From the editorial office. Organizing a discussion of the article by A. I. Salitsky and V. V. Tatsii1, the editorial staff proceeded from the importance of the issues raised in it and their debatable nature. There is no doubt that the first decade of the new century, especially in the context of the global financial and economic crisis, has seen significant changes in the global economy. The stability of the Chinese model of economic development has clearly manifested itself, and China's role in the global economy, its share in global GDP, and in world exports have increased. During the crisis, they began to talk about the "collapse of liberalism" - the mainstream of economic theory. However, along with the mainstream, there are (and co-exist with) other theories, in particular Keynesianism. State intervention in the economy (a characteristic feature of the Chinese model) allowed Western countries to reduce the negative consequences of the crisis (this is quite consistent with the concept of neoclassical synthesis, according to which the neoliberal model is used in a favorable economic environment, and Keynesian recipes involving state intervention in the economy are adopted in conditions of "economic turbulence").
The article speaks about the lack of balanced assessments of the current situation in the global economy, which raises a number of questions. Are we witnessing the final "decline" of the United States, the West, and the economy of post-industrial countries, with its servisization? Will the Chinese economic model replace the mainstream of economic theory? What are the main features of this model? Is the threat of a total collapse of the international financial system real, and who will be among the losers in this case? Will regionalization replace globalization? These questions are important not only from a theoretical, but also from a political and practical point of view.
The answers to these and other questions that arise in connection with the "provocative" article, in the words of two panelists, are provided by scientists. The discussion was attended by employees of the Institute of Information Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, IDV RAS, IMEMO RAS, ISAA MSU. The published presentations reflect different approaches to the problems under consideration and offer different answers to the questions raised. They contain an analysis of the features of the Chinese model and the "bottlenecks" of the PRC economy, assess the current situation in the world economy, and analyze the problems of economic theory. The discussion will continue in the next issue.
A. V. Akimov (IB RAS). REVALUATION OF EXISTING ASSETS AND EVALUATION OF NEW ONES. The discussion organized by the magazine "Vostok (Oriens)" based on the article by A. I. Salitsky and V. V. Tatsii is a correct and timely step. We can only express our gratitude to the authors of the article for choosing the exact topic for discussion, and to the editorial board of the journal for providing a platform for discussion. We should agree with the authors of the article that "during periods of global financial and economic crises, the lack of balanced assessments of current events is particularly acute" (Salitsky, Tatsiy, p.72). It is pointless to complain about this - such a reaction is the norm in the context of a democratic discussion of problems, when anyone can express any opinions, but the call of A. I. Salitsky and
1 Salitsky A. I., Tatsii V. V. Globalizatsiya versus regionalizatsiya [Globalization versus regionalization]. Mirovaya ekonomika: vremya revesenok [The World Economy: the time of revaluations]. 2011. N 5.
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Vladimir Putin: We can only welcome your interest in realistic estimates in a turbulent economic environment.
As for the content side of the issue, it seems that it can be divided into two parts. The first is a study of what has developed, what has determined the course of economic development for decades, but in a new light, a shift in emphasis, a reassessment of existing phenomena, strategies, and even the structure of values. The second is the search for new phenomena (which may be well-forgotten old ones) in the global economy, identification of emerging trends in its development, research work aimed at determining what can happen, what new trends that have not yet manifested themselves in real life are possible and can become decisive in the long term.
A. I. Salitsky and V. V. Tatsii point out that "some characteristics of the Chinese development model convince us that it is fundamentally possible to achieve high rates of economic growth if the financial sector is subordinated to the tasks of industrial modernization" (p.78). It seems that this feature of the Chinese model is not unique. The economies of Japan and the Republic of Korea developed in a similar way during the decades of industrial expansion of these countries.
On page 70, it is pointed out that "Shanghai's economy is already predominantly a service economy." It seems that this trend is absolutely natural, since in the most advanced regions of China, what is observed in all economically developed countries is happening. There is a saturation of all commodity markets, consumers have all the necessary items for a comfortable life and prestigious (for different income groups) consumption, including cars, housing, clothing, household appliances and electronics. New classes of goods do not appear very often, and no sane consumer will constantly throw away long-term consumption items and buy new ones, so only by offering services can a consumer who is "fed up" with things be encouraged to spend money.
On page 80, the authors discuss an important topic, which is not only significant in itself, but also very interesting, as a phenomenon of persistent distortion of the issue in the mass consciousness of the expert community, at least in our country. This is a question about the energy intensity of GDP. It is certainly important for our country, so the interest in it is justified, but trying to use the energy intensity of GDP as an indicator of economic development, and in economically developed countries the energy intensity of GDP is lower than in many developing countries and transition economies, many experts ignore the GDP structure of the countries being compared. Naturally, with a high share of services in GDP, the energy intensity will be lower, since for example, a stockbroker needs to use disproportionately less energy resources than for a metallurgist, who can work on the latest technological equipment. Since most of the Chinese industry was created in recent years, one can only agree with the authors that "the economy of the PRC is quite 'intensive' and 'modern '" (p.80).
The wording on page 81 is very accurate :" Neither the market itself, nor globalization, nor the strenuous attempts to create a "favorable investment climate" through legislative measures, nor "high-tech clusters of the new economy" solve the problems of modernization. It ultimately means subordinating all activities of the superstructure and the financial sector to the development of the productive forces." The experience of Japan, a significant number of new industrial countries and transition economies demonstrates vivid examples of the correctness of this position.
On page 82, the authors express the controversial idea that " things are probably moving towards regionalization of the world economy." This is unlikely due to the existing division of labor and the formation of a large number of oligopolies in various industries, as we will show below. There may be changes in the division of labor, due, for example, to the fact that the increase in the cost of labor in the PRC will allow many developing countries to wuxi-
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China will move to a more skilled segment, while China will continue to strengthen its position in industries that require cheap labor.
Here it is appropriate to refer to historical analogies that are important for the analysis of the present and future. The first analogy: the European world spent almost the entire period up to the beginning of the 19th century paying with precious metals for goods that were produced in the countries of the Orient2, i.e., to a certain extent, economic relations were akin to modern ones in the sense that the East produced and exported real products to Europe, and Europe paid with money that it owed"to get it. Naturally, a significant difference was that the main demand in the West was formed by a well-off minority, and the advantages of the East over the West lay in the natural area. In the East, nature gave more than in the West. Labor now provides more wealth in the East than in the West, because the East has a larger labor force. Previously, the West paid the East in gold, now-in currency and financial instruments. Second analogy: during the Industrial Revolution, low production costs in the West ruined artisans in the East. Now cheap imports from Asia are ruining manufacturers in developed countries.
It is possible that the current workshop of the world - China-will cease to be such in terms of cheap industrial products due to an aging population, an increase in the cost of labor, and, for example, African countries will export such products to China, which will become a supplier of high-tech and expensive products and financial resources for the world economy. Now economically developed countries will move towards the current position of the Netherlands and Sweden - countries that were advanced in their time, but lost ground to larger states. Naturally, this is less likely for the United States, but for European countries, this prospect does not seem improbable. It seems that this is partly why economic and even political integration within the EU is a sustainable trend, despite the big challenges along the way, since only a united Europe can meet today's global challenges.
Thus, it seems that a significant part of what China brings to the modern world economic development fits into the already known framework, so that revaluations in the global economy may not be fundamental. The financial sector is very likely to survive. The following arguments are the basis for considering the preservation of the financial sector of the world economy as its most important part. First, the development of credit institutions and banks has played an important role in boosting economic growth and the scientific and technological revolution, since loans have been needed for many decades to implement new projects or introduce new technologies. In order for the real sector to be flexible, able to implement large projects in a short time, respond to changes in demand and scientific and technological innovations, it must be able to lend quickly, cheaply and in large volumes. Secondly, the financial sector in its current form ensures the existence of funded pension systems in developed countries, so the collapse of the financial sector is not only a disaster for speculators and rich investors, but also for hundreds of millions of ordinary citizens of developed countries, so not only brokers, bankers and speculators, but also hundreds of millions of ordinary citizens many countries around the world are interested in maintaining a strong financial sector. Finally, all the" economic miracles " of the twentieth century were based on the fact that credit resources and investment moved easily between countries, which is useful for economic development, including in developing countries. It is difficult to create a modern economy without the most powerful banks, financial exchanges and related institutions
2 This feature of East-West trade is analyzed in detail by A. M. Petrov in the chapter " Economic contact between the West and the East (the process and results by the beginning of the XIX century)" in the monograph " International Economic Communication in the History of the East "(Moscow, 2010).
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imagine. Most states, firms and ordinary citizens are interested in these institutions. It is easier to imagine a more or less successful system reconfiguration.
Thus, it seems that in many respects China will only introduce specifics into the objectively developed processes in the world economy and will fit into them itself.
Now let's try to outline some problems and trends in what has not yet been determined, but may become significant in the future and cause fundamental revaluations in the global economy. This is the direction of technological development in connection with demographic and environmental processes. If the demographic and environmental components are well described (the only problem is whether the Earth's resources will be sufficient for the growing population in the long term), then the direction of technological development attracts less attention, and this question is important, since not all scientific and technological progress works to ensure the survival of humanity.
During the period of confrontation in the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the Western countries, led by the United States, experienced a period of intense scientific and technological progress, when jet aircraft technology was created, space exploration began, nuclear technologies were created, and a leap in shipbuilding was made. All these achievements were supported by the development of materials science and metallurgy, chemical technologies, instrumentation and electronics. With a significant conversion potential, not all of this complex has found application in the civil sector. For example, significant progress in the field of tank construction has not found civilian use.
With the end of the arms race, the development of a purely military direction in research and development has faded into the background, but it should be noted that the main areas of research activity that have developed over the past decades, such as electronics and information technology, medicine and the automotive industry, also have vulnerabilities in terms of their usefulness for waiting for humanity. The fact is that to a large extent, all three areas work to serve end-use, but are not related to life support, which includes food production and the creation and maintenance of artificial habitats, i.e. the creation of housing and thermal comfort. The above-mentioned areas of scientific and technical research do not provide much for the development of technologies that meet basic needs. All of these areas are important for modern economic growth. They provide jobs, technological progress, create absolutely useful goods (medicines), significantly expand the possibilities of human communication and intellectual activity (electronics and information technologies), improve everyday life and increase the ability to move and travel (cars). Constant investment in these industries creates a stream of innovation that is positively perceived by the market and again contributes to economic growth. It was the global auto industry that was most affected by the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, i.e. this industry has now turned out to be fundamentally important for economic stability.
