 The author of the article emphasized that only the church authorities have the authority to authorize any changes in ritual practice, trying to limit initiatives from below.

Articles from the late 1950s to the 1960s continued to develop the idea of the dependence of ritual practice on specific conditions, arguing with those who criticized Orthodox practice for its conservatism and traditionalism.74 It is important that any mention that only the church authorities can initiate changes is gradually disappearing from the pages of the magazine. Each change is recognized as effective, provided that the modified rite retains the necessary attributes of the sacrament: the authority of the person performing the sacrament (priest), the use of the appropriate substance or external sign, and the preservation of the ritual formula 75.

72. GARF. F. 6991. Op. 2. D. 2a. L. 100.

Isidore (ep.) 73. Essential properties of the True Church//Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (ZHMP), 1955, No. 5, p. 47.

Gnedich P. (prot.). 74. On the Orthodox understanding of the Church and the unity of Church life / / ZhMP. 1962. N 8. p. 54.

75. Ibid., pp. 53-55; Talyzin A. Sobornost ' i avtokefaliya [Conciliarity and autocephaly] / / ZHMP. 1959-N u. p. 54-55; Georgievsky A. Smysl i znachenie obryadov Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi/ / ZhMP. 1957-N 4. P. 51.

page 402
Such minimum requirements show that the church authorities were forced to accept and, despite their lack of desire, authorize spontaneous initiatives from below, since they could not offer an alternative way to preserve the ritual life of the Church. When interpreting the attitude of the official church to ritual changes, one should not forget about another important factor - these changes were perceived sharply negatively by the state authorities.

Conclusions

The Orthodox Church did not remain only a passive victim of the state's discriminatory policy, which was clearly manifested in a massive anti-religious campaign and a large-scale secularization program of the Khrushchev period, not least implemented through the introduction of the "new ritualism". The answer to the regime's actions should be sought primarily not in the form of open protest actions, but at the level of everyday practice, church routine.

Taking into account both the immediate realities of the Church's existence (from the acute shortage of churches and clergy to prohibitions and restrictions on performing church ceremonies) and the general Soviet socio-political and socio-cultural realities, the (theoretically non-initiative) clergy and laity saw two main ways to protect the Orthodox tradition. The first is to hide the visible manifestations of religiosity from the all-seeing eye of the corresponding "comrades". Hence-the performance of secret, unregistered, and therefore illegal, rites. The second was the desire to modernize traditional practice, make it more flexible and effective, which led to the mass distribution of" adapted "and" secular " rites.

The initiatives of the Orthodox clergy and laity were almost always double-edged: they opposed official prohibitions, but at the same time undermined traditional ritual life. Moreover, they did not agree with the views ("adapted" rites), and also contradicted the instructions (secret rites) of the Patriarchate's leadership. Secret and" adapted " rites and secular ceremonies became a large-scale phenomenon by the mid-1960s: the examples analyzed in these pages are only a few of them, although

page 403
and the most typical and significant ones for ritual life, as confirmed, among other things, by mass ethnographic sources. The researcher, describing the life of the Church in the Soviet period, is forced to forget about the usual categories of interaction between the " parish priest "and his"parishioners". Although "parishes"," parish clergy "and" parishioners " have certainly not disappeared, it is appropriate to use these terms only when analyzing specific cases. The traditional parish was practically destroyed, on the one hand, as a result of the mass closure of churches and the de - registration of clergy, and on the other-due to the specific response of the clergy and laity to these challenges.

Bibliography

Archive materials

State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). F. 6991 (Council for Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 1943-1991).Russian State Archive of Modern History (RGANI). F. 5 (Apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1949-1991).

Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). F. 17 (Fund of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1903-1991).

Central State Archive of the Highest authorities and Administration of Ukraine (TsDAVO, Ukraine).

F. 4648 (Council for Religious Affairs under the Ministry of Migration and Nationalities of Ukraine and its predecessors (joint fund)).

Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine (TSAOOO, Ukraine).

F. 1 (Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, 1917-1991).

Private archive of Fr. Mykhailo Datsyshyn (Stryi, Lviv region). Notebook entitled "Confessions" - "Thoughts-Journal of the MP".

Keston Institute (Oxford, Great Britain), Samizdat Archive.

Oral sources

Archive of the Institute of Church History (Lviv).

P-1-1.

Interview

Ya. Datsishina (2002)

Published sources

Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, 1944-1971.

Programs and Charters of the CPSU, Moscow: Politicheskaya literatura Publ., 1969.

page 404
Literature

Belyakova N. From the history of registration of religious associations in Ukraine and Belarus in 1976-1986//An inviolable supply. Debates about politics and culture. 2008. N 3 (59). Access mode: http://magazines.russ.ru/ nz/20o8/3/bei3.html.

Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, 1944-1971.

Pospelovsky D. V. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkva v XX veke [Russian Orthodox Church in the XX Century]. Moscow: Respublika Publ., 1995.

Programs and Charters of the CPSU, Moscow: Politicheskaya literatura Publ., 1969.

Радянські свята і обряди в комуністичному вихованні/В. К. Борисенко, В. Ю. Келембетова, А. П. Обертинська. К.: Політвидав України, 1978.

Religious rituals: content, evolution, and assessments/Under total. ed. Onishchenko A. S. K.: Vyshcha shkola Golovnoe izvo, 1988.

Tsypin V. (prot.). History of the Russian Church 1917-1997 (History of the Russian Church. - Book 9). Moscow: Izd. Spaso-Preobrazhensky Valaam Monastery, 1997.

Chumachenko T. A. State, Orthodox Church, Believers. 1941-1961 (Series "The first monograph"). Moscow: "ANRO-XX", 1999.

Shkarovsky M. V. Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet State in 1943-1964: From the "Truce" to the New War. Saint Petersburg: DEAN+ADIA-M Publ., 1995.

Shkarovsky M. V. Russian Orthodox Church under Stalin and Khrushchev (State-Church relations in the USSR in 1939-1964). Moscow: Krutitskoe patriarchal metochion; Society of Lovers of Church History, 2000.

Shtyrkov S. Revealing ethnography of the Khrushchev Era: Big ideology and folk custom (on the example of the North Ossetian ASSR)//An inviolable supply. Debates about politics and culture. 2009. N 1 (63). Access mode: http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2009/1/sh12.html.

Bell C. Ritual: Perspective and Dimensions. New York -Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Coniaris A.M. Introducing the Orthodox Church: Its Faith and Life. Minneapolis: Light and Life Publishing Company, 1982.

Ellis J. The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History. London - Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986.

Fletcher W.C. A Study in Survival: The Church in Russia 1927 - 1943. London: S.P.C.K., 1965.

Hervieu-Leger D. Religion as a Chain of Memory/Trans, by Simone Lee. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.

Naumescu V. Modes of Religiosity in Eastern Christianity: Religious Processes and Social Change in Ukraine. Berlin: LitVerlag, 2008.

Pascal P. The Religion of the Russian People/Trans. Williams R. New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1976.

Phillips A. Orthodox Christianity and the English Tradition. Norfolk: The English Orthodox Trust, 1995.

Stehle H. Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917 - 1979. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1981.