It should be noted that the current status of leading industries in scientific and technological development is possible only if the problems of life support are satisfactorily solved. High-tech medical equipment and medicines will be devalued if there is an acute shortage of food or heating, mobile phones, computers and the Internet will stop working if there is a prolonged power outage, cars will run out of fuel or if there is a power outage, if these are electric vehicles.3
3 An emotionally vivid example of the limited capacity of information technologies to solve acute crisis problems is provided by September 11, 2001. Then, after it became clear that it was impossible to get out of the upper floors of the burning shopping center building damaged by the terrorist plane, some people called their loved ones on the phone to say goodbye before they died. The transmission of information is at the highest level, but this does not create ways to save lives.
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In a certain sense, both the arms race and the current focus on stimulating individual consumption, with an emphasis on rapid changes in the product range of cars, mobile communications and computers, are akin to the construction of pyramids in ancient Egypt or temples, thermal baths, amphitheaters and stadiums in ancient Rome. This construction was also high-tech at that time, and it was aimed at consumption - state in the person of the pharaohs of Ancient Egypt or public in Ancient Rome. The development of high-tech construction in ancient Egypt and ancient Rome did not save these civilizations from destruction, since they were not aimed at solving the problems of life support. It can be noted that in China and India, during the existence of the Roman Empire, quite complex hydraulic structures (dams and irrigation systems) were also built, which were aimed at solving the problem of life support - food production. Chinese and Indian civilisations - by historical standards the same age as the Roman one - still exist today. Thus, the direction of scientific and technological progress, the combination of its various components, timely support for life-sustaining research, even if at present they give less economic return in the form of increased sales of new products, are important conditions for the successful development of both leading countries in the field of scientific research and the world as a whole.
For example, nanotechnologies, the development of which is becoming one of the main directions of scientific and technological development, can be useful for the development of life-supporting technologies in the creation of new materials for solar energy and new filter membranes that will provide water purification and desalination4. At the same time, if the development of nanotechnologies follows the path of creating a new element base for electronics, then as a result there may be great achievements in creating new goods purchased by consumers, in GDP growth, but this will not do much for the survival of mankind.
In this regard, it is interesting to search for sources of economic growth among technologies related to life support. Among the new components of growth, the infrastructure block industries deserve attention. The main economic task may be to invest in the creation of new and renewal of existing production and transport infrastructure, in urban development, global energy and food production, and in environmental conservation in both developed and developing countries and transition economies.5 In this case, the task is not to maximize individual consumption, but to create and improve conditions for the existence of a modern society with a comfortable environment, and to solve global problems. This strategy does not imply an immediate equalization of the levels of socio-economic development of different countries, but it creates conditions for this in the future.
The implementation of this strategy in practice may not be easy from the point of view of business organization and state management of economic processes. The fact is that the globalization of the economy and the parallel liberalization of regulation of this sphere of activity have caused a number of consequences that will affect any economic development strategy. These consequences create new conditions that are already having and will continue to have an impact on the global economy's recovery from the financial and economic crisis of recent years.
For developed countries, a number of problems are related to the success of their social and economic development.
4 См.: Roadmap at 2015 on Nanotechnology Application in the Sector of: Materials, Health & Medical Systems, Energy. Synthesis Report // AIRI/Nanotec IT. January 2006.
5 Problems with transport infrastructure and electricity supply as significant restrictions for foreign investment are indicated in particular by: Global Monitoring Report 2009. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. P. 52.
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First, the full promotion of market mechanisms in the economies of developed countries, while strengthening social protection mechanisms, has led to the fact that the mobilizing role of the economic crisis in terms of increasing activity in search of new jobs when ordinary members of society leave or start a new business has weakened. The level of social protection in the United States is lower than in Europe, but everywhere it is incomparably higher than it was a few decades ago, for example, during the Great Depression of the 1930s. This situation greatly limits the ability of the economy to heal itself from the crisis by mobilizing the entrepreneurial potential of the broad masses of people. At the same time, with a declining tax base, the State must bear the burden of social obligations.
Secondly, the technological level of production has become so complex that it requires very significant financial resources to start or establish it, and a very high level of knowledge to develop a truly new product to enter the market. It also often cuts off the creative opportunities of mass democratic market capitalism, where competition from many small producers in the market creates economic growth, limiting these opportunities to small businesses in trade and services. Small businesses in these areas can mitigate the problems of unemployment, but will not bring the economy to a new technological level.
Globalization and global competition have led to the fact that the improvement of production and the development of global marketing systems have created many oligopolies and even monopolies in narrow areas of production. For a large number of medium-and high-tech products, as well as key products of the mining industry, there are still a few manufacturers in the world that supply all countries with their products. This is observed in the oil, automobile, electrical, electronic, and pharmaceutical industries, which produce mass products, but the same situation is observed in the production of investment goods, such as the aviation industry, the production of metallurgical equipment, machine tool construction, and many other industries. Highly specialized monopolists may not be ready for major changes in their operations and expect that they will" sit out " the crisis, and in the conditions of recovery, demand for their products will grow again. This circumstance also limits the possibility of restoring economic development through market mechanisms.
Third, over the years of liberalization of economic policy, the state elite of developed countries has lost the skills and mechanisms of managing structural policy, i.e., the development of economic sectors and the creation of industrial policies. Currently, the most developed mechanisms for managing the financial sector, the organization of cash flows in the state, but these mechanisms were also damaged by the financial crisis.
As a result, society, business and the state in developed countries are facing a large-scale crisis, having lost many mechanisms of adaptation and solving such problems.
Developing countries and countries with economies in transition also have a number of constraints that will have an impact on economic policy.
First, most developing countries are small in terms of population and economy, so that in the context of globalization and heavy dependence on imports of everything that makes up the elements of modern life-from household appliances, cars, food to industrial equipment-they can only adapt to the conditions that will shape developed and large developing countries and countries with economies in transition. For the majority of developing countries, the global crisis will probably not be an impetus for development. Only a few countries in this group can claim the role of leaders, so it is quite reasonable to single out the twenty countries that have the most significant weight in the world economy.
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Second, there are different options for setting up development mechanisms, and major developing countries need to make important decisions in this area that can affect their political sustainability. The fact is that the development strategy can be aimed at that part of society that is already involved in modern production, participates in the international division of labor, but suffered during the global crisis with a reduction in exports to developed countries. Economic policy may consist in addressing the problems of employment and income of this part of society; thus, the already modernized part of society may become a priority for development.
At the same time, almost all countries in the developing world and countries with economies in transition, including China, have large populations that are still very far from modern standards of living. This part of the population needs to reorient investments towards taking their interests into account, but the technological level of both production and manufactured goods and services in this case will be lower than in the case of focusing on the modernized part of society. Unlike developed countries, developing countries and countries with economies in transition have huge unmet demand, but its very size is also a problem, since the question arises about the order of its saturation.
Third, the lack of natural resources - from minerals to fresh water - may become a challenge for the development of transition economies and developing countries in the coming years, which will hinder the catch-up development of these countries. The technological development strategy is already clear. This is a repetition of the path of developed countries, the most striking example of which is the motorization of China and India. Thus, catch-up development will require more and more natural resources, whose reserves are limited, and the most accessible deposits with low production costs have already been exhausted.
So it is the combination of long-term trends that have been modified by China's growth, and new phenomena, trends and risks in the global system that would have developed even without the phenomenal economic growth of the PRC, but cannot but become complicated, aggravated or grow in scale precisely because of this growth, that will determine the complex picture of the world economy, which, I hope that we will be able to discuss it many times on the pages of the magazine "Vostok (Oriens)".
V. Ya. Portyakov (IDV RAS). CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT MODEL: A REAL ASSESSMENT. The article by A. I. Salitsky and V. V. Tatsii fits seamlessly into the discussion that is currently actively going on in expert circles about the likely change of leaders of the world economy and the need to rethink some of the provisions of economic theory that dominated in the period 1991-2008, that is, in the time period from the collapse of the USSR to the global economic crisis of 2008-2009.
The focus of the discussion is whether the United States, Europe, and Japan are still the leaders of the global economy today, or whether they have already been replaced or are about to be replaced by some other states and groups of countries. Most often, they talk about the future leadership of developing Asia (primarily in the face of China and India, but not only) or "new emerging markets" in the face of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa with certain additions (Turkey, Mexico, etc.). Asia, Africa and Latin America with low per capita GDP will become the main engine of the global economy in the coming decades." As for the Western countries, today they are deprived of all the main trump cards that have become the basis of their well-being. The working-age population in these countries is not growing or declining. They no longer have a monopoly on new technologies and the production of sophisticated modern products..."- and so on [Zubets, 2010, pp. 50-51]. However, there are also many who believe that " developed countries can regain their authority and reputation. It will take
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a lot of effort, time and money, but they are able to restore their position, which is now shaken" [Nadorshin, 2011].
To a large extent, progress in the global economy will depend on the continuation of high GDP growth in China. This issue has also been the subject of lively discussions. Some analysts predict a slowdown in China's GDP growth to 8.9% in 2011 and to 8.3% in 2012 (10.3% in 2010) [Shamina, 2011]. Others, on the contrary, do not see any serious reasons for such a slowdown [Guriev, Tsyvinsky].
Although the article by A. I. Salitsky and V. V. Tatsii is accompanied by a question mark, their position is unambiguous. First, the shift in the global economy has become a fait accompli. "The era of US economic dominance is over," they say. Second, this shift, of which China was the main driving force, was made possible by Beijing's economic policies that do not coincide, or even directly contradict, the "mainstream" recipes, i.e., the liberal political and economic doctrine. Among the most important points, the authors highlight the PRC's focus on industrial development, rather than on the service sector and, above all, the financial sector, and Beijing's reliance on the investment model of development, which, as A. I. Salitsky and V. V. Tatsiy believe, "does not prevent consumption from growing dynamically in absolute terms due to high economic growth rates." Among the main final conclusions are the provisions that "the new structure of the world economy will be increasingly formed by China" and that a new economic center is being formed in the person of the PRC, "which will mainly be closed to the trade and financial flows of surrounding countries...".
Along the way, the authors question the notion of "innovative breakthroughs" as the basis of modern development and criticize the emphasis on expanding demand and "high-tech clusters" as the mainstay of modernization. Not all the "non-standard" ideas of the article by A. I. Salitsky and V. V. Tatsii are mentioned, but the mentioned one is quite enough to characterize the authors 'work as attention-grabbing, interesting, provocative, "thought-provoking", etc.
As for my attitude to the main provisions of this article, it is ambiguous. I can fully agree with some things (including the special role of industrialization in ensuring China's economic success), some require further reflection (for example, a positive assessment of the Chinese investment model of development), some raise objections at the first reading-for me, this is the idea of China's future significant contribution to the development of the world economy."real improvement of the planet" as "a rational, economical and therefore eco-friendly world". (By the way, the data in Table 7 of the article itself on specific CO2 emissions rather refute this idea of the authors than confirm it.) However, my main complaint to the text of A. I. Salitsky and V. V. Tatsiya is its excessive categorical character, an unconditional extrapolation of some trends of the world economy during the crisis years (2008-2009) for the entire foreseeable future.
The authors 'position is largely based on the thesis of reducing the dependence of China's economic growth on foreign economic relations and its ability to "develop at the expense of internal factors", which was shown by the global crisis of 2008-2009. At first glance, this position is also confirmed by official statistics: at the peak of the global economic crisis in 2009, the ratio of China's foreign trade to GDP fell to 44% from 57% in 2008, and the ratio of exports to GDP fell to 24% from 32%, respectively (see Table 7However, in the following year, 2010, following the relative normalization of the situation in the world economy and trade, these proportions significantly increased: the ratio of foreign trade to GDP reached 49%, and exports to GDP - up to 25.4%. So, in my opinion, it is too early to talk about a decrease in the dependence of China's economic growth on foreign economic relations as a stable trend. In addition, and this is probably even more important, the degree of this dependence itself remains very significant in the PRC.
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Table 1
Ratio of foreign trade to GDP in China, 1978-2010
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Foreign trade
Export
Import
GDP
1:4
2:4
3:4
1978
35.5
16.76
18.74
364.5
9.74
4.60
5.14
1979
45.46
21.17
24.29
406.3
11.19
5.21
5.98
1980
57.0
27.12
29.88
454.6
12.53
5.96
6.57
1981
73.53
36.76
36.77
489.1
15.03
7.52
7.51
1982
77.13
41.38
35.75
532.3
14.49
7.77
6.72
1983
86.01
43.83
42.18
596.3
14.42
7.35
7.07
1984
120.1
58.05
62.05
720.8
16.66
8.05
8.61
1985
206.67
80.89
125.78
901.6
22.92
8.97
13.95
1986
258.04
108.21
149.83
1027.5
25.11
10.53
14.58
1987
308.42
147.0
161.42
1205.8
25.58
12.19
13.39
1988
382.18
176.67
205.51
1504.3
25.40
11.74
13.66
1989
415.59
195.60
219.99
1699.2
24.46
11.51
12.95
1990
556.01
298.58
257.43
1866.8
29.78
15.99
13.79
1991
722.58
382.71
339.87
2178.1
33.17
17.57
15.60
1992
911.96
467.63
444.33
2692.3
33.87
17.37
16.50
1993
1127.1
528.48
598.62
3533.4
31.90
14.96
16.94
1994
2038.19
1042.18
996.01
4819.8
42.28
21.62
20.66
1995
2349.99
1245.18
1104.81
6079.4
38.65
20.48
18.17
1996
2413.38
1257.64
1155.74
7117.6
33.90
17.67
16.23
1997
2696.72
1516.07
1180.65
7897.3
34.15
19.20
14.95
1998
2684.97
1522.36
1162.61
8440.2
31.81
18.03
13.78
1999
2989.63
1615.98
1373.65
8967.7
33.33
18.02
15.31
2000
3927.32
2063.44
1863.88
9921.5
39.58
20.80
18.78
2001
4218.36
2202.44
2015.92
10 965.5
38.47
20.09
18.38
2002
5137.82
2694.79
2443.03
12 033.3
42.70
22.40
20.30
2003
7048.35
3628.79
3419.56
13 582.3
51.89
26.72
25.17
2004
9553.91
4910.33
4643.58
15 987.8
59.75
30.71
29.04
2005
11 692.18
6264.81
5427.37
18 493.7
63.22
33.87
29.35
2006
14 097.15
7759.46
6337.69
21 631.4
65.17
35.87
29.30
2007
16 674.02
9345.56
7328.46
26 581.0
62.73
35.16
27.57
2008
17 992.15
10 039.49
7952.65
31 404.5
57.29
31.97
25.32
2009
15 064.81
8202.97
6861.84
34 090.3
44.19
24.06
20.13
2010
19 568.72
10 102.45
9466.27
39 798.3
49.17
25.38
23.79
The data in columns 1-4 is given in billions. RMB. Data on gross domestic product are presented in current prices.
The data in columns 5 to 7 is given as a percentage.
Compiled and calculated on the basis of data from: Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2011 (Brief Statistics of China-2011). Beijing, 2011, p. 20, 65.
The table below clearly shows a steady increase in this dependence from less than 10% in the pre-reform period of 1978, when China was still in a semi-autarkic state, to a peak of 65% in 2006. (the country's export-GDP ratio increased from 4.6% to 35.9% during this period.) It is also necessary to take into account the commodity content of Chinese exports and imports, which is one of the main material components.
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factors in the implementation of the policy of industrialization of the country, which is so highly appreciated by A. I. Salitsky and V. V. Tatsii. Without a large-scale policy of openness and a really huge degree of reliance on the external market for a large country, this industrialization would not have been possible. Nor will it be possible in the long run to solve the new task for China - gaining the status of an innovative power.
Undoubtedly, investment pumping of the economy and stimulation of domestic demand played a significant compensating role in the crisis conditions of deterioration of external demand and the subsequent reduction in the country's foreign trade volume in 2009.
First, however, it is hardly necessary to absolutize these measures. They gave an impetus to the subsequent unwinding of the inflation spiral, which for the PRC is traditionally one of the leading factors of increasing social tension. This is exactly the picture we are seeing in 2011. Secondly, the objective need for China to increase the share of final consumption in GDP is both a long-term and difficult task. First, Beijing needs to reverse the current trend, when over three decades of reform policies, the ratio between retail trade volumes, on the one hand, and foreign trade and total investment in fixed assets, on the other, has almost steadily worsened. Chinese statistics allow us to trace this process in detail since 1981 (see Table 2).
As can be seen from the table above, in 1981 the volume of retail trade in the country exceeded the total volume of investments in fixed assets by 2.44 times. Perhaps this particular year, when China was insisting on a strict adjustment of the proportions of the national economy, which meant that investment was curbed in every possible way, is a special case. However, in general, in the 1980s, the ratio of the two indicators was kept at a rational level - in 1989-1990. It was 1.84. The transition of the economy to a market-based approach reduced the advantage of retail trade over investment to 1.09 in 1993-1994. Nevertheless, up to and including 2002, this preponderance still remained. With the rise to power of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao team, a qualitative shift is taking place. Since 2003, the volume of retail trade in China has consistently remained less than the volume of investment, and the steady decline in their ratio was not stopped even by the global economic crisis: 0.66 in 2008, 0.59 in 2009, and 0.56 in 2010.
This table also allows you to trace the ratio of foreign trade and retail trade, foreign trade and investment. The dynamics of these indicators illustrate the change in growth factors in China better than any lengthy verbal reasoning. For the sake of brevity, we will mention only a few important points.
In the period 1978-1993, the volume of foreign trade consistently lagged behind the volume of retail trade, although the gap gradually narrowed: 0.23 in 1978, 0.31 in 1981, and 0.83 in 1992. In the period 1994-2002, the "rivalry" is going on with varying success, with very close yuan values of foreign and retail trade volumes. Since 2003, foreign trade has been lagging behind, which remains to this day. The ratio of the two indicators, which peaked in 2006-2007 (1.78), falls to 1.14 in 2009, but rises again to 1.22 in 2010.
Finally, on the ratio of foreign trade and investment. It grew almost steadily in the 1980s (minimum-0.60, maximum-0.94). In the period 1990-2008, with the exception of two years, the volume of foreign trade in the PRC consistently exceeded the volume of investment. At the same time, after the maximum (1.35) reached in 2004, the size of the excess steadily decreased - to 1.04 in 2008 and in 2009-2010. the volume of investment exceeded the volume of foreign trade. At the same time, we emphasize once again that this does not give grounds to extrapolate this trend for the foreseeable future. This is also because even with a positive assessment of the current investment model of development in China, the volume of investment, and especially the share of savings in the use of GDP, seems abnormally high.