Wilson B. Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Young G. Power and the Sacred in Revolutionary Russia: Religious Activists in the Village. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

page 405
Appendix 1

Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign in the Ukrainian SSR

Sources: GARF. F. 6991. Op. 2. D. 257. L. 2, 4-5; Ibid. D. 265. L. 2-3, 55 TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 268. L. 5-25.

year*

1

2

3**

4

5

6

7

8

1959

8,464

6,741

61 (46)

477

425

6,453

1,375

211

1960

8,207

6,579

257 (162)

489

419

6,377

1,128

283

1962

6,418

5,463

1,789 (1,116)

1,372

585

1-functioning churches and houses of worship

2 - "standard" churches

3 - decreased by (compared to the previous period) ("standard" churches)

4-affiliated churches

5-churches where the liturgy is served daily

6-churches where the liturgy is served once a week

7-churches where the liturgy is served two or three times a year

8-registered churches where the liturgy has not been served for more than a year

year*

1

2

3

4**

5

6

7

1959

18

5,466

260

5,744

162

290

1960

17

5,166

243

5,426

65

416

1962

15

4,114

236

4,365

3,634

1-episcopate

2-priests

3-deacons

4-together

5-psalmists

6-ordained in the previous year

7-the number of clergy personnel decreased in the previous year

* Data as of January 1 of the current year.

** Calculated.

page 406
Appendix 2

Ritualism in the Ukrainian SSR (mid-1960s)

Source: TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 450. L. 1 - 4, 5, 9, 19 - 20, 35, 40 - 41, 46, 52, 62, 64 - 65, 68, 73, 85, 102, 106, 113, 116, 120 - 121, 136, 138, 152.76

Regions

Baptisms (% of newborns)

Weddings (% of registered marriages)

Religious funerals (% of the number of deceased)

Absentee funerals (% of the number of deceased)

1964*

1965

1964

1965

1964

1965

1964

1965

Vinnytsia region

38.4

42.5

2.4

1.6

29.0

19.6

Volyn region

78.0

79.0

14.0

12.0

74.0

69.0

Dnipropetrovsk region

29.1

32.3

0.4

0. Z

3.6

3.7

31.4

40.4

Donetsk Region

50.7

49.1

0.4

0.4

16.2

17.3

Ivano-Frankivsk region

68.9

71.1

36.8

27.7

76.0

76.0

Zhytomyr region

52.0

57.8

1.9

1.1

43.4

42.7

Transcarpathian region

62.0

53.7

31.8

28.1

58.9

58.2

Zaporizhia region

32.2

27.2

0.5

0.2

2.8

2.8

Kievskaya Street

41.1

45.5

1.1

0.7

29.4

18.1

13.0

Kirovohradskaya Street

33.6

38.5

0.5

0.2

1.8

1.9

46.9

27.6

Krymskaya Street

25.7

24.6

0,1

0,1

7.1

5.8

48.7

54.5

Luhansk Region

47.0

51.2

0.52

0.72

37.1

33.1

41.2

35.5

Lviv region

63.7

59.9

29.4

26.5

72.7

74.3

Nikolaevskaya Street

28.1

30.9

0,3

0,1

10.3

9.7

33.8

37.3

Odessa Region

44.4

45.2

5.5

6.6

28.0

34.7

Poltava Region

38.0

36.5

4.0

10.0

14.5

16.7

32.2

35,0

Rivne Region

71.6

63.9

22.8

21.5

65.0

67.5

Sumy Region

54.2

52.8

1.0

0.7

33.7

32.1

33.7

Ternopil Region

69.0

63.5

37.1

30.6

79.0

80.5

Kharkiv Region

43.5

47.0

0.6

0.6

12.0

12.0

36.5

46.9

Kherson Region

35.8

40.0

0.04

0.02

26.0

30.3

9.0

5.5

Khmelnitskaya

44.8

42.6

0.66

0.6

20.8

22.6

3.73

3.43

Cherkasskaya

35.6

35.5

0.2

0.28

16.3

12.4

13.7

14.7

Chernivtsi region

69.4

71.5

22.1

24.9

68.0

70.1

Chernihiv region

37.8

38.7

2.2

2.0

29.3

24.6

32.2

32.8

As a whole in the Ukrainian SSR

47.8

48.02

8.09

7.9

34.2

33.4

Z0. Z

28.9

* Data provided by regional commissioners as of the first half of the current year.

page 407

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