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Table 2
Ratio of foreign trade, retail trade and investment in fixed assets in China in 1981-2010, billion rubles RMB
Year
Foreign trade volume
Retail trade volume
Investments in fixed Assets
1:2
1:3
2:3
1981
73.5
235.0
96.1
0.31
0.76
2.44
1982
77.1
257.0
123.0
0.30
0.63
2.09
1983
86.0
284.9
143.0
0.30
0.60
1.99
1984
120.1
337.6
183.3
0.35
0.65
1.84
1985
206.7
430.5
254.3
0.48
0.81
1.69
1986
258.0
495.0
312.0
0.52
0.82
1.59
1987
308.4
582.0
379.2
0.53
0.81
1.54
1988
382.2
744.0
475.4
0.51
0.80
1.56
1989
415.6
810.0
441.0
0.51
0.94
1.84
1990
556.0
830.0
451.7
0.67
1.23
1.84
1991
722.6
941.5
559.4
0.77
1.29
1.68
1992
912.0
1099.4
808.0
0.83
1.13
1.36
1993
1127.1
1427.0
1307.2
0.79
0.86
1.09
1994
2038.2
1862.3
1704.2
1.09
1.20
1.09
1995
2345.0
2361.4
2001.9
0.99
1.17
1.18
1996
2413.4
2836.0
2291.3
0.85
1.05
1.24
1997
2696.7
3125.3
2494.1
0.86
1.08
1.25
1998
2685.0
3337.8
2840.6
0.80
0.95
1.18
1999
2989.0
3564.8
2985.5
0.84
1.00
1.19
2000
3927.3
3910.6
3291.8
1.004
1.19
1.19
2001
4218.4
4305.5
3721.4
0.98
1.13
1.16
2002
5137.8
4813.6
4350.0
1.07
1.18
1.11
2003
7048.3
5251.6
5556.7
1.34
1.27
0.95
2004
9553.9
5950.1
7047.7
1.60
1.35
0.84
2005
11 692.2
6835.3
8877.4
1.71
1.32
0.77
2006
14 097.1
7914.5
10 999.8
1.78
1.28
0.72
2007
16 674.0
9357.2
13 732.4
1.78
1.21
0.68
2008
17 992.1
11483.0
17 282.8
1.57
1.04
0.66
2009
15 064.8
13 267.8
22 459.9
1.14
0.67
0.59
2010
19 568.7
15 699.8
27 814.0
1.22
0.70
0.56
Compiled and calculated on the basis of the following data: [Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2011 (Brief Statistics of China-2011). Beijing, 2011, pp. 51, 65, 160].
And one last thing. The authors left out the question of the quality of economic growth in China. Meanwhile, the high-speed rail disaster in Eastern China on July 23, 2011 sadly confirmed the correctness of those who warned Beijing about the possibility of severe retribution for the " pursuit of precocious success." And not only for the high speeds on the railway, but also, very likely, for the abnormally high rates of economic growth in general.
I agree with A. I. Salitsky and V. V. Tatsi that the former "mainstream" - Europe and the USA-to some extent loses the role of a model, a reference point of the economic ecumene. However, I am afraid that China, Asia, and the BRICS countries are clearly not up to this role yet. In this sense, the world is threatened (or smiles-as you like) not so much smena mainst-
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so much for sliding into a" mainstream-free " state, characterized by the lack of generally accepted guidelines, recipes, and development models.
list of literature
Guriev S., Tsyvinsky O. Concerns about the Chinese economy are exaggerated. http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1351971 /probema_ne_v_kitae
Prong F. Raw materials are not a curse. On the development of the world economy in the medium term. Znanie - sila. 2010. N 10. pp. 48-51.
Nadorshin E. Russia: in search of a quiet harbor // Moscow news. 16.08.2011.
Shamina O. Locomotives slow down. Problems in Germany and China force us to revise our economic forecasts / / Moskovskie Novosti. 19.08.2011.
I. R. Tomberg (IB RAS). A SPLIT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. The article by A. Salitsky and V. Tatsiia is a clear and well-founded statement of the grandiose changes in the world economy that became apparent after the" global " financial crisis of 2008-2009.
The Chinese factor can now be attributed without any stretch to the structure-forming elements of globalization, which is quite natural, if we take into account the arguments given by the authors of the article, as well as some other circumstances of modern life. Take world trade, for example. If we exclude trade within the EU (consisting of 27 countries) from the global indicator, the EU remained the world's leading exporter in 2010 (15% of the global total), and China was firmly established in second place (13.3%).
However, many researchers believe that even these impressive figures do not fully reflect the real weight of the PRC in world trade. The fact is that a significant part of the products produced in China enters the foreign market through the channels of cross-border and shuttle trade without full registration by customs authorities.
Recognizing the role of China as one of the strongest players in the modern world, it is important to understand that not all of China's success can be attributed to cheap labor. The events of the crisis have clearly shown that it is not just about prices and the undervalued exchange rate. During the crisis of 2009, China's exports fell less deeply than those of other Asian countries, while the yuan's exchange rate remained stable against the US dollar and competitors ' exchange rates significantly declined. Here, a fundamentally different fact is fully reflected: the presence of a comprehensive industrial system in the PRC that allows successful localization of export production.
In addition, the contribution of internal factors to economic growth is constantly increasing. This contribution increased from 76.9% in 2005 to 92.1%, i.e., increased by 15.2%.
These facts are, as the authors of the article rightly point out, the key point for understanding the current and upcoming changes in the world economy, as well as the theories that explain these changes.
First, about the theories. The article under discussion could be called something else. For example: "Western theories and Chinese practice". The very fact of the emergence and continuing strengthening of the industrial system within a single national economy with a potentially colossal internal market shows the limitations of the theory of comparative advantages and the later construction of "integration into the value chains of TNCs". Statistical data show the opposite phenomenon: the growing growth in the zero years in China's foreign trade of the share of products produced entirely on the territory of this country.
The strategy of increasing the share of value added in the territory of the PRC has been consistently implemented for a long time: the ratio between the value of exports and imports in the toll-free segment of foreign trade is gradually increasing (from 1.2 in 1994 to almost 1.8 in 2010). At the same time, during the 11th five-year plan (2006-2010), the share of the segment size decreased from 48.6% to 38.9%, which is in line with the mentioned strategy [http://stats.gov.cn/tjfx/ztfx/sywcj/t20110302_402706681.htm].
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China's dependence on foreign capital is also decreasing. The growth of average annual FDI inflows in 2006-2010 (11.9%) and an impressive total of $ 426 billion. [ ibid.] - do not change the overall picture of the decline in the share of FDI in total investment-to approximately 2-3% by the end of the period from 4-6% at its beginning. At the same time, the share of FDI directed to the central and western regions of the country and the service sector is growing. The volume of foreign investment in one enterprise has significantly increased.
In connection with these facts, another theory is also not entirely correct, which is actually the basis for financial globalization, which began in the West. This approach provides for the formation of a single global financial market controlled by Western Powers and effectively distributing factors of production on a global scale. From the control center of this market can come destructive impulses for entire countries, substandard financial products or simply orders to block the accounts of unwanted rulers, companies or banks. Again, the Chinese financial system remains independent of such actions and, thanks to the accumulated resources, is in turn able to play an independent and large game in the international credit and foreign exchange markets.
China's economy is exporting growing amounts of capital (and this is qualitatively different from the Western one-this is a very important idea of the authors of the article), which significantly changes the picture of relations between national and foreign capital within the PRC itself, as well as in the world economy as a whole. Shifts within China's rapidly changing and fragile economy are proving to be more powerful drivers of globalization than the sluggish recovery in developed countries.
Therefore, the authors of the article are right to raise the question of possible regionalization of the world economy (and, let's add, finance). In another way, such a scenario could be described as fragmentation of the world economy, which, naturally, will require a radical revision of a number of postulates about its ever-growing unity. The expanding space of other countries ' national economies, which are increasingly closely linked to China, significantly modifies the usual models of North-South or East-West relations.
In practical terms, the "split world economy scenario" requires governments and businesses to develop strategies for interacting with the Chinese industrial system. Its existence and strengthening can lead to strengthening and integration into the Chinese economy and attempts to protect the start of modernization or reindustrialization from it. Both will objectively increase the demand for conventional fuel, which is generally to the benefit of Russia.
It should be noted that in a difficult year for world trade in 2009, the People's Republic of China greatly helped out fuel exporters. In value terms, imports decreased by 27% (amounting to $ 124 billion, or 12.3% of the country's imports) against a 44% reduction in imports to the United States ($279 billion). USD, or 17.5% of imports) [International Trade Statistics 2010. Geneva: WTO, 2010, p. 56]. During the crisis, China has become, in fact, the only driver of hydrocarbon demand, making an important contribution to ensuring stability in the oil and gas markets. Data on oil consumption and purchases from the PRC are beginning to have an increasing impact not only on prices, but also on the future structure of the global energy market, stimulating a more intensive search for substitutes, energy conservation, etc. (tab. 1) it was largely influenced by the Chinese factor.
Similarly, China's monetary policy is affecting global markets against the backdrop of the country's growing economic power. In October 2010, the NBK's announcement to raise interest rates on loans and deposits triggered a correction in financial markets for the first time in history. In the future, similar measures had an impact on the prices of gold, copper, Brent and Light Sweet quotes.
It is obvious that the Chinese economy is coping quite successfully with the increase in dollar prices for imported raw materials, as well as the rapid growth of domestic prices and tariffs. Less dependence on imported fuel than in the old world centers (USA, EU,
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Table 1
Change in world prices for some commodities (2005 prices = 100)
Year / Commodities
2000
2005
2007
2008
2009
2010
Iron Ore
44
100
130
216
155
257
Aluminum
82
100
139
136
88
110
Copper
49
100
194
189
141
191
Natural Rubber
46
100
153
174
126
237
Wheat
78
100
167
214
147
116
Rice
71
100
116
243
205
166
Cotton
107
100
115
124
114
163
Coffee
76
100
129
150
132
153
Oil
53
100
133
182
116
147
Natural gas
60
100
117
174
110
112
Coal
53
100
138
266
149
206
Other commodities
59
100
135
172
119
144
Sources: International Trade Statistics 2010. Geneva: WTO, 2010, p. 234.
Japan), is another important factor in the sustainability of the economy of this country. The intensification and servisization of the Chinese economy that has begun, the absence of hypertrophy in the financial sector, and large debts from the state and private sector mean that a favorable development outlook is certain.
I would like to emphasize once again that the benefits of further strengthening of China will be distributed in proportion to the ability of partners to build adequate strategies at the government, corporate and regional levels, their coordination, etc.
Therefore, the article by A. Salitsky and V. Tatsii is a good invitation not only to discussions, but also to the modernization of studies of the East, which is taking a leading place in the world economy.
O. N. Borokh (IDV RAS). CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE FUTURE OF ECONOMICS. The successful development of the Chinese economy in the context of the 2008 global financial crisis has led many researchers to pay more attention to the Chinese development experience and the possibility of its generalization in the form of a "model" suitable for use in other countries. Understanding the Chinese path as a challenge to established Western economic views leads to the question of whether the practice of reforms in the PRC can become the basis for the formation of a new generally valid economic theory. The desire of experts to put the blame for the problems of Western economies on miscalculations in the field of science and ideology raises expectations of the emergence of some external alternative. At the same time, the prospect of a steady increase in China's power and influence encourages us to look for new approaches to assessing the situation in the global economy through the prism of the Chinese experience.
Reassessment of what is happening in the world economy based on Chinese material requires paying closer attention to the current level of development of economic science in the PRC and to the ongoing socio-economic discussions within the country. If in the future China does indeed become the source of a new economic theory that surpasses the prevailing Western approaches, it is unlikely that it can arise outside of the context of the development of Chinese economic thought. Therefore, the seeds of such a theory can be found in the current economic science of the PRC.
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Critical discussion of Western theories and practical recommendations is ongoing in China. In particular, the problem of evaluating Western neoliberalism played an important role in Chinese discussions of the early 2000s devoted to understanding the shortcomings of the reform policy of the 1990s. The last decade of the twentieth century was a period of successful economic growth based on the development of the market mechanism, increased participation in global economic relations, the growth of the private economy and the restriction of state monopolism. At the same time, in the 1990s, market efficiency was placed above social justice, which gave reason to reproach Chinese reform economists for promoting the policy of "neoliberalism". The participants of the discussion stated that the postulates about the omnipotence of the market and private property, which deny the positive role of the state in the economy and allow excessive dependence on foreign investment, are unacceptable.
Criticism of the mainstream (zhulu) in Chinese economics was directed against economic liberalism and radical changes in the economic system. Representatives of the" non-mainstream " movement (Feizhuliu pai), along with the "new left" movement, argued that the reformers followed a liberal economic course, forgetting to protect the interests of "weak groups" in Chinese society. Against the background of the change in the country's leadership in the early 2000s, Chinese researchers, at the direction of the authorities, began to critically study neoliberalism as a dangerous trend that expresses the interests of foreign monopolistic capital. A specially created research group of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences concluded that modern neoliberalism opposes Keynesianism and acts as an ideological and theoretical expression of "the demand for the transformation of state-monopoly capitalism into international monopoly capitalism."
It is noteworthy that Keynesianism, rather than official Marxism, was named as an opponent of Neoliberalism. Keynesianism had a significant impact on the formation of Chinese economics during the republican period, and scientists continued to argue about its applicability in the PRC even in the second half of the 1950s. This ideological resource is still present in the Chinese economic debate today. In particular, when Chinese economists turned to studying the causes of the global crisis in 2008, much attention was paid to the current significance of the ideas of Karl Marx and J. M. Keynes. The researchers emphasized that Marxism proved its validity in explaining the causes of the crisis of the capitalist economy, but the recommendation to destroy private property is not acceptable. At the same time, modern Western economic science has been unable to identify the causes of the crisis, but its specific recommendations may well be used to mitigate its negative consequences and restore the economy.
China has successfully passed through the crisis, which is recognized by experts around the world. State intervention in the economy and recovery from the crisis with the help of cash injections are not a unique Chinese invention. At the same time, in China, the application of Keynesian recipes was very effective, which made it possible to avoid a slowdown in economic growth due to a decline in export supplies. On this basis, the proponents of the" Chinese model " were able to claim that success was achieved due to the rapid concentration of efforts and resources in the interests of implementing anti-crisis policies. In this case, the key positive features of the" Chinese model " are the CCP's one-party power, the dominant position of the state economy, the rejection of broad privatization of state property, the guiding role of the government's economic construction plan, and the use of the stimulating role of the market for the development of productive forces. In this context, we can say not only that in China the activity of the "superstructure "is subordinated to the task of developing the productive forces, but also about the high degree of subordination of economic life to the command functions of this"superstructure".
However, Chinese opponents of attempts to generalize the existing experience as a "model" suitable for borrowing by other countries point out that in an enhanced sense, the Chinese government is not ready to use it.
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The authorities ' control over the entire socio-economic system of the country is nothing fundamentally new. Bureaucracy hinders the development of entrepreneurship, state-owned enterprises monopolize markets and leave no room for private business. Some critics of the" Chinese model "attribute the country's economic success to the fact that the reforms still followed the prescriptions of the "Washington consensus". According to Yao Yang of the Chinese Center for Economic Research at Peking University, the achievements of the PRC demonstrate the victory of neoclassical economics, and therefore the "Chinese model" is devoid of its own content.
Many Chinese researchers disagree with Yao Yang, but their dispute shows how complex and multifaceted the experience of China's economic development is, if such different interpretations can be applied to it. At the slogan level, Chinese reformers rejected Western ideas of privatizing state-owned enterprises and liberalizing trade, but many concrete actions pushed China in this direction. Propaganda criticism of the "Washington consensus" did not become an obstacle to borrowing its individual requirements - strengthening financial discipline, reducing the budget deficit, reducing inflation, and stabilizing the macroeconomic situation. Professional Chinese economists belonging to the mainstream do not call for a complete rejection of the" Washington consensus", but for its updating and addition.
The theme of the "Chinese model" is popular among experts, but it is not one of the official slogans of the Chinese authorities. In the spring of 2011, a foreign correspondent asked Premier Wen Jiabao what other countries might learn from China's development model. He replied: "Our reform and construction are still in the search process, we have never considered that our own development is a model." In such matters, the Chinese leadership prefers a cautious and restrained approach.
The long-term consequences of the authorities ' anti-crisis policies are also worrying for Chinese economists. Investment pumping led to a surge in inflation (6.4% in the first half of 2011). An important place in the polemical speeches of Chinese economists in 2011 was occupied by refuting the prediction of a "hard landing" of the economy that appeared abroad after the effect of anti-crisis measures was exhausted. This forecast was made by N. Roubini, a professor at New York University, who suggested that by 2013 the probability of serious problems in the Chinese economy will increase significantly. Since Roubini was able to predict the emergence of the global crisis in 2008, his assessment attracted increased attention in China. Chinese economists have begun discussing the possible prospect of a "hard landing", and their active reaction indicates concern about this.
In response to increased state intervention in the economy, researchers raise the question of when and under what conditions the state should withdraw financial support for the economy. During the crisis, the development of the Chinese economy returned to its previous model of accelerated growth, supported by a large amount of cheap investments. Chinese researchers are concerned that the policy of increasing investment instead of increasing consumption may lead to the creation of excess capacity. Wu Jinglian, a prominent Chinese economist, noted that the short-term success of the anti-crisis policy has strengthened confidence that the use of administrative measures in the economy is a special political advantage of China. However, Chinese officials are used to bossing the economy around, and increased government intervention may be a long-term trend that will harm the country's economy.
The "Chinese model" is multi-faceted, and it is extremely difficult not only for foreigners, but also for Chinese authors to distinguish the only main feature at the expense of other components of economic policy, otherwise they themselves would not have missed the opportunity to create a brief and capacious description of it. For example," expanding demand " is a positive official economic slogan in China. The same applies to participation in globalization, creating a favorable investment climate, and striving for "innovative development".-
page 97
innovative breakthroughs". Their generalized characterization as secondary borrowings from Western economic practice may hinder a holistic and comprehensive perception of Chinese reforms, which is important for identifying China's potential contribution to the development of world economic science.
Is it possible to find in the PRC a complete theoretical justification for a new development model that is alternative to Western recipes? At the level of political slogans, there is an official concept of "specifically Chinese socialism", but its name implies the lack of universality that the "model"should have. The well-known formulation of the "Beijing Consensus", which was proposed by the American journalist J. K. Ramo, has not gained scientific and theoretical content.
The materials of the propaganda campaigns of 2009-2010 aimed at the domestic Chinese audience were listed, which is completely unacceptable at the current stage of China's development. In ideology, anti - Marxism, pluralism of leadership ideas, and democratic socialism appeared on the other side of the forbidden line; in economics, privatization or a return to total domination of public property; in politics, the separation of three powers and competitive multiparty system. During the crisis, Chinese authors have repeatedly pointed out how quickly and effectively problems can be solved without cross-party disputes. Some foreign experts are ready to share this thesis. In particular, the well-known American futurist J. R. R. Tolkien, who is currently working in the People's Republic of China. Naisbitt concluded that the CCP's one-party government is capable of implementing a long-term development strategy, whereas in the West, the goals are short-term and interrupted by the electoral cycle.
Chinese intellectuals note that foreign praise of the "Chinese model" is often superficial and one-sided. Tsinghua University professor Qin Hui pointed out that the Western right likes the low level of social obligations of the state in China, while the left is impressed by the practice of restricting economic freedom. Different forces "sing in unison", praising the "Chinese model", but they will not be able to borrow it, even if they really want to. According to Qin Hui, for the right, the lack of a social state in China confirms the validity of economic liberalism, while for the left, the lack of economic freedom indicates the importance of social support for citizens. However, the simultaneous restriction of both social obligations and economic freedoms is unacceptable for Western authors, and therefore the implementation of such a scenario in the West is possible only if the democratic system is abandoned.
The assessment of China's future theoretical contribution to the rethinking of the world economy should take into account the current reality of the parallel existence in the PRC of a set of economic slogans of "specifically Chinese socialism" and professional economic science. The problem is that slogans that point to successful economic policies cannot become part of the world economic science, while the research of Chinese economists closely related to Western economic theory has not yet led to the creation of their own school with global influence. At the beginning of the reforms, Chinese economic science was faced with the challenges of rethinking the centralized planning model based on Marxism and mastering modern Western theory. In the 1990s, both problems were solved, and criticism of Soviet political economy and centralized planned economy lost its relevance. In the 2000s, the fascination with theoretical problems of the transition economy gave way to the study of development economics with the involvement of modern foreign concepts.
Chinese authors often reproach Western neoclassical theory for its inability to adequately describe Chinese reforms. For example, Tsai Fan, Director of the Institute of Population and Labor Economics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, notes that the prevailing theory of growth cannot explain the effectiveness of the development of a dualistic economy with Chinese characteristics. It is impossible to deduce a specific target model of Chinese reform from the theory of the transition economy. The mechanical application to
page 98
China, which is in transition, needs a Western interpretation of the macro-control policy. Mainstream Chinese researchers criticize modern economic theory, but they do not reject this scientific paradigm. Doubts about modern economics as such are the lot of non-mainstream economic publicists, who tend to explain the popularity of liberal concepts by the machinations of international capital and foreign special services.
For more than a decade, Chinese economists have been discussing the prospects for strengthening the global position of Chinese economics and its possible contribution to the development of world economic thought. China's rapid development and growing influence in the global economy are constantly fueling these expectations. Scientists would like to create a theory that corresponds to the reality and cultural specifics of China. They think not only about making a contribution to science, but also about the possibility of providing their country with a "voice" in world economic science, in order to increase China's influence on global processes in the interests of creating a new and favorable international economic and political order.
In the post-crisis period, Chinese economists argue about whether the national development model is universal or specific, how to combine the borrowing of foreign theories and their own experience in Chinese economic thought, and what should be the framework for state intervention in the economy. The history of discussion of these issues in China is not limited to the few years that have passed since the crisis, nor to several decades of reforms.
Disputes about the role of the state in the economy, the free market, and the space for private initiative developed in China as early as the 1920s and 1930s. In the early 1930s, most researchers showed interest in the planned economy of the USSR and the "controlled economy" of Germany, where high growth rates were ensured. However, during the war years, interest in borrowing the mechanisms of state management of the economy began to decline, and Chinese economists increasingly expressed support for the development of a private economy in conditions of free competition, focusing on the American model. Although in 1949 the country embarked on a path of copying the Soviet centralized economy, the dispute over the relationship between liberalism and state intervention was not completely resolved. The simplified characterization of the current Chinese proponents of reducing the role of the state in the economy as representatives of the views of modern Western neoliberalism makes it difficult to assess the historical depth of the discussion of this topic in China.
References to Russian economists of the past, whose views were rejected by the Soviet official ideology, have become commonplace in modern Russian scientific literature. In particular, the authors of the article refer to Kondratiev's ideas in one of the notes. It should be noted that Russian economic science before 1917, as the historian of economic thought N. Makasheva describes it, was a science of a "pre-paradigm type, which methodologists often call immature." In China, before the 1949 revolution, a scientific economic community was formed, which in the 1920s and 1940s, in the course of intensive contacts with the West, managed to join the marginalist revolution and Keynesian ideas. Reference to the intellectual heritage helps to better understand the problems of our time, so when discussing the possible contribution of China to economic theory, it is very appropriate to refer to the ideas of republican economists who discussed the current problems of development, state intervention and the degree of openness of the economy in the first half of the XX century.
An important research topic covered in the article is the impact of cultural tradition and national psychology on modern and future Chinese economic science. In particular, Chinese researchers also discuss the contribution of specific features of the peasant worldview to the success of the reform. However, the chances that this mentality will become China's contribution to the ecological consciousness of mankind do not seem very high due to the rapid urbanization of Chinese society. The authors 'proposed characterization of" small welfare " (xiaokang) as " habits
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The Chinese approach to a reasonable limitation of labor costs and needs" should be supplemented with a reference to the status of this concept in the system of official program slogans. The Chinese authorities have turned the slogan of building a "small welfare society" (Xiaokang shehui) into a target for the growth of material wealth, tied to an increase in GDP. In addition, self-restraint is not the only and key aspect of the influence of the Chinese tradition on modernity; it is also necessary to take into account Confucian ideas about the relationship between profit and morality, the role of the state in economic life, and the relationship between the welfare of the upper and lower classes. The pre-Qin Confucians considered not only an excessive desire for luxury, but also an ascetic refusal to consume, which undermines economic life. The Chinese authorities now point out that" people's welfare " (minsheng) is more important than economic growth. This reminds us not only of the legacy of the founder of the Republic of China, Sun Yat-sen, who formulated the cornerstone " three people's principles "(nationalism, democracy and people's welfare), but also of the Confucian concern of the ruler for the material side of the life of his subjects in order to maintain stability and harmony in the state.
Chinese researchers warn that an overly high assessment of their own success can lead the country to complacency and isolation, which will eventually slow down the necessary transformations. Nationalist sentiments create a desire for self-isolation and confidence in the superiority of the Chinese development path. There is a sense that China has nothing more to learn from the West, which is struggling to cope with economic difficulties. China has no other foreign example, such as the USSR served in the past. In this situation, there is a tendency to turn away from the outside world, because one's own path seems successful, and continuing reforms seems unnecessary.
In 1995, the Chinese economist Lin Yifu (then head of the Chinese Center for Economic Research at Peking University, and now holds the position of vice-president of the World Bank) pointed out the connection between the country's economic development and the progress of economic science - after all, the Chinese proverb says that "in a tower located near water, the moon is visible earlier". He wrote that economics was born at the end of the 18th century in Great Britain, which retained its global economic leadership until the 1930s. During this period, the most famous economists were English or worked in England, because they were in the most favorable conditions. Then the United States became the center of global economic development, where the main research organizations moved and the most prominent scientists and economists moved. Now China is claiming the role of the world's largest economy, which will not only strengthen its influence on the course of global economic development, but also create conditions for turning the country into a center for the development of economic science.
Lin Yifu's historical analogy cannot serve as proof of the inevitable leadership of Chinese economics. A place in the "tower by the water", i.e. living in the center of global economic growth, is not a guarantee for Chinese economists that they will be at the forefront of the development of world economic science. Western researchers contribute to updating the theory, and the weight of their conclusions is reinforced by the greater influence and "discursive hegemony" of the West, corporate cohesion, and the benefits of professional training. There is no reason to say that Western science has stopped, having lost the ability to respond to the challenges of the crisis and to comprehend changes in the global economy. At the same time, these efforts can no longer claim to be complete and self-sufficient without taking into account the experience of China's economic development and the scientific research of Chinese economists.
N. A. Kosolapov (IMEMO RAS). OVERESTIMATION-NO DOUBT. WHAT AND IN WHAT DIRECTIONS? The lack of a clear statement of the problem in the article under discussion (this is not a criticism, but only a statement of fact, and in this case, the publication's dignity, which gives it a good scientific provocation) allows not only to agree or argue with the authors, but also to express their own thoughts that arise in association with the problem.-
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The article focuses on the success of the Chinese model against the background of the global financial (and not only) crisis.
What exactly is subject to reassessment in the light of the global economic experience of the last 30-20 years (counting from the collapse of the USSR 6 or from the beginning of the new century)? Of course, not ratings: they are purely technical tools, just a method of attributed values. What matters is what is measured and for what purposes; and whether we measure in inches, centimeters, or parrots is a big deal.
Apparently, not the role of the state in the economy: the more developed the state, the more significant its role is not only on a national but also on an international scale; and its optimal content and forms depend on specific circumstances, their dynamics and on the strategic goals of the state (if any) and cannot be expressed by any a priori formula. The slogan "Less state!" is akin to Perestroika's " More socialism!" - the same degree of populism and semantic ambiguity that give the desired political freedom of hands.
It is hardly advisable to focus on another debunking of the (neo -) liberal economic concept: its social, moral and environmental inferiority has long been convincingly shown in practice, described and argued in science. The fact that this ideology of social Darwinism (which is nothing else) continues to be considered the "mainstream" of the world economy and political globalization is due not only to the power of the interests behind it, but also to the fact that (neo -) liberalism is the political and ideological foundation of the US claim to " global leadership "(which has long been included in the deepest contradiction with the practice of this leadership, which relies primarily on the resources, capabilities and measures of the state). A similar function was performed by the concept of a centrally planned economy in the former USSR, which he extrapolated to the countries of social friendship.
Something else is more interesting. Comparing the "mainstream" and the Chinese model, the authors of the article actually fix the ideological nature of each of these two concepts and corresponding systems. The former and the latter are not only ontogenetically related by mutual negation, but also de facto complement each other. (Neoliberalism is increasingly relying on financial and military support from the state (which ideologically speaking should not be). The Chinese model remains socialist in its declared goals and state-centered in its means and methods of achieving them, although over the past 30 years it has undergone considerable pragmatization towards the market both within the country and in terms of China's inclusion in world markets - a phenomenon that was completely absent in the former USSR.
Both of these models, each in its own way, prove that the economic system of modern and contemporary times cannot but be ideological in origin. Since the spontaneous course of life and management began to be more and more corrected and directed by man - and this happened at the level of social systems (i.e., not only individuals, families, individual groups and clans, city-states) with the emergence of capitalism, the goals and content of such influences are determined not only by the interests of a person (whatever they may consist of), but also by his ideas about good and evil, law and justice, his vision of the future, i.e. values and norms of a moral and ideological order.7 And before the phase of the political and economic cycle begins, in which a person is forced to understand what kind of life and why he has created for himself (namely
6 Below, it will become clear why we think about this in a seemingly inappropriate context.
7 A convincing "proof to the contrary" is provided by modern Russian reality - the absence of any ideology (and the moral principle inherent in it) does not allow the society and the elite to legitimize property and its disposal convincingly - as many politicians and deputies say at all levels of business. The consequence is not only massive disrespect and violations of property rights, but also the absence of any moral barriers to corruption and raiding, which corrupts the state, the economy and society as a whole. Moreover, over time, such a moral practice gradually acquires ideological (and by no means liberal) functions and consequences.
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the world has been experiencing this phase since the early 2000s), actual consciousness forms being - and it can do this exclusively on this basis. Therefore, every economic system is based on a moral and ideological system (another question is how developed and to what extent it is realized in this capacity). Let's talk about the "ideology-economy" link.
1
I have long been very close to the central idea of the authors of the article about the theoretical insufficiency of modern social knowledge.8 I have also expressed it in various ways and at different times. Moreover, "insufficiency", in my opinion, is a very soft wording. I would venture to speak of failure, but dividing social knowledge according to a well-known formula into three layers (or levels, as they wrote in the middle of the XX century): applied, instrumental, which does not pretend to theoretical constructions (political technologies, surveys, descriptive and comparative works, etc.); ideological, which creates macrosocial and macrohistorical constructs both those claiming to be universal scientific fundamentality (liberalism, Marxism, as well as a number of" isms " of smaller scale and significance); and intermediate (middle-level theories), trying to reconcile certain ideological concepts with wayward and violent empiricism.
The assessment of "theoretical failure" refers, in my understanding, to the ideological level; it is not applicable to the applied level ("more theory" would not hurt him, but it is not his task to create such theories); and it is relatively applicable to the average (the more pronounced the ideological foundations in a particular theory of this class, the less likely it is to succeed its scientific value). Why am I so hard on ideological concepts? - There are three interrelated reasons for this: the nature of ideology as a phenomenon; the cognitive nature of ideological concepts; and the nature of the terminology they use.
The debate about ideology as a phenomenon has been going on for more than two centuries. There are several hundred definitions of an ideology, depending on whether it is seen as a destructive or at least partially positive factor. Without entering into a discussion that is still far from completion and taking into account the limited volume of the article, I will venture to offer a definition: ideology is(i) a historically determined system of moral and socio-political provisions and ideas, (ii) reflecting the level of emotional experience, as well as understanding of spiritual and practical problems of the period of its origin, (iii) "covering" the perceived sphere of the unknown by normative postulates, (iv) in this state and quality accepted by a socially significant part of society, (v) acting as the moral, logical and psychological basis for this part of its political and/or social behavior, (vi) in the case of the coming of carriers of this ideology to power, it becomes the basis of macrosocial governance and / or missionaries 9. The main thing here is that for socially significant questions that do not have an answer today or cannot have such an answer in principle, ideology offers a certain set or complex of postulates. Then it's up to us whether to accept them or not.
Special attention should be paid to the fact that the central tenets of ideology have always been of a moral nature. Ideology teaches how it should be done; and it should be done this way, and not otherwise, because the proposed answer follows from ideas about justice, law, and freedom (it is clear that the content of such ideas may differ significantly in different epochs, among different social forces, and in different circumstances). A new belief, ideological concept, or postulate is accepted, as experience shows, when a number of necessary and sufficient conditions coincide: (a) when life in the existing conditions is not limited.
8. Salitsky A. I. O teoreticheskoi nedostatnosti sovremennogo sotsial'nogo znaniya [On the theoretical insufficiency of modern social knowledge].
9 Readers interested in the problem of ideology will easily see the origins of the proposed definition; its detailed justification requires, of course, a separate article. I will only note that within the framework of the proposed definition, religion is nothing more than a historically early form of the phenomenon of ideology.
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her life becomes morally and psychologically unbearable (financially-practically, quite possibly, while remaining tolerant, even quite good); (b) when the problems that make it unbearable are postulated (exactly so!)to be true. some fundamentally new content, not always "correct", but morally and psychologically attractive answer; and (c) this answer is expressed in a language that is emotionally accessible (but not necessarily logically understandable!) a socially and / or politically significant part of society.
The latter means that a significant part of any ideology and socio-political ideas derived from it inevitably turn out to be expressed in terms and concepts that have emerged under the influence of the most acute need of society and/or some part of it for psychological compensation. And since we are dealing with ideologies whose age has been measured for centuries, the conditions under which they emerged in the past have now changed significantly. These are not terms in the modern scientific sense of the word, but "Yaroslavna's lament".
Once accepted, a new ideological postulate or concept for its time objectively turns into a social hypothesis (not necessarily scientific, but certainly social), and an internally contradictory process begins. One of its facets is the alignment of life (economy, politics, everyday life, etc.) in greater or lesser accordance with the requirements of the accepted ideology. The other is the accumulation and comprehension of experience, comparison with the original postulates, i.e., objective verification of the latter. History shows that the more rigidly and dogmatically a new ideology is established, the faster the inevitable contradiction between it and practice arises and becomes more pronounced.
Its political and cognitive implications are ambiguous. If the facts contradict your beliefs, so much the worse for the facts. When the contradiction can no longer be silenced and/or denied, it is overcome not by correcting the ideology, but by political, ideological, often administrative, and physical pressure on researchers and interpreters of practice. Thus, to the natural, subtle, often unconscious pressure that comes from a sincere desire to arrange life in accordance with good ideals, goals and intentions, a conscious and purposeful press is added, the first objects of which are mass (including professional) consciousness and science, primarily its middle-level theories as the most associated with the sphere of the ideological.
The process of verifying an ideology can take decades or centuries, but the general scheme is exactly that. At the stage when ideology turns from a source of hope and inspiration into an encyclopedia of increasingly dubious myths, depending on the specifics of society and the current situation in it, three fundamentally different variants of the reaction of ideology and its carrier institutions to the established contradiction with life are possible: correction of individual dogmas and/or ideology as a whole; collapse of the state of ideology and its institutions, usually accompanied by socio-political upheavals; or undermining the corresponding ideology, the status and authority of its bearers, but - in case of political impossibility of change-spreading everyday, socio-political and professional (including scientific) cynicism: we think one thing, say another, do the third.
The ideology of the" mainstream " today is frantically fighting for political and practical survival. The contradictions between its tenets and economic practices at the country and transnational levels are not just obvious - they are glaring. However, like any ideology in general, (neo -) liberalism cannot accept any other model than the "free market"; and attempts to create and/or actually existing other types of models are considered as heresy or as stages of underdevelopment preceding the "free market".
This is the reverse effect of ideology on practice and on science at the stage when the contradictions between ideology and life can no longer be ignored, but also cannot be clearly explained. Theses like Western governments,
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by taking measures to regulate financial and other crises, they depart from the ideals of economic liberalism, and they are absolutely identical with the accusations of individual party leaders in the USSR that they deviate from genuine Leninism. Let us also emphasize that modern Western economic thought, and above all its most mathematically advanced schools and trends, is guided by the same model of the "free market", clarifies and develops it, without questioning this very central postulate for liberalism. Social democracy and center-left parties are debating with (neo-)liberals about the goals and forms, scope and limits of using the same model, but not about its essence.
2
The emergence of capitalism revived the contradiction that was already recognized in the writings of Aristotle and Plato: which principle is primary in social life - personal or social. In the era of early capitalism, the former was expressed in the ideas of freedom in general and the individual's right to economic independence, in particular, in fact, economic sovereignty. The second is in the ideas of the social contract, the nation-state and civil society that was born out of it. The former feudal (in modern scientific terms, hierarchical) organization of society was rejected in favor of nominally equal (network) organization. De Facto society has been atomized economically and politically on the assumption that free, politically equal units will be able to come to a reasonable agreement among themselves in the future. "Reasonable" was a key word that was embodied in the United States even in a special historical period known as the Age of reason.
It is now generally accepted that the formation of capitalism would not have taken place without overlapping ideological processes: the reformation with its rethinking of the significance of human life and activity in "this" world; political liberalism; economic liberalism derived from it, originally expressed in the ideas of political economy. The first two processes reconciled the Christian worldview with a new self-consciousness of the individual, far advanced in comparison with the times of early Christianity and even the late Middle Ages. The third proposed the coordination of Christian moral imperatives with the economic practice of modern times.
The term "political economy" appeared in France in 1615. Almost one hundred and fifty years later (1763), the first department of political economy was created at the University of Vienna. And twenty years later (1784), A. Smith's Wealth of Nations will be published. But its author is not a political economist (Malthus will become the first British professor of political economy only in 1805), but the head of the department of moral philosophy. The purpose of his works is to develop the idea of fair, moral (and not at all effective!) management in accordance with the ideas, ideas and aspirations of the era.
A follower and follower of the ideas of A. Smith is called D. Ricardo. But, being a successful financier, Ricardo turns political economy to the idea of the market as a sphere of play between the forces of supply and demand. This model, whose ideological value is linked to the ideas of individual freedom and self - realization, and whose practical value is a minimum of control over the producer (i.e., the owner of capital), becomes one of the cornerstones of the ideological myths of the West and at the same time the basis for the development of economic theories of the fundamental and average levels.
State regulation arises as a forced response to the most acute and socially and politically dangerous consequences of the game of market forces - crises, unemployment, social conflicts, revolutions. However, ideologically, it is still seen by neoliberals as evil, and the "free market" as a good and one of the highest values.
The forced emergence of state regulation of the economy and finance raised the problem of balancing key macroeconomic indicators and thus gave a powerful impetus to the development of economic theories of secondary and applied economics.
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levels. Twentieth-century economics, in its turn, stimulated the intensive development of mathematical theories that, as far as I can tell, have no other application than in the fields of mathematical modeling of economic processes. But the fact of a breakthrough of knowledge in these two areas is not in doubt.
Paradoxically, the development of economic science is accompanied by the accumulation of crisis phenomena in the real economy. In the course of the twentieth century, it was possible, by means of measures derived more from practice than from science, to introduce the production cycle of developed countries into a framework that no longer caused social upheavals and revolutions. This fact, as well as the scientific achievements noted above, supports the idea of the effectiveness of the liberal economic model. By the early 2000s, however, there were two major nodes of serious problems. Decades of state regulation have raised the problem of crises from the sphere of production and sales (supply and demand)to the sphere of finance, where such threatening phenomena and processes as the accumulation of obviously unrealistic debts and large-scale financial speculation have matured. Globalization has also emerged, posing fundamentally new challenges to financial and economic regulation.
Note that, although ideologically the theory and practice of Western economics grew out of liberalism, from a practical point of view, the phenomenon of "free market" never existed; it does not exist today, either in the world or in any country economy. The theories on which the practice of state regulation is based do not provide reliable forecasting tools (otherwise, crises would not be taken by surprise). Financial regulation is rightly recognized as an art, the success or failure of which depends crucially on the professionalism, abilities and intuition of key figures in this field.
It is difficult not to conclude that the economic theories that have gained recognition and political weight in the West and in leading international organizations are nothing more than a set of ideological dogmas, the main goal and task of which is to maintain the economic system behind them and the world order based on it. This is not a condemnation of such concepts, but a statement of their place in the corresponding system of ideas and practices: even if world religions considered it necessary to determine their attitude to property, trade, and profit (all these phenomena are associated with the category of justice, i.e., with the sphere of morality, which is key to any ideology), then modern secular ideologies cannot include economic sections. Something else is more important: what remains beyond the attention of neoliberal - and not only-middle-and fundamental-level economic theories?
3
Economic life existed before capitalism and today in dozens of countries still does not fit into the Procrustean bed of the ideological model of the "free market". It is possible to ignore, condemn, and ridicule non-Western forms of democracy as primitive and "backward"; it is possible to look down on them as not having given (and not being able to give - this is obvious) the development of the Western type; it is possible to sincerely empathize with countries and peoples that, for one reason or another, have not yet managed to enter the blessed duality of democracy and "free market". But any such attitude does not and cannot replace a scientific understanding of the laws of economics based on principles, postulates, moral and other basic axioms other than (neo)liberal ones. As well as understanding the reasons for its historical stability, its ability to reproduce itself flexibly.
The essence of the alternative model is the leading role of the government (not necessarily the state!) in the organization, maintenance, and direction of the economy. According to the criterion of the goals of the government's intervention in the economic life of its time, three historical forms can be distinguished: for the sake of self-enrichment; for the implementation of a certain religious or ideological project; and for the development of the country, strengthening its position in the world, and raising the standard of living.
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and the quality of life, solving other problems that require the use of resources and capabilities of the authorities.
In the first case, we are dealing with (pre-)feudal forms of power; in the second, with the power of the clergy, the ideological organization; in the third, with a modern, sufficiently developed state. According to the criteria of dominant social relations and the type of organization derived from them, in the first two cases, informal interpersonal and intergroup relations, as well as norms, rules and procedures ("concepts") prevail; moreover, the secular (feudal) type of power depends decisively on the presence of spiritual power institutions (in the second case, such institutions themselves are in power otherwise, the feudal organization self-exposes itself as the outright power of princes and robbers, thus undermining the foundations of its own stability. In the third case, large organizations (the leading one is the state) that operate on the basis of formal law and laws dominate.
The main thing that unites these cases is that the authorities and / or the state in all of them first withdraw some part of the wealth produced in society for their own interests and goals, and then redistribute it according to the personal and clan interests of the rulers and the elite close to them (the first type), the goals and objectives of a certain messianism (the second type) or state policy priorities (the third type). This type of economy, in contrast to the classical market economy, is legitimately called the economy of power redistribution. Power-because redistribution is achieved in it as a result of power and through its use; at the same time, power itself can have a very different nature (up to the domination of groups and individuals of criminal origin). Redistribution - because this function is not just present in the economy and society (it is also present in the market model), but dominates them, playing a system-forming role. It is not market forces that set the tone, experiencing the minimum necessary corrective influences of society and the state, but the authorities "mold" the economy in accordance with their interests and ideas, arbitrarily limiting the market's action, subordinating it to themselves, and in extreme cases prohibiting its very existence.
In the current political, ideological and scientific concepts, the model of power redistribution is opposed to the model of the "free market", but in practice any real economy is a combination of these forms, with the addition of many very significant details.10 The dogmatic approach contrasts the economic models of the United States and the former USSR, the United States and China as ideologically opposed to each other (which from an ideological point of view seems, if not indubitable, then quite reasonable).
The scientific approach, and even just a realistic one, cannot fail to see that, on the one hand, the American state and its policies-opposing the game of market forces, among which speculation and bubbles occupy a significant place-are today the main factor in the stability of the American and global economy, as shown by the recent financial crisis and the history of the credit rating downgrade US$. On the other hand, there was a limited market - officially allowed and persecuted, but economically significant shadow market - even in the extremely fundamentalist planned economy of the USSR.
10 Karl Marx's words about the "Asian mode of production" are nothing more than a recognition of the fact that two models - capitalism (free market) and socialism (planned economy) - do not exhaust the real diversity of economic life. And in the light of the success of not only China, but also a number of other Asian countries, these words do not sound at all derogatory today.
11 I am quoting these figures from memory; perhaps economists and criminologists will correct me; but for the mid-1980s. (beginning of perestroika) the average level of the shadow economy of the USSR as a whole was estimated at about 40% in relation to the official one; in some union republics, it ranged from 80 to 120% of the republic's economy.
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The modern world economy and, more broadly, the world social and political order depend on the rivalry and mutual influence of several ideological and theoretical trends. At the ideological level, this is liberalism in all its subsequent modifications and the socialist idea in its three main hypostases - communist, social-democratic and national socialist. At the middle level, these are the "market models" of (neo-)liberalism and social democrats, the power-redistributive communist, national Socialist, and, interestingly, globalist. At the applied level, this is the experience of planned economy, which is very diverse in the former and now existing social countries (Hungary, SFRY, USSR, China), but is very poorly understood theoretically; and applied economic theories that can (as the experience of China, the former GDR and SFRY shows) work quite adequately in the framework of a planned economy. By the late 1970s, China was at an interesting intersection of these trends.
The ideological level of the ideological and theoretical foundations of the world economy was set long before this milestone by liberalism and was experiencing a neoconservative renaissance at that time. Nominally, liberalism was opposed at the same level by Marxism-Leninism (not Marxism!) and the idea of a centrally planned economy, i.e., the de facto Soviet political and economic model, which in its key characteristics sharply differed from similar models of other socialist countries. Nominally , since this model did not actually enter the world liberal economy: the share of the USSR in it was minimal, its participation was deliberately restrained from within and from the outside. Ideologically, it did not push the liberal party in any way, but practically set off the latter's strengths and made it easier to obscure the weak ones. As early as the mid-1950s, its serious vices were revealed, which was recognized by the almost continuous thirty-year series of attempts to reform it in the USSR (from the sovnarkhoz to perestroika) and retreats to the point of abandoning it in most social countries. During the second half of the twentieth century, the Soviet model was increasingly compromised practically and ideologically.first of all, against this background, the (neo)liberal and (neo)conservative models were relatively strengthened 12.
The specificity of the current Chinese model, in my opinion, is not that power redistribution is combined with a large-scale and full-fledged market; but in the absence (perhaps I am wrong, but this is my impression so far) of a rigidly dogmatic, fundamentalist approach to both the former and the latter. Since 1978, China has made and consistently adheres to the choice in favor of traveling-with or without checkers. For more than half a century, the Chinese leadership has focused on the development of the country, strengthening its place and weight in the world, and not on ideological and/or military - political confrontation. This is partly possible because the former Soviet Union assumed the role of confrontation; but even after its collapse, China is not at all eager to occupy the vacant niche - on the contrary, it is making significant efforts to prevent itself from being dragged into it.
The United States, intoxicated by the "victory over communism", came to believe in its ideological correctness and slipped into fundamentalist messianism, which makes it necessary to search for new "heretics" to continue and justify the confrontation (hence the themes of "international terrorism" and "the Chinese threat"), and most importantly, dooms the United States itself, the West as a whole and its international relations. structures (from the G8 to the IMF) to tighten political, economic and ideological rigidity, which is fraught with new exacerbations of contradictions between ideology and the economy, especially at the global level. There is another reason behind these processes. The "containment of development" mentioned by A. I. Salitsky and V. V. Tatsii is not only one of the negative consequences of debt bondage and the rise in the cost of credit, but in the global world with its sharpest competition, it is also the main direction of intraspecific struggle, as well as ensuring leadership, which, if necessary, is conveniently justified by political, economic and ideological considerations.
12 From an ideological point of view, the nuances hidden behind the prefix "neo -" are insignificant for us in this case.
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The paradox is that while China directly, honestly and openly relies on the role of the state in ensuring the country's further growth, the United States-far from just bowing to the gods of liberalism and the "free market" - in practice pursues policies that objectively require the same and or will lead to an increase in the importance of the state in the future. or, in case of ideologically motivated successful attempts to limit such a role, it will result in an acute financial, economic and political crisis of global (given the weight of the United States in the world) scale and consequences.
* * *
Contrary to the recently widespread ideas about the "blurring" of the role, sovereignty, and the very institution of the state, such a fate befalls only weak, corrupt, and incapacitated states. Nevertheless, cases of success, breakthroughs, and large-scale achievements in the ideologically non-market and market parts of the modern world always turn out to be decisively related to the role of the state in them. The number, scope and significance of problems that cannot be solved on a market basis alone and require the use of means and methods of power redistribution are also increasing. But since any economy, especially a global one, is a large system with many bifurcation points and therefore unpredictable behavior, in principle there is a place for both power redistribution to implement vital or desirable macro-projects, and self-regulation on a market (network) basis. The problem lies in the optimal combination of these two approaches, in identifying patterns of their interaction, and not in choosing one and destroying the other.
The Soviet model, with its rigid rigidity reinforced by a unique set of bureaucratic interests, proved the fundamental impossibility of managing the modern economy from a single center for a historically long time. The clash of ideological dogmas with life in its conditions and under the pressure of this complex gave the effect of a turn to neo-feudalism, a return to the seemingly passed model of "power for the sake of self-enrichment". It is reasonable to assume that its ideological antithesis is also close to the final proof of the impossibility of living only in the market. The Chinese model is interesting because it breaks the "market - power redistribution" dichotomy on a practical level, successfully (so far?) gropes for an approximation to their optimal combination and thus opens the way to the possible creation of a new scientific and economic axiomatics.
Its development, however, requires a preliminary theoretical analysis of the model of the economy of power redistribution (a special case - the economy of appropriation). as a legitimate and, most importantly, really existing and significant type of political and economic organization, the significance of which will increase dramatically in the future. The theory should see, explain, and predict the dynamics of not ideal models, be it the market or the administrative system, but the real complexity of interaction between the former and the latter, including the informal and shadowy facets of this complexity.
It is hardly possible to completely de-ideologize the practice in the foreseeable future. But a theory, including an economic one, will be sound only if it is aware of the fact and extent of its ideologization, shows options for alternative basic (ideological) axioms and their consequences for theory and practice; and, most importantly, develops clear criteria for determining the range of tasks solved by each theoretical approach.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to A. I. Salitsky and V. V. Tatsii for finding the words and form that opened up an opportunity for discussion on these long-overdue issues.
(The ending follows)
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